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CHAPTER 16 
Constitutional Law 
JOHN D. O'REILLY, JR. 
§16.1. Religion and the state. Prayer in public schools again be-
came a controversial matter in the courts of the Commonwealth when 
a school committee adopted a resolution permitting the opening of 
its public school classrooms five minutes before commencement of 
classes to teachers and pupils who wished, but were not required, to 
participate in informal prayer or other activity "in the free exercise of 
religion." The form of the permissible prayer or other activity was not 
prescribed by the school committee. The practice seemingly was 
authorized by a Massachusetts statute that provided: "The school com-
mittee of any city or town may permit any child attending its public 
schools to participate in voluntary prayer with the approval of such 
child's parents before the commencement of each daily school session."1 
In Commissioner of Education v. School Committee of Leyden,2 the 
Supreme Judicial Court enjoined the school committee from continu-
ing the permitted prayers, on the ground that the practice constituted 
an establishment of religion and was forbidden by the Constitution of 
the United States.3 Although the exercises were completely voluntary, 
without prescribed form, and not held under the supervision of teachers 
or school administrators,4 the Court held that the practice was con-
stitutionally objectionable because the exercises involved use of public 
school property. 
The Court's holding on Leyden would seem to be a corollary of 
McCollum v. Board of Education,5 as that case was explained in 
Zorach v. Clauson.6 In McCollum, the Constitution was held to have 
joHN D. O'REILLY, JR. is professor of law at Boston College Law School and a member 
of the bars of Massachusetts, the District of Columbia, and the Supreme Court of the 
United States. He wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Bartholomew Molloy, a 
second-year student at Boston College Law School, in the preparation of this article. 
§16.1. 1 Acts of 1970, c. 264, adding G.L., c. 71, §lB. Chapter 264 further provided 
that a city or town permitting such prayer was not to be denied the use of the Common-
wealth's educational funds. 
2 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 263, 267 N.E.2d 226, cert. denied, School Comm. of Leyden v. 
Massachusetts Commr. of Educ., 404 U.S. 849 (1971). 
3 U.S. Const. amend. I provides: "Congiess shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion. . . . " 
4 Cf. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 
421 (1962). 
5 333 u.s. 203 (1948). 
6 343 u.s. 306(1952). 
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been violated when representatives of certain religious faiths were 
allowed to visit a public school to give doctrinal instruction to such 
pupils as desired to receive it. Zorach distinguished McCollum in ruling 
that public school pupils might be excused from class to go elsewhere 
to receive religious instruction. The fact that the exercises involved in 
Leyden were nondenominational was immaterial, since it has been 
clearly established that the Constitution prohibits any compulsory 
school prayer, whether denominational or not.7 The Supreme Judicial 
Court did not reach the question of wheth,er the Leyden resolution or 
the statute involved in Leyden was a violation of the Massachusetts 
Constitution, but it seems likely that the Massachusetts Constitution 
had indeed been violated.8 
A more involved problem was presented when a town and a parochial 
school run by a parish of the town proposed a project of mutual bene-
fit. The town would lease the first floor of the parochial school building 
at a nominal rent plus an agreed percentage of building operating 
costs, and the rented floor would constitute a part of the town public 
school system. Public school teachers there would conduct courses in 
secular subjects, while teachers employed and governed by the parish 
would give courses in religion and certain secular subjects on the sec-
ond floor. Pupils would attend both schools in "platoons." Those 
who attended the private school in the morning session would attend 
the public school in the afternoon. Those who attended the public 
school in the morning would have the option of spending the after-
noon either in the private school upstairs or in a nearby public school. 
The attorney general, in an opinion to the commissioner of educa-
tion, ruled that the plan was constitutionally objectionable.9 He found 
the plan in conflict with both the "establishment of religion" provision 
of the federal Constitution and the "aid" provision of the Massachu-
setts Constitution. 10 With respect to the federal Constitution, the 
attorney general's opinion was compelled, he felt, by Lemon v. Kurtz-
man,11 in which the Supreme Court had held unconstitutional Penn-
sylvania and Rhode Island statutes that permitted public funds to be 
applied to the salary payments of teachers of secular subjects in non-
public schools, all or most of which, in both states, were Catholic 
elementary schools. In Kurtzman the Supreme Court had recognized 
that total separation between church and state was an unrealistic 
concept, and that "the line of separation, far from being a 'wall,' is a 
blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all the circum-
7 AbingtonSchooiDist. v. Schempp,374 U.S. 203,205 (1963). 
8 Mass. Const. amend. art. XVIII, §2, as replaced by amend. art. XLVI, Nov. 6, 1917, 
provides: "[N]o ... use of public money or property or loan of public credit shall 
be ... authorized by the commonwealth or any political division thereof for the pur-
pose of founding, maintaining or aiding any school or institution of learning, whether 
under public control or otherwise, wherein any denominational doctrine is inculca-
ted .... " 
9 Mass. Op.Atty. Gen. (Sept. I, 1971). 
10 See nn.3, 8 supra. 
II 403 U.S. 602(1971). 
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stances of a particular relationship." 12 Although in Kurtzman the 
teacher salary subsidies were applicable only to teachers of "secular" 
subjects, the Court had accepted the thesis that in Catholic elementary 
and secondary schools the teaching of religious doctrine is such a per-
vasive part of the curriculum that it tends to be reflected in the pre-
sentation of subjects which are not in themselves of a religious nature. 
Assurance that religous doctrines were not so reflected in subsidized 
secular courses would, said the Court, require supervision and moni-
toring of private school classrooms by the state. The Court had con-
cluded that "the cumulative impact of the entire relationship arising 
under the statutes [at issue] ... involved excessive entanglement 
between government and religion."13 The attorney general felt that 
similar surveillance would be required under the proposed plan and 
that the forbidden entanglements would result. 
The attorney general found further support for his position in 
Sanders v. ]ohnson,14 wherein the Supreme Court had affirmed a 
federal district court's decision invalidating Connecticut's Nonpublic 
School Secular Education Act. 15 The district court had declared that 
the primary effect of the act was to bestow control of the secular parts 
of the private schools on the public school system, while leaving con-
trol of the nonsecular parts unchanged. What resulted, according to 
the district court, was an unconstitutional advancement of religion. 
In treating the matter under the Massachusetts Constitution, the 
attorney general noted that the shared-time proposal was offered to 
solve problems in both the public and the private school systems. The 
private schools were finding themselves less able, for financial reasons, 
to continue to operate, and the public schools were having to absorb, 
at overwhelming expense, large numbers of pupils who were seeking 
public instruction as their private schools were forced to close. While 
the proposal was designed to avoid consequences which would impose 
hardship both on the public treasury and on sponsors of private educa-
tion, it nevertheless involved a form of aid to nonpublic schools. In 
light of the rigid language of the state Constitution, 16 as interpreted 
by the Supreme Judicial Court,l7 the attorney general felt that the 
plan was not constitutionally acceptable. 
Public deference to religious belief was at issue in Dalli v. Board of 
12 ld. at614. 
15 ld. at62l. 
14 403 U.S. 955,aff'gpercuriam 319F. Supp. 421 (D. Conn. 1971). 
15 319F. Supp. 421, 426(0. Conn. 1971). 
16 The constitutional language is set forth in n.8 supra. 
17 Opinion of the Justices, 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 789, 796, 258 N.E.2d 779, 783 (bill 
proposing to reimburse non public schools for part of cost of educating students would 
be in violation of Mass. Const. amend. art. XL VI, §2, since "such substantial assistance 
to a nonpublic school from public funds amounts to 'aiding' as the term is used in 
[§2] ... "). Opinion of the Justices, 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 9ll, 914, 259 N.E.2d 564, 566 
(bill proposing vouchers for use by nonpublic school parents involves "an indirect 
form of aid to nonpublic schools which, if enacted, would have in substance the same 
practical effect as the measure [declared unconstitutional in 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 789, 
supra]" and would violate Mass. Const. amend. art. XVIII, §2, as replaced by art. XL VI). 
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Education. 18 The Commonwealth's compulsory school attendance 
law had required that pupils be vaccinated against smallpox and im-
munized against certain other communicable diseases, but also provided 
that where the parent of a school-age child objected to his vaccina-
tion or immunization upon the ground that it conflicted with the 
tenets and practice of a recognized church or religious denomination, 
and a church or denominational official certified by affidavit that the 
parent was an adherent or a member in good standing, the child would 
be exempted from the requirement.l9 Ms. Dalli, the mother of a school-
age child, possessed religious convictions against vaccination that 
were not based upon the doctrine of any church. Since it appeared that 
school officials would refuse to exempt her daughter from the vaccina-
tion statute, Ms. Dalli filed an action for a declaratory judgment to 
ascertain whether the statute applied to her child. The question before 
the Supreme Judicial Court was whether the plaintiff would be em-
braced within the exemption to the vaccination statute for adherents 
or members of a "recognized" church or religious denomination. There 
being no compelling state interest, the Court recognized that if the 
plaintiff's beliefs were sincere, they were entitled to the same protections 
as the more widely held belief of others.20 Upon findings of fact by the 
trial court, including a determination that the plaintiff's beliefs were 
sincere, the Court implicitly found that the plaintiff was equally en-
titled to the exemption from vaccination. By no stretch of the imagina-
tion, however, did the plaintiff come within the language of the exemp-
tion clause. The Court held that the preferred granting of the exemption 
to members of recognized religions was discrimination against others 
having different beliefs and therefore in violation of both the federal 
and state constitutions. 
Ironically, while the plaintiff prevailed in her contention that the 
statutory classification of religious grounds for exemption was uncon-
stitutional, she did not receive the relief she sought. The Court felt 
that the statute was not susceptible of an interpretation that would 
broaden the exemption so as to include the plaintiff; instead, the Court 
invalidated the exemption in its entirety. As a result of the decision in 
Dalli, however, the legislature rewrote the statute to exempt from vac-
cination any child whose parent or guardian states in writing that 
vaccination conflicts with the parent's or guardian's religious belie£. 21 
The unarticulated reasoning of the Court seems to have been based 
on the principle that there must be a reasonable relation between the 
classification of persons eligible for the exemption .embodied in the 
statute and the statute's legitimate objectives. This principle has re-
cently been carefully delineated by the federal courts in numerous 
18 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 237,267 N.E.2d219. 
19 G.L., c. 76, §15. 
zoe£. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 
163 (1965); United States v. Sisson, 297 F. Supp. 902 (D. Mass. 1969), app. dismissed, 
399 U.S. 267 (1970). 
21 Acts of 1971, c. 285, amendingG.L., c. 76, §15. 
4
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1971 [1971], Art. 19
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1971/iss1/19
412 1971 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §16.1 
selective service cases that have prevented Congress from disallowing 
military conscientious objector status to those whose objections to war 
are based upon atheistic religious principles.22 Of course, the legis-
lature is under no compulsion to defer in secular matters to religious 
beliefs,23 but it may selectively defer in some cases to religious doc-
trine.24 Within the constraints of the First Amendment as outlined 
in the recent cases, however, legislatures drawing distinctions upon 
religious grounds must reflect in their classifications valid secular pur-
poses such as facilitating the administration of general policy, and must 
avoid discrimination in favor of one or another set of moral values. 25 
§16.2. Academic freedom: Students and teachers. During the 1971 
SuRVEY year, public education continued as a subject of federal court 
litigation. In Mailloux v. Kiley, 1 a teacher had written a pungent 
vulgarity on a blackboard during the course of a discussion and had 
invited his eleventh-grade class to define it. For this conduct the teacher 
was dismissed by the school committee, but he was soon reinstated 
under a preliminary injunction.2 At the trial on the merits in federal 
district court, expert witnesses testified as to whether the technique 
used by the teacher on the occasion in question was conducive to a 
serious educational discussion. Although the court found the testimony 
inconclusive, it also found that the teacher had acted in good faith for 
what he thought to be a valid educational purpose. The court ruled 
that although the academic freedom of a teacher on the secondary 
school level is subject to a substantial degree of administrative control, 
the teaching method employed by the teacher under the particular cir-
cumstances was constitutionally protected, absent a school regulation 
clearly prohibiting it. The challenged conduct was held not proscribed 
by a general regulation against "conduct unbecoming a teacher."3 
While the law has traditionally been tolerant of authoritarianism 
in school administration,4 recent years have witnessed a perceptible 
trend towards subjecting educational disciplinary measures to judicial 
scrutiny;5 a great deal of case law will be required, however, to bring 
about a balancing of individual rights with the necessary flexibility 
of control of the educational process. One of the problem areas is that 
22 N.20 supra. The Court in Welsh held that the Universal Military Training and 
Service Act "exempts from military service all those whose consciences, spurred by deeply 
held moral, ethical or religious beliefs, would give them no rest or peace if they allowed 
themselves to become part of an instrument of war." 398 U.S. 333, 344 (1970). 
23 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S.ll (1905). 
2< Cf. Gillettev. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971). 
25 Ibid. 
§16.2. 1 323 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Mass.), aff'd per curiam, 448 F.2d 1242 (lst Cir. 1971). 
2 D. Mass., Dec. 21, 1970; app. dismissed, 436F.2d565 (lstCir. 1971). 
3 323 F. Supp.1387, 1389 (D. Mass.l971). 
4 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 526 (1969) 
(Black,]., dissenting). 
5 See Van Alstyne, The Student as University Resident, 45 Denver L.J. 582 (1968); 
Wilson, Campus Freedom and Order, 45 Denver L.J. 502 (1968); Wright, Constitution 
on the Campus, 22 Vand. L. Rev. 1027 (1969). 
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of unpromulgated school regulations. In Hasson V. Boothby,6 three 
high school students had attended a social event at the school and had 
been caught by a teacher with the odor of beer on their breath. Al-
though the beer was actually consumed off school premises, the boys 
were placed on probation when the school principal learned of their 
transgression. The boys sought judicial relief on the ground that the 
school had no published regulation concerning consumption of beer 
off school premises, although no contention was made that the drink-
ing of beer was a constitutionally protected activity.7 The federal 
district court concfuded that school regulations that do not have a 
chilling effect upon the exercise of constitutional rights need not be 
so narrowly drawn as those that do. It went on to hold that where, as in 
the instant case, the unacceptability of the conduct is readily known, 
there may be no need for a specific promulgation to put a violator on 
notice of his exposure to disciplinary measures. The court went on, 
however, to suggest that the seriousness of the offense and severity of 
the concomitant sanctions would be relevant in an appraisal of the 
necessity for specific regulations. Although the punishment imposed 
in Hasson was sustained, the court clearly intimated that if the boys' 
conduct had resulted in their suspension or expulsion, due process 
would demand a rather precise regulation defining what conduct was 
forbidden. 
The termination of a teacher's employment was at issue in Roumani 
v. Leestamper. 8 The plaintiff, a nontenured assistant professor at a 
state college, was employed under a one-year contract to teach for the 
academic year 1970-1971. By the terms of the contract, he was entitled 
to notice by December 15, 1970, if he was not to be reappointed for the 
year 1971-1972. No notice was given by that date. On April16, 1971, the 
college president requested that the professor resign. This he declined 
to do. On May 14, 1971, the president, apparently implementing the 
trustees' approval of the president's nonrenewal recommendation, no-
tified the professor that his contract would not be renewed for the year 
1971-1972. The notification of nonrenewal indicated, without specifi-
cation, that the decision was based upon the plaintiff's misstatement of 
fact concerning his eligibility for a Ph.D. degree. There was no further 
communication between the plaintiff and the college administration 
with respect to the decision. 
The professor sued to regain his position. In an earlier decision from 
New Hampshire, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit had held 
that a nontenured teacher who has been given timely notice of non-
retention for a subsequent year is constitutionally entitled to receive a 
detailed written statement of the reasons for nonrenewal of his contract 
6 318 F. Supp. 1183 (D. Mass. 1970). This case is the subject of a student comment in 
§16.9 infra. 
7 In Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969), 
the Court held that the rights of students to symbolic free speech had been unconstitu-
tionally obstructed by school regulations. 
8 330 F. Supp. 1248 (D. Mass. 1971). 
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of employment.9 The statement of reasons given in the instant case 
clearly did not meet this requirement. In Roumani, however, the dis-
trict court went a step further. Since the notice of nonrenewal was not 
timely given, the court ruled that the college's action amounted to a 
discharge of the teacher for cause, a matter of substantially more 
significance in the academic community than failure to rehire a pro-
bationary teacher. The court held that under the circumstances due 
process required not only that the teacher be notified in detail of the 
reasons for the adverse action, but also that he be accorded a full hear-
ing before the trustees, the governing body possessing the authority 
to make decisions as to the termination of faculty employment. 
Roumani is an important case in the trend away from the premise 
that public employment is a privilege rather than a right of the em-
ployee, a concept epitomized in the pithy sentence of Justice Holmes: 
"The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but 
he has no constitutional right to be a policeman."10 Government's 
promotion of its own concerns in the management of governmental 
affairs must be tempered by a consideration of the interests of individ-
uals affected by such management.u 
§16.3. No-fault automobile insurance. In Pinnick v. Cleary, 1 a 
case of first impression in the Commonwealth, the Supreme Judicial 
Court sustained the validity of the so-called no-fault system of com-
pulsory motor vehicle insurance.2 In part, the no-fault plan provides 
that claims for compensation for pain and suffering are not ·allowable 
subject to certain exceptions, the principal one being with respect to 
an injury resulting in medical expenses of more than $500. Where the 
injury is caused by the fault of another, the tort-feasor is not liable for 
damages to the extent that the injured person is entitled to receive per-
sonal injury benefits from his own insurer. Pinnick's injuries had been 
caused solely by the negligence of the defendant; the plaintiff would 
have received (according to a stipulation of the parties) a verdict of 
$800 for pain and suffering had a jury been permitted to assess damages. 
The plaintiff, who would have had a common law claim against the 
defendant for a total of $1565, was held to have no right of recovery 
against the defendant, and was inferentially left with the $115 medical 
expense claim against his own insurer. 
The Court ruled that there is no constitutionally vested right in 
common law remedies, and that the legislature is competent, within 
due process limitations, to abrogate or modify such remedies. The new 
no-fault legislation, in changing the rights of a motor vehicle accident 
9 Drown v. Portsmouth School Dist., 435 F.2d 1182 (lstCir. 1970). 
10 McAuliffev. New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216,220,29 N.E. 517 (1892). 
11 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 
U.S. 886 (1961). 
§16.3. 1 Pinnick v. Cleary, 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1129, 271 N.E.2d 592. 
2 "No-fault," as it is popularly known, was passed as Acts of 1970, cc. 670, 744, 
amending G.L., cc. 90, 175,231. For a detailed discussion of the legislation, see 1970 Ann. 
Surv. Mass. Law c. 22; recent developments are discussed in §§ 11.17 to 11.19 supra. 
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victim, was not wanting in due process of law since it was reasonably 
calculated to achieve the public purpose of alleviating the heavy bur-
den that was imposed upon the judicial system by the incidence of 
motor vehicle tort cases. Considering, without necessarily accepting, 
the contention that a legislature is not free to take away completely an 
injured person's remedy against a wrongdoer without providing a 
reasonably just substitute, the Court held that such a requirement, if 
one exists, was satisfied in the instant setting for the same reasons that 
the requirement was satisfied in the case of the workmen's compensa-
tion laws.3 The motor vehicle accident victim, while denied the benefit 
of special damages, was, in the Court's view, given assurance of re-
covery of actual outlays and was spared the risks of litigation, such as 
trial delays, possible successful defenses, inadequate verdicts, and 
disproportionate expenses. The Court also considered equal protection 
objections to the statute. Damages for pain and suffering were not 
available to the plaintiff because his injury did not involve medical 
expenses in excess of $500, nor did it involve his death, a fracture, loss 
of a body member, permanent and serious disfigurement, or loss of 
sight or hearing. The Court concluded that if, in keeping with a per-
ceived and permissible legislative policy expressed in the statute, pain 
and suffering were to be eliminated as an element of damages in claims 
for "minor" injuries, the selection of the enumerated criteria as de-
finitive of "serious" injuries was not unreasonable. 
Chief Justice Tauro concurred on the limited ground that the plain-
tiff had failed to overcome the presumption of the constitutionality of 
the statute, i.e., he had failed to prove that the provisions thereof 
"cannot be supported upon any rational basis of fact that reasonably 
can be conceived to sustain" them.4 Such a burden, Chief Justice 
Tauro conceded, was "a virtually insuperable task in the circum-
stances." He declined to agree, however, that the statute was justifiable 
on the theory that it would alleviate the burdens of judicial adminis-
tration, or by the analogy of the workmen's compensation laws, or 
both. He also registered reservations with respect to the Court's 
acquiescence in the statutory criteria for classifying injuries as "minor" 
or otherwise. 
It is no easy matter to define the limits of legislative power to alter 
or eliminate the common law remedies available to a victim of an 
unlawful act. However, it might be argued that once it has been es-
tablished that Massachusetts may attempt to resolve the problem of 
compensating motor vehide accident victims by requiring its motor-
ists to carry personal injury liability insurance, it is a relatively small 
step to transform that obligation into one requiring the carrying of 
personal injury accident insurance. 
§16.4. Disturbers of the peace and stubborn children. In two 
3 SeeNewYorkCentral R.R. v. White,243 U.S.I88(1917). 
4 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. ll29, 1158, 271 N.E.2d 592, 612, quoting from Sperry and 
Hutchinson Co. v. Director of Div. on the Necessities of Life, 307 Mass. 408, 418, 30 
N.E.2d 269, 274 (1940). 
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Massachusetts cases, different substantive provisions of the same 
criminal statute, G.L., c. 272, §53,1 were attacked on constitutional 
grounds. In each case the defendants contended that the statutory 
definition of the crime was unacceptably vague. In both cases, how-
ever, the challenge was unsuccessful. In Commonwealth v. ]arrett2 
the defendants were charged with disturbing the peace by making loud 
noises, using abusive language, and striking "divers persons." They 
were found guilty in the district court and appealed to the superior 
court. The superior court justice reported the case to the Supreme 
Judicial Court prior to trial with questions as to the constitutionality 
of the statute.3 The Supreme Judicial Court ruled that the insertion of 
the phrase "disorderly persons" into the statute in 1943 at the sugges-
tion of a legislative study commission4 did not create a new crime, 
but was done for the purpose of establishing a fixed penalty for a 
common law crime. The Court went on to hold that the constituent 
elements of the crime of disturbing the peace, as they are reflected in 
common understanding and practice, are sufficiently definite to give 
adequate warning of what is prohibited. The defendants further con-
tended that the statutory prohibition against disturbing the peace was 
"unconstitutionally overbroad" because the statute could be used to 
prosecute one who was exercising, for instance, his constitutional 
right of free speech. Although the Court took the occasion to point 
out that Commonwealth v. Harriss and Commonwealth v. Oaks6 
did not by their terms permit prosecution for the exercise of free speech, 7 
the Court did not express an opinion as to the second contention of 
the defendants, because the issue was not involved in the questions 
presented by the trial court. Had the Court chosen to consider the issue, 
it might well have concluded that a finding by the trial court to the 
effect that free speech would be obstructed by prosecution under the 
statute would be an absolute defense.8 
In the second case, Commonwealth v. Brasher,9 the Court dealt with 
§16.4. 1 Section 53 provides in part: "Stubborn children, runaways, ... common 
railers and brawlers, ... idle and disorderly persons, ... [and] disturbers of the 
peace . . . may be punished by imprisonment in a jail or house of correction for not 
more than six months. . . . " 
2 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 833, 269N.E.2d657. 
! Pursuant to G.L., c. 278, §30A. 
4 HouseDoc.l462at9(1943). 
5 101 Mass. 29(1869). 
6 113Mass.8(1873). 
7 The Court stated: "The mere making of statements, or expressing of views or opin-
ions, no matter how unpopular, or views with which persons present do not agree, has 
never been and is not now punishable as a disturbance of the peace under the law of this 
Commonwealth .... [Such is] what we understand the law to have been at the time of 
the Harris and Oaks decision[s] and at all times since." 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 833, 840, 269 
N.E.2d 657, 662. 
8 Cf. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (public display of a vulgar word not 
punishable as disorderly conduct even though calculated to arouse resentment on aes-
thetic or other grounds). 
9 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 907, 270 N.E.2d 389. This case is the subject of a student com-
ment in §7.11 supra. 
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the problem it had avoided the year before in Joyner v. Common-
wealth,10 namely, whether the statutory provision for punishment of 
"stubborn children" was sufficiently definite to meet constitutional 
criteria. In sustaining the statute, the Court stated that the provision 
in question, like the "disorderly persons" provision, did not create a 
new crime, but merely prescribed a specific penalty for engaging in 
conduct of a sort long prohibited by the Commonwealth. The statutory 
prohibition of the offense was found in a colonial law of 1654 that was 
directed to the evil of children who behaved themselves "too disrespec-
tively, disobediently, and disorderly towards their parents, masters and 
governors .... " 11 The elements of the offense, the Court said, are a 
lawful and reasonble command given to a child by one with authority 
to give such command, a refusal by the child to obey, and a determina-
tion that the refusal was stubborn in the sense that it was "wilful, ob-
stinate and persistent for a period of time." 12 
On the facts developed at the trial, the case was not the most per-
suasive vehicle imaginable for a constitutional attack on the "stubborn 
children" statute. The defendant, living at the Deaconess Home, re-
fused to comply with an order to submit to examination by a physi-
cian. She indulged in outbursts of temper, slammed doors, and ab-
sented herself from the home in violation of regulations and of specific 
directives. On some occasions she used language "of a kind formerly 
used only by common railers engaged in gutter brawls."13 Antisocial 
though the conduct of the defendant was, it seems questionable 
whether the statute, even as interpreted by the Court, gives children 
any more notice of what is prohibited than, for instance, would be 
given to another person, also defiant of lawful authority, by an ordi-
nance punishing those who "unreasonably saunter" after being told 
by a police officer to move on. 14 
§16.5. Criminal procedure: Recent Massachusetts decisions. Of 
the cases handed down by the Supreme Judicial Court during the 1971 
SuRVEY year, the largest number involved criminal law and procedure. 
Several of the cases posed new and interesting questions of constitu-
tional significance. 
"John Doe" indictment. In Connor v. Picard, 1 the plaintiff Connor 
was appealing from a denial of his request for a writ of habeus corpus 
from the federal district court. Connor had been found guilty in a state 
10 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1169, 260 N.E.2d 664. The ground for decision in Joyner v. 
Commonwealth was that the "stubborn children" provision of the statute did not cover 
those who had passed their eighteenth birthday. See 1970 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §6.4. 
11 3 Mass. Bay Records355 (1644-1657). 
12 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 907,911,270 N.E.2d389, 393. 
u Id. at 915, 270 N.E.2d at 395. In light of Cohen v. California, n. 8 supra, it does not 
appear that any weight should have been given by the Court to the use of vulgar lan-
guage by Miss Brasher. 
HCommonwealth v. Carpenter, 325 Mass. 519,91 N.E.2d 666 (1950). See also United 
States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921). 
§16.5. 1 434 F.2d 673 (1st Cir. 1970). This important case is the subject of a student 
comment in §16.12 infra. 
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court of being an accessory to murder. Connor's claim of federal right 
was based upon the fact that the indictment returned by the grand jury 
in the murder prosecution had included an alleged accessory under the 
name "John Doe." The trial court allowed the prosecutor to amend 
the indictment later by substituting Connor's name. Relying upon 
Commonwealth v. Gedzium,2 the Supreme Judicial Court ruled that 
such a practice, that is, amending a "John Doe" indictment at trial 
to include a person not originally known to the grand jury, was not 
error.3 The federal District Court for Massachusetts declined to disturb 
the conviction,4 but the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit re-
versed, holding that Connor had been denied equal protection of the 
laws. 
The case presents an unusual interweaving of federal and state con-
stitutionalism. The Constitution of the United States does not give a 
defendant in a state criminal case a right to be indicted before being 
placed on trial.5 The Massachusetts Constitution, however, does 
establish such a right.6 In Massachusetts, the prosecutor may uni-
laterally amend an indictment by supplying the true name of the de-
fendant described in the indictment "by a fictitious name or by any 
other practicable description, with an allegation that his real name 
is unknown."7 It would seem to follow, therefore, that the sufficiency 
of an indictment is a question of state law and not susceptible to attack 
by habeas corpus. Nonetheless, the court of appeals took the position 
that if Massachusetts required indictments in felony cases, it could not 
try an unindicted Connor for a felony without violating the equal 
protection clause. The court of appeals agreed with the dissenting 
Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court that where the identity, as well 
as the name, of an accused is unknown to the grand jury, a person 
cannot be said to be indicted by having his name subsequently inserted 
in the indictment. 
The constitutional question posed by the federal court's decision 
was whether its ruling amounted to a review of the Supreme Judicial 
Court's decision as to the sufficiency of the indictment, or whether 
it was merely an application of constitutional standards to a factual 
situation created by state law. In its application for certiorari to the 
United States Supreme Court, the Commonwealth emphasized that the 
Fourteenth Amendment issues had not been properly presented for 
decision by the Supreme Judicial Court. The Commonwealth claimed 
that petitioner had erroneously been allowed to raise his particularized 
constitutional arguments for the first time in the federal court. The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari and carried the case over to the docket 
for the 1971 October Term. As the SuRVEY was about to be published, 
2 259Mass. 453, 156N.E. 890(1927). 
~Commonwealth v. Doherty, 353 Mass. 197, 229 N.E.2d 267 (1967). Justices Kirk and 
Spiegel dissented. 
4 Connorv. Picard, 308F. Supp. 843 (D. Mass.l970). 
'Hurtadov. California, llOU.S. 516(1884). 
6 Jones v. Robbins, 74 Mass. (8 Gray) 329 (1857). 
7 G.L., c. 277, §19. 
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the Supreme Court decided in favor of the Commonwealth and re-
manded for further state proceedings.8 
Increase of sentence. During the 1971 SuRVEY year, the defendant in 
the case of Walsh v. Commonwealth9 continued his efforts to obtain 
freedom. Walsh, originally sentenced to a 5- to 10-year term for armed 
robbery, had appealed his sentence to the Appellate Division of the 
Superior Court, 10 where his sentence was increased to an 8- to 12-year 
term. The increased sentence was sustained on application for writ 
of error in the Supreme Judicial Court. Upon application to federal 
district court for a writ of habeas corpus, Walsh, relying mainly upon 
North Carolina v. Pearce, 11 contended that the procedure that sub-
jected him to an increase of his original sentence exposed him to double 
jeopardy and deprived him of liberty without due process of law. The 
federal district court denied his request and the court of appeals 
affirmed. 12 Summarily rejecting the defendant's double jeopardy 
arguments and addressing themselves to the petitioner's due process 
arguments, both courts ruled that the Commonwealth's sentence 
revision procedure was constitutionally permissible. The court of 
appeals found that the Massachusetts appellate procedure was calcu-
lated to achieve the salutary goal of uniformity of sentencing, adapted 
to the circumstances of particular cases, and did not contain the seeds 
of vindictiveness. The majority of the court felt that a sentence-revising 
tribunal was no more obligated to explain its revision than was a trial 
judge obligated to explain the original sentence. The dissenting Judge 
Coffin felt that constitutional due process required an explanation of 
an increased sentence. 
The Supreme Court ruled in Pearce that when a second trial is 
ordered as a result of a successful appeal and the sentence imposed 
after the second conviction is more severe than the original sentence, 
close scrutiny of the second sentence is required. The Court's concern 
stemmed primarily from the fear that the imposition of a more severe 
sentence might be a vindictive device to punish a defendant, not for 
his crime, but merely for having appealed his conviction. Such a prac-
tice, declared the Court, would be lacking in due process of law, and 
would be subject to due process and equal protection objections to the 
extent that it discouraged the resort by defendants to appellate proce-
dures. The Court did not hold that the Constitution forbids a more se-
vere sentence after a second trial than was imposed after the first, but 
nonetheless did require that the reasons for the heavier penalty be af-
firmatively stated. The Massachusetts procedure, unlike the procedure 
examined by the Supreme Court in Pearce, does not provide for a 
review of the merits of the conviction. The function of the Appellate 
Division review, as viewed by the Supreme Judicial Court, is to 
8 404 u.s. 270(1971). 
9 1970Mass.Adv.Sh.l315,260N.E.2d911. 
10 Such an appeal is authorized by G.L., c. 278, §§28A-28D. 
II 395 U.S. 711 (1969). 
12 Walsh v. Picard, 446 F.2d 1209 (lst Cir. 1971), aff'g 328 F. Supp. 427 (D. Mass. 
1971). 
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consider "whether a particular defendant's sentence is excessively short 
or long compared to other defendants' sentences for the same or similar 
offences."13 
The rejection of any double jeopardy argument by the courts that 
reviewed Walsh's application for habeas corpus seems inescapable. 
Since there is no federal or state constitutional right to more than one 
hearing, one who invokes a statutory right of appeal that looks to a 
new trial necessarily waives whatever immunity he might have had to 
a second trial for the same offense. 14 The same rationale would seem 
to imply that one who chooses to appeal only his sentence takes the 
statutory procedure the way he finds it. It would also seem that the 
Supreme Court's reasoning in Pearce would not reach the situation 
presented in Walsh absent a showing that the Commonwealth's 
appellate review was a vindictive or an arbitrary process. It is perhaps 
the view of the dissenting Judge Coffin that Pearce makes suspect 
any increase in the severity of an already imposed sentence and there-
fore by its terms requires an appellate court to affirmatively justify 
such an increase. There is little to indicate, however, that the United 
States Supreme Court would extend the affirmative justification as-
pect of Pearce to the situation presented by Walsh. 
Issues relating to the right to jury trial. Last year this author critically 
discussed the Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Ladetto v. Common-
wealth,15 which had presented, for a second time, 16 constitutional 
objections to the composition of the trial jury in a prosecution for 
murder in the first degree. The trial judge in Ladetto had excused a 
prospective juror for cause after a voir dire examination had elicited 
from the venireman an ambiguous answer to the question, "Have you 
any opinion which would prevent you from finding the defendant 
guilty of an offense punishable by death?" The crucial issue in 
Ladetto was not the propriety of putting the question to the veniremen, 
but the judge's conclusion, on the basis of an unresponsive answer, 
that the juror did not stand indifferent and should for that reason be 
excused. The Supreme Judicial Court had found no error in the earlier 
case and did not prove any more receptive the second time around. The 
Supreme Court of the United States, apparently disagreeing with the 
Supreme Judicial Court's evaluation of the situation, granted cer-
tiorari and summarily reversed,I1 simply citing Witherspoon v. 
Illinois, 18 Boulden v. Holman, 19 and Maxwell v. Bishop.2o 
13 Walshv.Commonwealth,l970Mass.Adv. Sh.l315,1322,260N.E.2d9ll, 916. 
14 UnitedS!atesv. Ball,l63 U.S. 662 (1896). 
15 356 Mass. 541, 254 N.E.2d 415 (1969), discussed in 1970 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law 
§15.7, at 377. 
16 The first hearing, Commonwealth v. Ladetto, 349 Mass. 237, 207 N.E.2d 536 (1965), 
was a direct appeal. The second hearing sought reconsideration of the original assign-
ments of error in light of the intervening decision in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 
510 (1968). 
17 Ladettov. Massachusetts, 403 U.S. 947 (1971). 
1a391 U.S.510(1968). 
19 394 U.S. 478 ( 1969) (remanded for reconsideration in light of Witherspoon). 
20 398 U.S. 262 ( 1970) (remanded forreconsideration in light of Witherspoon). 
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The putting of the question in itself seems perfectly proper. In 
Witherspoon, the Supreme Court held that a sentence of death could 
not be imposed by a jury from which there had been automatically ex-
cluded veniremen who had scruples against, or were opposed to, 
capital punishment. The Witherspoon holding is not incompatible 
with the applicable Massachusetts statute,21 which excludes only 
jurors whose opinions would actually preclude a finding of guilt of a 
capital offense. The statute would not exclude jurors who, given the 
choice (as are Massachusetts juries in such cases) between a sentence 
of death or one of life imprisonment, might be reluctant, because of 
attitudes toward ·capital punishment, to impose the former penalty. 
An unusual and significant problem remains, however, with respect 
to the disposition of an appeal that has been sustained on the ground 
that veniremen having scruples against capital punishment were 
automatically excluded from the jury. The Supreme Court was care-
ful to point out in Witherspoon that only the sentence of death was 
vacated; the verdict of guilty was not affected. Although the Massachu-
setts death sentence statute differs from the statute examined in 
Witherspoon (the Massachusetts statute imposes the death sentence 
unless the jury recommends otherwise, while in Illinois the jury de-
cides both guilt and punishment), it seems clear that the death sentence 
should not be automatically imposed in cases where the veniremen 
who would vote against its imposition have been automatically ex-
cluded from serving. Were such a case to occur in Massachusetts, it 
would seem to require a new trial since there is no available pro-
cedure for the disposition of the sole issue of sentence. There are as yet 
no reported decisions that shed any light on this interesting procedural 
problem. As for Ladetto, his sentence has been commuted to life im-
prisonment, so the question has become academic as far as this case 
is concerned. It is unlikely that other cases presenting the Ladetto 
issue will arise, since judges may be expected to continue the practice 
of conducting penetrating voir dire examinations of veniremen who 
indicate personal opposition to capital punishment, rather than auto-
matically excluding them. 
Several other aspects of the "jury clemency" statute22 were con-
sidered in Commonwealth v. Stewart. 23 Since the statute makes death 
the normal punishment upon a finding of guilty, the alternative of 
life imprisonment may be imposed only if the jury unanimously 
recommends it. Such was the Supreme Judicial Court's interpretation 
of the statute in 1952,27 and in Stewart the Court declined to review 
it, although the great majority of courts which have considered the 
question (as the opinion of the court documents) have ruled other-
wise.25 Reconsideration of the established rule was deemed a proper 
21 G.L., c. 278, §3. 
22 G.L., c. 265, §2. 
23 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1039, 270N.E.2d811. 
24 Commonwealth v. McNeil, 328 Mass. 436, 104 N .E.2d 153 ( 1952). 
25 Commonwealth v. Stewart, 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1039, 1043 n.2, 270 N.E.2d 811, 
814 n.2. 
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'Subject for the legislature, not the judiciary, and the issue was not 
regarded as one of constitutional dimension. 
Two more constitutional issues were tendered in the case, and both 
were summarily rejected. One contention was that the procedure 
whereby the jury decided both the question of guilt and the question 
of punishment after a single trial is not constitutionally acceptable. 
The other was that the Constitution does not tolerate giving the jury 
absolute discretion, without guiding standards, to grant or withhold 
clemency after a finding of guilt. The first contention was rejected on 
the authority of McGautha v. California. 26 The second was rejected 
because "[w]e are not persuaded by this argument." (A substantially 
identical contention had also been rejected in McGautha). It should 
be pointed out that both contentions were rejected by the Supreme 
Court of the United States over vigorous dissents. Justice Douglas 
pointed out that to tie determinations of both guilt and punishment 
to a unitary trial was to subject a defendant desiring to present matter 
in mitigation of punishment to risk of loss of his privilege against 
self-incrimination. Justice Brennan argued that a statute giving a jury 
the decision of life or death for a convicted defendant without pro-
viding standards of decision should be held void for vagueness. Justice 
Marshall joined the dissenters. In view of the strength of the dissents 
and the upsurge of public opinion concerning capital punishment, 
it cannot yet be said that the issue is dead. 
An advisory opinion27 by the Supreme Judicial Court has clarified 
some constitutional questions concerning a proposal for radical 
change in criminal procedure. Traditionally, crimes cognizable by 
the district courts have been tried before a judge only; those defendants 
who are found guilty are entitled to a trial de novo in the superior 
court before a jury of 12 members.28 An alternative appellate proce-
dure exists in some districts in accordance with which the defendant 
might have a de novo trial before a 6-member jury of the district court 
if he so elects. 29 The Justices were asked for their opinion as to whether 
it would be constitutional for a defendant in a district court to be 
given access to a 6-member jury trial in the district court in lieu of the 
de novo trial in the superior court, the only place where a defendant 
could be tried before a 12-member jury. The problem, of course, was 
whether a law implementing the proposal would comply with the 
constitutional mandates of trial by jury in criminal cases.3o The Jus-
tices answered in the affirmative. 
A.s to federal constitutional requirements, the answer had already 
been indicated by the Supreme Court of the United States. In 1968 
the Court had ruled in Duncan v. Louisiana31 that the states must 
26 402 U.S.183 (1971). 
27 OpinionoftheJustices,1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1169,271 N.E.2d335. 
28 G.L., c. 278, §§2, 18; G.L., c. 212, §6. 
29 Id., c. 418, §26 note. 
30 U.S. Const. amend VI; Mass. Const. pt. 1, art. XII. 
31391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
15
O'Reilly: Chapter 16: Constitutional Law
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1971
§16.5 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 423 
provide jury trials in criminal cases that, if triable in federal courts, 
would have to be before juries. Duncan had generated problems for 
several states that had assumed they were not subject to federal con-
stitutional jury trial restrictions and had thereupon adopted jury 
standards at variance with the traditional 12-member, unanimous-
verdictjury. The problems had come to a head in Williams v. Florida,32 
in which the Sureme Court had held that Florida satisfied a defen-
dant's constitutional right to jury trial in a criminal case by providing 
a jury of 6 members.33 The Supreme Judicial Court, after ruling that 
Williams made the 6-member jury proposal unobjectionable under 
the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal Constitution, concluded 
that the reasoning behind Williams should lead to a similar result 
under Article XII of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.34 The 
Court noted that common law standards for jury composition have 
not been rigidly followed, in that women have been recognized as 
eligible for jury service and more than 12 jurors may be impaneled 
for protracted trials (though only 12 participate in the verdict); its 
conclusion was that rigid adherence to the size of the jury was similarly 
optional. Justice Quirico, however, felt that the jury trial provision 
of Article XII expressed a purpose to adopt the 12-member institution 
which had been developed over the centuries prior to 1780. 
The Justices stated two potentially significant caveats to their 
opinion. First, they pointed out that their opinion had no effect upon 
trials for the more serious crimes or in any case in which the defendant 
could be sentenced to state prison. Secondly, the· Justices emphasized 
that they were not considering whether jury trials could be eliminated 
completely in some minor criminal cases. The implication drawn from 
the Court's first caveat is that the question of whether capital crimes 
must be tried by the conventional jury, although other crimes may be 
tried by various other juries, is a matter of constitutional dimension 
rather than of prudential judgment of the legislature. It should be 
noted that some United States district courts, in reliance upon Williams, 
are said to be considering adoption of a system of 6-member juries for 
32399U.S. 78(1970). 
33 The Supreme Court, in Williams v. Florida, overrode a number of earlier precedents 
that had indicated that the 12-member jury, a traditional part of the Anglo-American 
criminal justice machinery since the fourteenth century, was indeed constitutionally 
mandated. The Court concluded that the size of the common law jury was an historical 
accident and that the number of members in the jury was not necessarily related to the 
essential nature of the jury procedure. 
34 Mass. Const. pt. I, art. XII provides that " ... no subject shall be arrested, im-
prisoned, despoiled, or deprived of his property, immunities, or privileges ... or 
deprived of his life, liberty, or estate, but by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the 
land." 
The clause requiring state legislation to conform to the "law of the land" has been 
held to be more restrictive of state power than the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Compare Jones v. Robbins, 74 Mass. (9 Gray) 329 (1857) (serious criminal 
proceedings must be commenced by grand jury indictment under the Mass. Const.) with 
Hurtado v. California, llO U.S. 516 (1884) (Fourteenth Amendment does not prevent 
a state from instituting a capital prosecution by information). 
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their trials. With respect to eliminating jury trials completely, it should 
be noted that in Baldwin v. New York35 the Supreme Court ruled that 
the jury trial requirement of Duncan was applicable to prosecutions 
of crimes punishable by at least six months' imprisonment, the impli-
cation being that the trial of crimes carrying lighter penalties may, 
consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment, be left to judges sitting 
alone. Whether Article XII of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights 
would permit such a result was left undecided by the Justices. 
Another facet of the jury trial problem was raised in Commonwealth 
v. Thomas,36 in which certain persons who had been adjudged de-
linquents in a district court proceeding37 took appeals to the superior 
court and demanded jury trials. The requests for jury trials were denied. 
After bench trials, the defendants were adjudged delinquents. The 
Supreme Judicial Court construed the applicable statute to require a 
jury trial upon an appeal from a judgment of delinquency, although 
by another statute38 delinquency proceedings were not deemed to be 
criminal proceedings. Deciding the case in this fashion, the Court did 
not reach the issue as to a constitutional requirement of jury trial in 
juvenile cases. Two months later, the Supreme Court of the United 
States, in cases from Pennsylvania and North Carolina, concluded 
that neither Duncan v. Louisiana39 nor In re Gault40 required a state 
to give a jury trial for persons accused of juvenile delinquency.41 
Open for decision in some future case remains the question of whether 
Article XII of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights would permit 
withdrawal of the right of trial by jury in this class of cases. 
Consideration of federal issues on appeal. Ackerman v. Scafati42 
involved an unusual problem pertaining to review of a criminal con-
viction. During and after his trial for rape, the defendant had asserted 
a number of claims of federal right. The trial judge ruled against him 
in each instance, but exceptions were not taken to the rulings. Under 
the felony appeal statute,43 nothing is brought before the Supreme 
Judicial Court for review upon appeal unless based upon a valid ex-
ception.44 Nevertheless, the defendant's brief on appeal argued the 
constitutional issues that had been present. Although the Court might 
well have disposed of the appeal without considering any constitu-
tional arguments, it affirmed the defendant's conviction in a brief 
rescript: "[T]he reported testimony shows that the charge was con-
, 399U.S. 66(1970). 
36 1971 Mass.Adv. Sh. 721, 269N.E.2d277. 
37 G.L., c. 119, §56 provides for an appeal to the superior court from the district 
court's finding that the child is a delinquent child. The statute requires that "[t]he 
appeal, if taken, shall be tried and determined in like manner as appeals in criminal 
cases .... " 
38 G.L., c. 119, §53. 
39 391 U.S.l45(1968). 
40 387 u.s. 1 (1967). 
41 McKeiverv. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971). 
42 328F. Supp. 386(D. Mass. 1971). 
43 G.L., c. 278, §§33A·33G. 
44 Commonwealth v. Gray, 314 Mass. 96, 49 N .E.2d 603 (1943 ). 
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vincingly proved in detail. No question worthy of discussion has been 
raised. " 45 
Subsequently, in response to a petition for habeas corpus in the 
United States District Court for Massachusetts, the Commonwealth 
asked for dismissal for failure of the petitioner Ackerman to exhaust 
state court remedies. The district court ruled that the direct appeal to 
the Supreme Judicial Court had constituted such exhaustion under 
the circumstances. Although the rescript of the Supreme Judicial 
Court had not explicitly enumerated the federal questions upon which 
the defendant had relied, its failure to base the disposition of the case 
upon improper or inadequate raising of the questions, together with 
the fact that the questions were argued, led the federal court to the 
inference that the decision of affirmance amounted to a ruling on the 
questions adverse to the defendant. Had the inference been otherwise, 
the defendant would have had to seek a writ of error in the state court 
before seeking relief in the federal court. 
§16.6. Miscellaneous decisions. · In G & M Employment Service, 
Inc. v. Commonwealth, 1 the plaintiff employment agencies challenged 
the validity of the Massachusetts statute that establishes a schedule 
of maximum commissions that may be charged by employment agen-
cies for the placement of certain classes of job seekers. 2 The plaintiffs 
contended that the statutory fees were so low as to be confiscatory. 
Offered in proof of the contention was evidence indicating that had 
the plaintiffs conducted their business in 1967 in accordance with the 
statute they would have received substantially less income than they 
actually received and would have consequently suffered in several 
cases, operating losses. The Supreme Judicial Court held that the 
plaintiffs' evidence was insufficient to prove their contention. Justice 
Cutter for the Court pointed out that the plaintiffs had failed to show 
that the statute would have had similar impact on the employment 
agency industry generally and that the losses could not have been 
avoided by the placing of additional emphasis upon categories of 
placement for which fees were not regulated. The Court further pointed 
out that there was no basis for evaluating the relevance and reason-
ableness of the plaintiffs' operating expenses, as there would have 
been in the case of public utilities and insurance companies who are 
required to maintain uniform statistical practices. Although the Court 
accepted the premise that the legislature may not set employment 
agency fee rates at a confiscatory level,3 proof of the existence of 
confiscation would appear to be difficult. The Court suggested that 
45 Commonwealth v. Ackerman, 356 Mass. 721, 249 N.E.2d 631 (1969) (rescript 
opinion). 
§16.6. 1 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1583,265 N.E.2d476. 
2 G.L., c. 140, §46L, as amended by Acts of 1967, c. 896, §4, fixes agency commissions 
as a percentage of the salary or wages received by the employee over a determined period 
of employment. 
3 The Court stated: "[L]egislatively fixed fees and charges may not be set so low as 
to be confiscatory, and to make it impossible for a prudent, efficient person, ... en-
18
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1971 [1971], Art. 19
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1971/iss1/19
426 1971 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §16.6 
any plaintiff urging confiscation upon the Court would have the 
burden of showing, in addition to significant,ly unfavorable operating 
figures, that his operating results were fairly representative of a sub-
stantial part of the class of regulated businesses to which the plaintiff 
belonged, that the plaintiff's methods of operation and expenses 
were reasonable and proper, and that the plaintiff was not able to op-
erate his business so as to avoid the unfavorable effects of the legisla-
ture's regulation. 
In Godfrey v. Massachusetts Medical Service, 4 the Supreme Judicial 
Court was called upon to referee one aspect of the ongoing controversy 
between conventional physicians and other persons who profess to be 
fellow practitioners of the healing arts. Godfrey was one of a group of 
podiatrists challenging, by a class action, a Massachusetts statute5 
providing that the Massachusetts Medical Service (MMS), the admin-
istrator of the Blue Shield medical service plan of insurance, may enter 
into contracts for the payment of fees of physicians and podiatrists, 
but must contract for the payment of fees of physicians who desire to 
participate in the program. MMS has not accepted the applications of 
podiatrists to participate in its plan. The plaintiffs contended that the 
omission of podiatrists from the mandatory provisions of the statute 
constituted a denial of equal protection or due process in violation of 
the United States Constitution. The Supreme Judicial Court ruled 
that the statutory distinction between physicians and podiatrists had 
been made upon a rational basis and that the classification was related 
to the statutory purpose of promoting public health at manageable 
expense. In reaching that conclusion, the Court relied on the differ-
ences between the extent of the respective practices of physicians and 
podiatrists, the training requirements of the two groups, and the vol-
ume of public demand for the services of each. The Court was also 
swayed by "the possibility that the subscribing public would bear the 
cost of having podiatrists included" in the plan. 
In Massachusetts v. Laird,6 the latest in the line of cases involving 
the Shea Bill/ an action was filed in the United States district court 
by the Commonwealth (and several of its citizens who were members 
of the armed services about to be assigned to military duty in Viet 
Nam) to have declared unconstitutional the participation of the 
United States in the VietNam conflict. The complaint was dismissed 
gaging reasonably in the regulated and lawful calling, to receive fair payment for its 
services and a fair return upon its investment." 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1583, 1590, 265 
N.E.2d 476, 482. 
4 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 969,270 N.E.2d804. 
5 G.L.,c.l76B,§§4, 7. 
6 327 F. Supp. 378(D. Mass.), aff'd, 451 F.2d26 (lstCir. 1971). 
7 Acts of 1970, c. 174, discussed in 1970 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law c.12 and §14.8. The 
Shea Bill directs the attorney general of the Commonwealth to initiate a suit to prevent 
the citizens of Massachusetts from giving military service in Viet Nam. The attorney 
general, in his initial attempt to enforce the bill, was denied leave to file a complaint 
within the original jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court. Massachusetts v. 
Laird, 400 U.S. 886 (1970). 
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on the alternative grounds that the issue presented was not justiciable, 
or, if it was, various acts of Congress constituted adequate legislative 
approval of the government's action. 
In Priestley v. Hastings and Sons Publishing Co.,8 the Court rec-
ognized additional constitutional limitations on the scope of libel 
actions. The defendant had published alleged defamatory statements 
concerning the plaintiff, an architect who had been involved in the 
construction of a public school. The publication was in a report of 
a meeting of the town selectmen, at which meeting statements had 
been made that were critical of the school construction. At the trial,. a 
principal question had been the burden of proof, namely, whether the 
plaintiff was a "public figure" under the rule of New York Times Co. 
v. Sullivan9 and thus had the burden of proving that the publication 
·was malicious as well as false. The trial judge, ruling on that question 
in the negative, refused to direct a verdict for the defendant. After a 
judgment for the plaintiff, an appeal, and arguments before the Supreme 
Judicial Court, the Supreme Court of the United States decided 
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. 10 Rosenbloom, amplifying New 
York Times, held that the First Amendment principles applied through 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect the 
Fourth Estate against liability for nonmalicious publication of a 
matter of public or general concern, whether the individual involved 
was a government official, a "public figure," or a private citizen. The 
Supreme Judicial Court concluded that the Rosenbloom-New York 
Times doctrine governed Priestley, and that the evidence did not war-
rant a finding of malicious publication; judgment was ordered for the 
defendan t. 11 
In Meyer v. Massachusetts Eye and Ear lnfirmary,I2 the federal 
District Court for Massachusetts was presented with an interesting free 
speech problem involving a hospital staff physician. The physician 
was concerned about the disparate treatment accorded to different 
classes of hospital patients: private patients under the continuous care 
of their own doctors, and clinic patients treated at different times by 
the various staff physicians assigned on a rotating basis to clinic 
service. The physician felt that, by reason of the public subsidies for 
the aged and indigent under such programs as Medicare13 and Medic-
8 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1265, 271 N.E.2d 628. This case is the subject of a student 
comment in §16.10 infra. 
9 376 u.s. 254 ( 1964). 
10 403 u.s. 29(1971). 
11 The outer limits of a publisher's First Amendment immunity are a matter for 
speculation. In Dun & Bradstreet v. Grove, 92 S. Ct. 204 (1971), the Court refused to 
grant certiorari to review a decision imposing liability on the publisher of a credit-
rating service for a nonmalicious false statement concerning a private individual's debt 
payments. Justice Douglas dissented on the ground that the Court ought to have taken 
the case to consider the broad question of whether the First Amendment will permit the 
maintenance of any libel action against legitimate publishers. 
12330F.Supp.l328(D.Mass.l971). 
13 42 U .S.C. §1395. 
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aid,14 clinic patients were in fact financially able to receive private 
care. A hospital regulation, however, prohibited him from conveying 
this information to clinic patients. The federal district court rejected 
his contention that the hospital regulation constituted an abridgment 
of his freedom of speech. The court ruled that the hospital's prohibition 
was a reasonable means of guarding against unprofessional solicitation 
of patients by physicians. Reserved until trial on a second claim was 
the issue whether, in any event, the hospital regulation constituted 
"state action" so as to bring it within the ambit of constitutional 
prohibition, a question that would depend upon the factual extent of 
the institutional participation in governmentally funded programs. 15 
In White v. Minter, 16 a three-judge federal district court was called 
upon to decide the validity of G.L., c. 119, §23E. The plaintiff, the 
mother of a small child, had suffered an injury and had left the child 
with a friend while she recuperated in bed. When the mother returned 
to collect her child, she learned that the friend had entered a hospital 
and had turned the child over to the Department of Public Welfare. 
When the plaintiff went to the department, the officials refused to sur-
render custody of the child, justifying their action by Section 23E, 
which directs the department to arrange care for a child who is seem-
ingly without a parent or guardian, and to make arrangements for the 
child's welfare if the parent is unable or unwilling to do so. The mother 
challenged the constitutionality of the statute on the ground that it 
failed to accord the parent a hearing on the question of her ability and 
willingness to care for the child. The court declined to pass on the 
validity of the statute, although the parties had stipulated that resolu-
tion of that issue would be dispositive of the case. The court ruled 
instead that the department had applied the statute in an unconstitu-
tional way by refusing to accord the mother an administrative hearing 
or to apply to the probate court for a custody orderY The court de-
clared that the mother's alternative choice of remedy, a petition for 
habeas corpus, was inadequate because it would have involved an 
improper shifting of the burden of proof from the department to the 
mother. 
One advisory opinion remains to be noted.18 The Senate, in 1970, 
requested an opinion of the Justices as to the constitutionality of a 
bill that had been filed in the 1970 legislative session but was to be 
14 I d. § 1396. 
15 A similar issue was considered in McQueen v. Druker, 438 F.2d 781 (lst Cir. 
1971), which involved the question of whether the activities of a private landlord, who 
had constructed a housing facility in connection with an urban renewal program, took 
on the color of state law and made applicable the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. See §12.19 supra. 
16 330 F. Supp.ll94(D. Mass.197l). 
17 G.L., c. ll9, §23, subsec. c provides: "The department may seek and shall accept 
on order of a probate court the responsibility for any child under [21] who is without 
proper guardianship due to the death, unavailability, incapacity or unfitness of the 
parent or guardian .... " 
18 Answerofthejustices, 1970Mass. Adv. Sh.1333, 262 N.E.2d590. 
21
O'Reilly: Chapter 16: Constitutional Law
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1971
§16.7 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 429 
considered by the legislature jointly with a companion bill to be filed 
in 1971. The 1970 session was prorogued before the request was trans-
mitted. The Justices declared that the question had not been put on a 
"solemn occasion" 19 and declined to give their opinion. Although in 
at least one instance the Justices have given advice to a legislature for 
the guidance of its successor, 20 the instant opinion seems to indicate 
abandonment of that practice. The instant answer was necessitated 
by the almost unbearable burden on the Court from the increasing 
volume of requests for advisory opinions and the expansion of the 
appellate and single-justice dockets. 21 
§16.7. Supervision of the judiciary. In re DeSaulnier1 potentially 
poses a constitutional question of significant dimension, namely, 
whether and to what extent a judicial body may impose sanctions 
against a judge for misconduct in the performance of judicial duties. 2 
For the first time in the history of the Commonwealth, an information 
was filed in the Supreme Judicial Court alleging acts of misconduct 
by two judges of the superior court. The judges were directed to answer 
to the allegations, and were notified that the matter would be set down 
for hearing. In response to challenges by the judges as to the jurisdic-
tion of the Court, the Justices held that the Court had jurisdiction on 
at least four grounds: (l) its inherent powers as the highest constitu-
tional court of the Commonwealth; (2) its supervisory powers over 
the lower courts;3 (3) its disciplinary powers over members of the bar; 
and (4) its power "to establish and enforce rules of court for the orderly 
conduct (1) of officers and judges of the courts and (2) of judicial 
business and administration. " 4 The Court held that it 
has jurisdiction to impose appropriate discipline upon a member 
of the bar, who is also a judge, for misconduct or acts of impro-
priety, whether such acts involve his judicial conduct or other 
conduct. This, we hold, even though, because he is a judge, he 
is not permitted to engage in the practice of law.5 
Of course, it is well settled in Massachusetts, where many practicing 
19 Mass. Const. amend. art. LXXXV. 
20 Opinion of the Justices, 250 Mass. 591, 148 N. E. 889 (1925). 
21 See discussion in 1968Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §7.3; 1969 id. §10.1. 
§16.7. 1 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1345,274 N.E.2d 454. 
2 As this volume was going to press, the Supreme Judicial Court confronted this 
question. One judge was disbarred; and the Court ordered that no judicial business be 
assigned him until further order. Another judge was censured. It was also ordered that 
copies of the record of the proceedings be forwarded to the governor and the legislature. 
In re DeSaulnier, 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 65, 274 N.E.2d 454. At the request of the governor, 
the disbarred judge has resigned, and the chief judge of the superior court has an-
nounced that no cases will be assigned to the second judge. The governor requested the 
resignation of the second judge, but the latter refused to resign. A legislative commis-
sion, composed of members of both branches, has been selected to look into the matter. 
3 G.L., c. 211, §3 describes the Court's supervisory powers. 
4 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1345, 1346-1347,274 N.E.2d 454,456. 
5 I d. at 1347,274 N.E.2dat 456. 
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lawyers are part-time judges, that the Court may entertain disciplinary 
proceedings against an attorney for misconduct, even though he is 
also a judge.6 Indeed, it has been held that the seriousness of an in-
dividual's misconduct as an attorney may be aggravated by the very 
fact that he is also a judge.7 It is not a long step from this to conclude 
that what an individual does qua judge may be relevant in a disciplin-
ary proceeding against him qua attorney. The relevance of conduct in 
a bar discipline matter is its bearing upon the individual's fitness to 
practice law. In the instant case, the Court ruled that its competence 
to proceed as a matter of bar discipline was not affected by the fact that 
the respondents, while they were judges, were prohibited by statute 
from practicing law.8 
Reference in the opinion to the inherent and statutory supervisory 
powers of the Court, however, may raise a difficult question as to the 
power of the Supreme Judicial Court to proceed against a respondent 
as a judge. There are constitutional provisions for removal, either by 
legislative impeachment9 or by executive action upon address by both 
legislative houses,10 and it may be that these methods were intended 
to be the exclusive means of reining in an errant judge. The Supreme 
Court of the United States has recently exercised great ingenuity in 
avoiding coming to grips with the problem as it has arisen with the 
federal judiciary. In Chandler v. judicial Council of the Tenth Cir-
cuit,u the council had ordered that no new cases be assigned to a 
particular district court judge within the circuit. The judge applied 
for a writ of prohibition, but the Supreme Court denied relief for failure 
to exhaust alternative remedies. Justice Harlan concurred on the 
ground that the council had acted within the bounds of its lawful 
jurisdiction. Justices Douglas and Black dissented, arguing that a 
judicial body cannot be invested with power to strip a judge of his 
judicial power. The lack of supervisory authority even in the Supreme 
Court may be illustrated by the fact that precedents exist on the prop-
osition that the Supreme Court does not have power to prevent one 
of its own members from participating in a particular case on the 
ground that he is disqualified. 12 In Massachusetts, by the statute 
implementing judicial reorganization in 1963,13 the chief justice of 
the district courts was given broad supervisory powers over judicial 
administration in those courts, including the power to issue direc-
tives to individual judges. In the event of disobedience of such direc-
tive, the chief justice is to report to the Chief Justice of the Supreme 
6 Inre Ruby, 328Mass. 542, 105 N.E.2d234(1952). 
7 Petition of Centracchio, 345 Mass. 342, 187 N .E.2d 383 ( 1963 ). 
8 G.L., c. 212, §27. 
9 Mass. Const. pt. 2, c. 1, §3, art. VI; id. §2, art. VIII. 
10 Mass. Const. pt. 2, c. 3, art. I. 
II 398 U.S. 74 (1970). 
12 Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local 6167, UMWA, 325 U.S. 897 (1945) (Jackson, 
J., concurring). 
13 Acts of 1963, c. 810, codifiedasaportionofG.L., c. 218, §§6-77A. 
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Judicial Court for the issuance of an "appropriate order." 14 
The supervisory function has traditionally been exercised through 
the appellate process15 or by invocation of the power to make general 
rules of practice and procedure. Apart from such informal practices as 
the giving of distasteful assignments, the recognition and punishment 
of unacceptable judicial conduct has usually been reserved for legis-
latures through the exercise of their power to impeach. Impeachment 
is unquestionably cumbersome, and can be activated only in the most 
extreme cases. It has perhaps been responsible for the establishment 
of an independent judiciary, for it minimizes the possibility of removal 
of a judge for inadequate, though temporarily popular, reasons. A 
by-product of its cumbersome nature, however, has been the continu-
ance of some incompetents on the bench. If this is deemed to be too 
high a price for judicial independence, perhaps a solution would be 
found in a constitutional amendment providing for a tribunal, acting 
within carefully drawn standards, to consider disciplinary proceedings 
in matters involving members of the judiciary. 
§16.8. Privileged communications: Constitutional right of news-
men to protect sources. During the 1971 SURVEY year, the Supreme 
Judicial Court was presented with the question of whether there 
existed a constitutional privilege on the part of news reporters to re-
fuse to testify before a court or grand jury. The petitioner in In re Pap-
pas1 had been employed by a New Bedford television station as a news-
man-photographer. In the summer of 1970, he had been assigned tore-
port on civil disorders that were occurring in New Bedford. In carrying 
out his assignment, the defendant sought entrance into a building that 
was being used as a headquarters by the Black Panthers, a group of 
New Bedford residents who were apparently intimately involved in 
the disturbances. The newsman was allowed to enter the headquarters 
only on the condition that he would not report anything he saw or 
heard there, unless a police raid occurred. No police raid occurred, 
and Pappas reported nothing. Some months later, Pappas was sub-
poenaed before a county grand jury that had convened to investigate 
the civil disruptions that Pappas had been assigned to cover. He 
appeared, but refused to answer certain questions concerning what 
he had witnessed inside the Panther headquarters. After refusing to 
testify, the petitioner filed a motion to quash an outstanding subpoena 
requiring him to testify at a further grand jury sitting, at which he 
presumably would have been asked the same questions he had already 
refused to answer. A superior court judge ruled that Pappas was not 
protected by any privilege and that he had to respond to the subpoena 
11 G.L., c. 218, §43A. 
15 See discussion in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 40 (1949) (Black, J., concurring), 
referring to McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943). 
§16.8. 1 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 69, 266 N.E.2d 297. The case has been discussed by 
numerous commentators, e.g., Hall and Jones, Pappas and Caldwell, The Newsman's 
Privilege-Two Judicial Views, 56 Mass. L.Q. 155 (1971). 
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and answer any questions put to him by the grand jury. The judge 
then reported to the Supreme Judicial Court the question of whether 
a newsman had a constitutional right to protect his confidential 
sources of information against a grand jury inquiry. The Supreme 
Judicial Court affirmed the lower court ruling and held that there 
existed no constitutional newsman's privilege, either qualified or 
absolute, to refuse to appear and testify before a court or grand jury. 
Pappas, on appeal, had relied chiefly upon the now famous Caldwell 
v. United States,2 in which the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
had found a qualified newsman's privilege in the First Amendment to 
the Constitution. In Caldwell, the grand jury had apparently been 
seeking general information concerning the Black Panther party and 
had subpoenaed Caldwell, a black reporter for the New York Times, 
as part of its general inquiry. In response to Caldwell's motion to quash 
the outstanding subpoena, a federal district court entered a protec-
tive order to the effect that, inter alia, the reporter need not reveal his 
sources or relate confidential information to the grand jury. The court 
of appeals concluded that the protective order embodied to the maxi-
mum extent the newsman's First Amendment privilege and held that 
to require Caldwell to appear at all, the government would have to 
show "a compelling need for the witness's presence." 
In the course of its opinion in Pappas, the Supreme Judicial Court 
took the occasion to review the status of the newsman's privilege. The 
applicable overriding principle, implied the Court, is that the public 
"has a right to every man's evidence."3 It was also noted that although 
other states may have created a statutory privilege covering newsmen, 
Massachusets has not chosen ·to do so. Although the Court acknowl-
edged an argument for finding a qualified constitutional newsman's 
privilege, it also pointed out the prevailing countervailing view that 
"[ i]f a privilege to suppress the truth is to be recognized at all, its limits 
should be sharply determined so as to coincide with the limits of the 
benefits it creates. "4 The common law was read by the Court as per-
mitting, in the exercise of the power of courts to compel testimony, 
at least some weighing of competing public interests so as to prevent 
"unreasonably broad, unnecessary, irrelevant, or needlessly burden-
some inquiry."5 The broad implications of the Caldwell decision 
were criticized by the Court on several grounds. Initially, the Court 
indicated that the creation of a First Amendment newsman's privilege 
2 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970), rev'g 311 F. Supp. 358 (N.D. Cal.); Caldwell has 
also received extensive commentary, e.g., Note, The Newsman's Privilege: Government 
Investigations, Criminal Prosecutions and Private Litigation, 58 Calif. L. Rev. 1198 
(1970); Nelson, Newsmen's Privilege Against Disclosure of Confidential Sources and 
Information, 24 Vand. L. Rev. 667 (1971); Comments, [1971] Wash. U.L.Q. 478; 46 
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 617 (1971). 
3 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 69, 71,266 N.E.2d 297, 299, citing [8] Wigmore, Evidence §§2192, 
2285 [McNaughton rev. 1961]. 
4 Id. at 73, 266 N.E.2d at 301, citing E. Morgan, preface to ALI Model Code of 
Evidence at 7 (1942). 
5 Id. at 74,266 N.E.2dat301. 
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would be a "judicial amendment of the Constitution or judicial legis-
lation." The Court then observed that compelling a newsman's 
testimony would not prevent the dissemination of the information 
he possessed: only future news, said the Court, would perhaps be 
affected. Writing for the Court, Justice Cutter felt that important 
state interests in the enforcement of criminal law had been disregarded 
by the Caldwell court in favor of interests of the news media that could 
reasonably be protected by the judiciary under existing common law 
principles. The obligation of newsmen, explained the Court, is "to 
appear when summoned, with relevant written or other material when 
. required, and to auswer relevant and reasonable inquiries. Such 
appearances, however, like those of other citizens, are subject to super-
vision by the presiding judge to prevent oppressive, unnecessary, 
irrelevant, and other improper inquiry and investigation."6 The Court 
declared that the witness complaining of improper grand jury pro-
ceedings has the burden of establishing that the grand jury inquiry 
is improper or oppressive. 
Certiorari was granted in both Caldwell7 and Pappas,8 as well as 
in a case from the Kentucky court of appeals raising a similar issue.9 
All three cases will be argued together. 
STUDENT CoMMENTS 
§16.9. Constitutionality of public school regulations. In the 
wake of the 1968 decision of the United States Supreme Court in 
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 1 there remains 
much uncertainty over the state's power to regulate student activity. 
The United States District Court for Massachusetts and the First 
Circuit Court of Appeals discussed the problem last year in Richards 
v. Thurston,2 striking down a grooming reg.Jlation that set a maxi-
mum allowable hair length and regulated other aspects of hairstyle. 
During the 1971 SuRVEY year, the federal district court, in Hasson v. 
Boothby3 and Ordway v. Hargraves, 4 contributed two additional 
decisions that define more clearly the extent of state regulatory power 
and the correlative rights of students under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 
The case law that governs the relative rights of schools and students 
has developed primarily in federal courts and within the past three 
decades. Before 1942, there was little mention of students' rights. 
6 Id. at 77,266 N.E.2dat303. 
7 United States v. Caldwell, 402 U.S. 942(1971), docketed as No. 70-57. 
8 In re Pappas, 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 69, 266 N .E.2d 297, docketed as U.S. No. 70-94. 
9 Branz burg v. Hayes, docketed as U.S. No. 70-85. Reported below, 461 S. W .2d 345 
(Ky. 1970). 
§16.9. 1 393 u.s. 503 (1968). 
2 304 F. Supp. 449 (D. Mass. 1969), aff'd, 424 F.2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1970), noted in 1970 
Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §23.6. 
3 318 F. Supp. 1183 (D. Mass. 1970). 
• 323 F. Supp. 1155 (D. Mass.1971). 
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Even the landmark freedom of education case of Meyer v. Nebraska, 
for example, turned upon "[the teacher's] right thus to teach, and the 
right of parents to engage him so to instruct their children [which 
rights], we think, are within the liberty of the [Fourteenth] Amend-
ment."5 The Supreme Court decided that parents have a duty to 
educate their children that corresponds to their right to control them; 
but if the children were thought to have rights of their own, the Court 
chose not to mention them. Constitutional protections were extended 
directly to students for the first time in 1942, in Board of Education v. 
Barnette. 6 In that case, a regulation required all students to join in 
the pledge of allegiance to the flag under pain of expulsion from 
school. The Supreme Court struck down the regulation because it 
denied First Amendment religious freedom to Jehovah's Witnesses, 
whose beliefs forbade them to salute the flag. 
Then, in Tinker, the Supreme Court held explicitly that "First 
Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of 
the school environment, are available to teachers and students. "7 
(Emphasis supplied.) Despite the division of opinion on the Court8 
and the majority's express narrowing of the holding,9 Tinker has 
generated a flood of litigation and considerable diversity of opinion 
among lower federal courts. 1o The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
has cited Tinker for the broad proposition that "the Constitution 
protects minor high school students as well as adults from arbitrary 
and unjustified· governmental rules." 11 The United States District 
Court for the Northern District of Ohio, on the other hand, has quoted 
5 262 U.S. 390, 400 ( 1923 ). 
6 319 u.s. 624(1942). 
7 393 U.S. 503, 506(1968). 
8 Justice Biack was reluctant to find the wearing of armbands "symbolic speech" 
under the First Amendment. But even if it were, he argued, public schools were not the 
appropriate forum for the exercise of such speech. Id. at 515-526. Justice Harlan agreed 
that the Fourteenth Amendment did have some bearing on the activities of local school 
boards, but that "school officials should be accorded the widest authority in maintain-
ing discipline and good order in their institution." To give effect to this policy, he 
would place upon the student the burden of proving that a particular school rule was 
motivated by other than legitimate school concerns. Id. at 526. Justice Stewart agreed 
with the Court's decision, but rejected the "Court's uncritical assumption that, school 
discipline aside, the First Amendment rights of children are coextensive with those of 
adults." Id. at 515. 
9 '"The problem posed by the present case does not relate to regulation of the length 
of skirts or the type of clothing, to hair style, or deportment. ... It does not concern 
aggressive disruptive action or even group demonstrations. Our problem involves direct, 
primary First Amendment rights akin to 'pure speech.'" Id. at 507-508. 
10 Although the Supreme Court itself has made no further pronouncements, the 
most recent statement by a Supreme Court Justice in the area of student rights was made 
by Justice Black in Karr v. Schmidt, 401 U.S. 1201 (1971). In that case, Justice Black 
heard an appeal in his capacity as Circuit Justice for the Sixth Circuit, to vacate stay 
of an injunction that would have prevented a public school committee from enforcing 
a rule against long hair in its high schools. Although some lower federal courts have 
granted relief in similar circumstances, e.g., Richards v. Thurston, 304 F. Supp. 449 
(D. Mass. 1969), aff'd, 424 F.2d 1281 (lst Cir. 1970), Justice Black refused to find that the 
right to long hair was constitutionally protected from intrusion by a local school board. 
11 Breen v. Kahl,419 F.2d 1034, l036(7th Cir.l969). 
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Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Tinker12 to support the 
proposition that "children cannot be accorded all the liberties con-
stitutionally afforded to adults without encountering very serious 
practical difficulties." 13 Even those courts that interpret Tinker 
broadly have disagreed as to the source of students' rights, finding the 
source variously in the First and Ninth Amendments14 and in the 
due process clause15 and the equal protection clause16 of the Four-
teenth Amendment. In Richards, the federal District Court for Mas-
sachusetts held that the freedom to wear long hair is embraced by the 
concept of liberty and is entitled to protection unless the state can 
show a compelling interest in its regulation. The First Circuit 
affirmed, but without conceding that the freedom to wear long hair 
is within the ambit of the First Amendment. Instead, the circuit court 
held that whenever a personal liberty is shown, the state's counter-
vailing interest in regulation must either be self-evident or affirm-
atively shown.i7 It is within the context of Tinker and Richards 
that the Hasson and Ordway cases arose. 
Hasson and Ordway were brought under 42 U.S.C. §1983. Section 
1983 provides that a civil action will lie in federal court against any 
person who has acted under color of state law to deprive the plaintiff 
of a right granted by the United States Constitution. 18 Section 1983 
has been the basis for jurisdiction in cases in which students have 
challenged school regulations involving haircuts, 19 clothing,2° 
refusal to live in a dormitory,21 school newspaper publication,22 
and speakers on campus.23 Some federal courts, however, have refused 
to entertain student cases under section 1983, either because of the lack 
of a substantial federal question,24 or because state remedies have 
not been previously exhausted.25 . 
The significance of federal jurisdiction under Section 1983 should 
12" '[A] State may permissibly determine that, at least in some precisely delineated 
areas, a child-like someone in a captive audience-is not possessed of that full capacity 
for individual choice which is the presupposition of First Amendment guarantees.' " 
393 U.S. 503, 515 (1968). Justice Stewart quoted his own earlier concurring opinion in 
Ginsburg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 648-650 (1968). 
13 Cordova v. Chonko, 315 F. Supp. 953, 959(N.D. Ohio 1970). 
H Breen v. Kahl, 419F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969). 
15 Sims v. Colfax Community School Dist., 307 F. Supp. 485 (S.D. Iowa 1970). 
16 Zachry v. Brown, 299 F. Supp. 1360 (N.D. Ala. 1967). 
17 424F.2d 1281,1286(lstCir.l970). 
18 42 U.S.C. §1983 reads as follows: "Every person who, under color of any statute, 
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects or causes to 
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction 
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Consti-
tution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or 
other proper proceeding for redress." 
19 Richards v. Thurston, n.2 supra. 
2° Bannisterv. Paradis, 316 F. Supp.l85 (D.N.H. 1970). 
21 Moliere v. Southeastern Louisiana College, 304 F. Supp. 826 (E.D. La. 1969). 
22 Antonelli v. Hammond, 308 F. Supp. 1329 (D. Mass. 1970). 
23 Smith v. University of Tennessee, 300 F. Supp. 777 (E.D. Tenn. 1969). 
24 Alberda v. Noell,322F.Supp.l379(E.D. Mich.l971). 
25 Schwartz v. Galveston Indep. School Dist., 309 F. Supp. 1034 (S.D. Texas 1970). 
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not be underestimated, since Massachusetts courts have traditionally 
approached the school regulation problem from a much different 
perspective. The controlling state precedent is Watson v. City of 
Cambridge, wherein the Supreme Judicial Court said: 
The management of the schools involves many details; and it is 
important that a board of public officers, dealing with these de-
tails, and having jurisdiction to regulate the internal affairs of 
the schools, should not be interfered with or have their conduct 
called in question before another tribunal, so long as they act in 
good faith within their jurisdiction.26 
Watson has been cited as authority most recently in Leonard v. 
School Committee of Attleboro,21 in which haircut regulations 
similar to those in Richards were upheld four years before the 
Richards decision. Apart from the good faith test in Watson, a stan-
dard of reasonableness has occasionally been applied by the Supreme 
Judicial Court,28 but under either standard, challenges to school 
regulations have generally met with little success at the state level. 
Hasson involved three high school athletes who had attended a 
dance held on school premises during a school vacation. At the dance 
the boys met one of their teachers, who was also a coach on the track 
team. When asked about the smell of beer on their breath, they ad-
mitted that they had been drinking off the school premises; when the 
teacher did not require them to leave the dane~, they considered the 
episode ended. At no time did the boys cause any disturbance. On the 
following day, the boys learned from their respective coaches that 
they were to be suspended from athletics. Suspension was the usual 
sanction for athletes caught drinking and the boys were aware of it. 
In addition, the principal ordered that the boys be put on one year's 
probation. Although automatic probation was in fact a part of the 
usual school response to student drinking, no policy to that effect 
had ever been published. After two meetings with the boys' parents, 
the school committee upheld the principal's decision, but directed 
him to review each boy's status periodically. After reviewing the 
status of each boy at the beginning of the following school year, the 
principal refused to terminate the penalties prior to November. The 
boys were superior athletes with hopes of obtaining college athletic 
scholarships, but the principal's decision left them ineligible to play 
football and to compete for athletic scholarships during their junior 
year. 
Shortly thereafter, the boys brought a suit in the United States Dis-
trict Court for Massachusetts under Section 1983 to set aside their 
punishments. They alleged that their punishments viofated Four-
26 157 Mass. 561,563,32 N.E. 864,865 (1893). 
27 349 Mass. 704, 212 N.E.2d 468 (1965), noted in 1966 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§14.3, 
21.8. 
28 See, e.g., Hodgkins v. Inhabitants of Rockport, 105 Mass. 475 (1870); see also 
G.L., c. 76, §5. 
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teenth Amendment due process guarantees because the policy 
against drinking had not been published. The court disagreed and 
held that the validity of punishment in the absence of published rules 
depends upon three factors: "(l) prior knowledge of the offending 
student of the wrongfulness of his conduct and the clarity of the public 
policy involved, (2) potential for a chilling effect on First Amendment 
rights inherent in the situation, (3) severity of the penalty imposed."29 
Upon finding the required prior knowledge, the absence of First 
Amendment considerations, and a reasonable penalty, the district 
court upheld the punishment and dismissed the complaint. The 
court's opinion did not indicate, however, whether any one of the 
three due process tests is more important than the others, or whether 
all three must be unfavorable before a student's due process rights 
will be considered violated. 
Moreover, each test presents its own problems. For example, there 
are no clear guidelines to assist in determining when a particular 
penalty is severe. As an example of a major penalty, the court lists "ex-
pulsion or suspension for any significant time."30 Probation would 
seem to be a minor penalty, but the court added a qualification: 
[W]ere the plaintiffs required to serve the full "sentence" [pro-
bation for one year] imposed on them for an offense as minor as 
theirs appears to have been, despite good behavior [during the 
probation period], such a penalty might approach the order of 
arbitrary and capricious in a constitutional sense. 31 
There may also be a problem of vagueness in the dual test of prior 
knowledge and clarity of public policy. To avoid the constitutional 
questions, the Hasson court emphasized the probability of actual 
knowledge in the case at hand. The court noted that pamphlets warn-
ing of the dangers of alcohol had been distributed in health classes at 
school, and that the Massachusetts General Laws forbid the consump-
tion of alcohol by minors. Moreover, plaintiffs admitted their knowl-
edge of the athletic department's policy against drinking on or off 
school premises. The test of actual or constructive knowledge, 
although applied soundly in Hasson, may need additional refinement. 
A student with actual knowledge of disciplinary policies, for example, 
might reasonably expect that they do not apply to situations outside 
of school. He might reasonably assume that drinking rules would be 
relaxed during school vacations or for certain social functions in his 
home. 
Closely related is the administrative problem of writing regulations 
which are broad enough to provide effective discipline, yet specific 
enough to be enforceable. As might be expected, the courts are divided 
in their approach to specific regulations. Several courts have applied 
the stringent principles of statutory construction to regulations and 
29 318F.Supp.ll83, 1188(D.Mass.l970). 
30 Ibid. 
'' 318 F. Supp. 1183, 1189 (D. Mass. 1970). 
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have applied the constitutional tests of vagueness32 and overbreadth33 
to determine the sufficiency of notice. Other courts have taken the 
more reasonable position that "handbook rules" should be more 
liberally construed to permit effective discipline.34 The liberal con-
struction rule is also more practical where school authorities have 
limited experience in statutory draftsmanship. The Hasson decision 
seems to be a compromise between two extremes. The first extreme is 
the doctrine asserted by plaintiffs in Hasson that no rule is enforceable 
unless it has been officially promulgated prior to enforcement. The 
district court felt compelled to reject this contention because of dic-
tum in the First Circuit's decision in Richards: "[W]e do not wish 
to see school officials unable to take appropriate action in facing a 
problem of discipline or destruction simply because there was no 
preexisting rule on the books. " 35 The second extreme is the doctrine 
that school officials have an inherent authority to punish students, 
even without published rules. Although the penalty in Hasson was 
upheld on the facts of the case, the court pointedly acknowledged 
that "imposition of a severe penalty without a specific promulgated 
rule might be constitutionally deficient. " 36 
In Ordway, an 18-year-old unmarried high school senior brought 
a Section 1983 action against her principal and the seven members of 
her local school committee for an order to compel them to readmit her 
to school on a regular-class-hour basis. In January 1971, the plaintiff 
had informed her principal that she was pregnant and expected to 
give birth the following June. At the time, a school committee rule 
provided: "Whenever an unmarried girl enrolled in . . . [h ]igh 
[ s ]chool shall be known to be pregnant, her membership in the 
school shall be immediately terminated." Pursuant to this rule, the 
principal informed Miss Ordway that she must stop attending regular 
classes following the February school vacation. In a confirmatory 
letter to the girl's mother, the principal set forth the conditions for 
Miss Ordway's future association with the school. He stated that she 
would be prohibited from attending classes during normal school 
hours, but would be allowed to engage in extracurricular activities 
and receive instruction from her teachers after the usual school hours. 
The local school committee endorsed the principal's action, although 
he had failed to sever Miss Ordway's connection with the school, as a 
32 Crossen v. Fatsi, 309 F. Supp. 114 (D. Conn. 1970). 
33 McAlpine v. Reese, 309F. Supp. 136(E.D. Mich. 1970). 
34 E.g., Pritchard v. Spring Branch Indep. School Dist., 308 F. Supp. 570 (S.D. Texas 
1970). 
35 424 F.2d 1281, 1282 (1st Cir. 1970). Although the circuit rourt ordered the school 
principal to readmit the student plaintiff, its decision was not based on the lack of a 
previously published rule. 
' 6 318 F. Supp. 1183, ll88 (D. Mass. 1970). For cases in which severe penalties were 
upheld because of published general rules, see Barker v. Hardway, 283 F. Supp. 228 
(S.D.W. Va. 1968), aff'd, 399 F.2d 638 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 905 (1969); 
Jones v. State Bd. of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190 (M.D. Tenn. 1968), aff'd, 407 F.2d 834 
(6th Cir. 1969), cert. granted, 396 U.S. 817 (1969), but dismissed, 397 U.S. 31 (1970). 
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literal reading of the rule would have required. Thereupon, Miss 
Ordway brought her action in the United States District Court for 
Massachusetts. 
At the hearing on her motion for a preliminary injunction, the 
plaintiff introduced testimony to support three contentions: first, 
that her regular attendance at classes would not endanger either her 
health or the health of the child (there was even testimony that a 
greater danger to the mental well-being of both mother and child 
might result should Miss Ordway be excluded from school against 
her will); second, that her pregnancy had not disrupted any school 
events; and third, that she would obtain an education inferior to that 
of her classmates if excluded from regular classes. Citing Richards, 
the court held that the right to receive a public school education is a 
basic personal right, and that the burden of justifying any rule which 
limits or terminates that right is on the school authorities. Since the 
court found no adequate justification, it ordered that Miss Ordway 
be readmitted as a regular student. 
The court considered it sufficient to point out that none of the pre-
viously recognized "compelling state interests" was present; no 
attempt was made to define which of those interests would or would 
not present an adequate justification for expulsion of Miss Ordway. 
The broadest category of compelling interests recognized by other 
federal courts in school situations is the state's interest in maintaining 
order and discipline in the school. Two decisions handed down by 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, one granting 
a student constitutional protection from a school regulation for-
bidding the wearing of "freedom buttons,"37 the other upholding 
a similar regulation in a different school,38 were distinguished by 
the court in Ordway on the basis of disciplinary problems in the 
second school. One other federal court, in upholding the right of 
an unwed mother to continue her high school education, has indi-
cated that proof that the girl was a bad influence on the morals of 
the other girls at the school would be sufficient to deny her a public 
education.39 The district court in Ordway implied that the state's 
interest in removing immoral influences or in protecting the health 
of mother or baby might be compelling enough to justify exclusion 
from regular classes, but that these dangers had not been proven in 
the case at hand. 40 
Although Miss Ordway alleged a denial of equal protection, the 
court chose not to rely on the Fourteenth Amendment in its opinion. 
Plaintiff had argued that the violation lay in denying her the same 
educational opportunities afforded girls who . were not ptegnant. 
Because the local school regulations seemed to allow married preg-
37 Burnsidev. Byers, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966). 
38 Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966). 
39 Perry v. Grenada Municipal Separate School Dist., 300 F. Supp. 748, 753 (N.D. 
Miss. 1969). 
40 323 F. Supp. 1155, 1158 (D. Mass. 1971). 
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nant girls to continue regular school attendance, it might have been 
better to stress the different treatment given girls who were married 
and pregnant as opposed to girls who were not married and pregnant. 
There is precedent for the argument that discrimination based on 
marital status is unconstitutional in some school situations. In a 
1969 Mississippi case, two unwed mothers claimed that their expul-
sion from a public high school while married mothers were allowed 
to continue their education violated the equal protection clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. The federal District Court for the Northern 
District of Mississippi held that the equal protection clause demands 
equal treatment for unmarried mothers unless the state can show spe-
cial justification, such as immoral character, for their exclusion.41 
The plaintiff in Ordway may have chosen the broader equal protection 
argument-on behalf of all pregnant girls-so that the school could 
not circumvent a decision in her favor by rewording the rules to apply 
to both married and unmarried pregnant girls. 
Although the basis of the Ordway decision was the "basic personal 
right or liberty" to receive a public education, the source of the right 
was not discussed. Presumably, the source is in the Constitution, 
since jurisdiction in the case was based upon 42 U.S.C. §1983, which 
gives every person deprived of a constitutional right an action in a 
federal district court.42 One possible indication is found in Richards, 
where the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the right to 
determine one's own appearance is an aspect of the "liberty" assured 
by the Fourteenth Amendment: 
The idea that there are substantive rights protected by the 
"liberty" assurance of the Due Process Clause is almost too well 
established to require discussion. Many of the cases have involved 
rights expressly guaranteed by one or more of the first eight 
Amendments. But it is clear that the enumeration of certain 
rights in the Bill of Rights has not been construed by the 
[United States Supreme] Court to preclude the existence of other 
substantive rights implicit in the "liberty" assurance of the Due 
Process Clause.43 [Footnote omitted.] 
Having thus affirmed the student's right to determine his own appear-
ance, the First Circuit placed the burden on the school authorities to 
justify their grooming regulations. The court agreed with the findings 
below that the defendant had failed to show that the plaintiff's long 
hair "involves a health or sanitary risk to him or to others, or will 
interfere with plaintiff's or others' performance of their school work, 
or will create disciplinary problems of a kind reasonably thought to 
be a concern of public officials."44 
41 Perry v. Granada Municipal Separate School Dist., 300 F. Supp. 748, 751-752 
(N.D. Miss. 1969). 
42 See n.l8 supra. 
43 424F.2d 1281, 1284(lstCir.l970). 
44 304 F. Supp. 449,451 (D. Mass. 1969). 
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If the "liberty assurance" of the due process clause has been extended 
in Ordway from the right to govern one's own appearance to the right 
to a public school education, a number of crucial questions are pre-
sented. The most important question is whether all future expul-
sions from public schools will automatically raise a constitutional 
issue.45 If so, the presumption in favor of a school regulation's 
validity, presently available in Massachusetts state courts,46 may 
effectively be destroyed, for each time a student questions the validity 
of a rule under which he has been expelled, he would have a federal 
cause of action where the burden would be on the school authorities 
to show compelling state interest. Most local school regulations 
might be open to question. Furthermore, there seems to be nothing 
in the Ordway opinion to limit its holding to cases involving expul-
sion-as opposed, for example, to a lengthy suspension. If there is a 
right to education, perhaps such a suspension would also deny that 
right. Education might even be defined broadly enough to include 
certain extracurricular activities. Ordway also leaves doubts regarding 
the levels of public school education to which the decision pertains. 
Other federal courts have considered the constitutional rights of 
grade school students47 and college students,48 affording certain 
constitutional protection to both groups. 
An additional question, the geographical extent of school regula-
tory power, was not treated in either Hasson or Ordway, although 
the offensive conduct in each case, the drinking in Hasson and the 
beginning of Miss Ordway's pregnancy, occurred off the school 
premises. Traditionally, however, Massachusetts courts have granted 
broad powers to public school authorities to regulate both off-the-
premises conduct and conduct after normal school hours when such 
conduct bears some relation to a function of the school. In Antell v. 
Stokes, 49 the Supreme Judicial Court upheld a principal's regulation 
of student clubs whose only connection with the school was that their 
membership included children from the school. It will be necessary 
to await future decisions tq see whether the federal courts will attach 
any importance to the time or place at which an offense occurs. 
Conclusion. In both Hasson and Ordway, the federal courts em-
ployed a balancing test. In Hasson, the school's interest in effective 
and flexible discipline was weighed against the student's right to be 
warned in advance by published rules of the danger of punishment. 
In Ordway, the court balanced the interest of the school in excluding 
45 Since Ordway, the California Supreme Court in Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 
487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971), has openly asserted that a public high school 
education is a "fundamental interest" protected by the United States Constitution. In 
that case, however, protection was found in the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
46See, e.g., Leonard v. School Comm. of Attleboro, 349 Mass. 704, 212 N.E.2d 468 
(1965), noted in 1966 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§14.3, 21.8. 
47 Press v. Pasadena Indep. School Dist., 326 F. Supp. 530(S.D. Tex. 1971). 
48 Moliere v. Southeastern Louisiana College, 304 F. Supp. 826 (E.D. La. 1969). 
49 287 Mass. 103,191 N.E. 407 (1934). 
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an unwed pregnant student against the student's right to a public 
school education. The court accepted for the first time the proposi-
tion that the Constitution protects a right to public education, and 
this may lead to an even more frequent use of the federal courts as 
the forum for asserting student rights. It may also create uncertainty 
in the formulation of school disciplinary rules, for any rule used to 
expel a student could be open to scrutiny as to a compelling state 
interest. In the absence of additional guidelines, Tinker affords the 
clearest test for finding compelling interests in a given case: if "appro-
priate discipline" necessitates a rule, it will stand.50 Although many 
questions remain in the wake of Hasson and Ordway, the cases mark 
an increasing role for the federal courts in local public education. 
RICHARD A. OLIVER 
§16.10. Expansion of the constitutional privilege to defame: Priest-
ley v. Hastings and Sons Publishing Co. 1 The defendant was ~ued 
for libel2 in Essex Superior Court, based on three articles printed in its 
newspaper. The articles reported charges of incompetence, bad faith, 
and misconduct that had been made by the town manager of Saugus 
against the plaintiff,3 an architect who had been commissioned by 
the town of Saugus to design and supervise the construction of a new 
junior high school. The allegedly libelous statements reported in the 
defendant's newspaper emanated from conversations between the 
defendant's reporter and the town manager and from meetings of the 
town selectmen at which complaints about the school's construction 
were aired. 
It was the defendant's contention that the "actual malice" standard 
articulated by the United States Supreme Court in New York Times 
Co. v. Sullivan4 was applicable to the case. This standard denies 
recovery to a "public official" unless he can prove that his alleged 
libeler acted "with knowledge that ... [the publication] was false 
or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. "5 At the 
close of evidence, the trial judge ruled that the plaintiff was not a 
5o 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1968). 
§16.10. 1 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1265, 271 N.E.2d 628. 
2 There is no statutory definition of libel in Massachusetts. See Grande and Son v. 
Chace, 333 Mass. 166, 168, 129 N.E.2d 898, 899 (1955), for a common law definition. 
3 The final article printed by the defendant, that of Oct. 19, 1967, contained by far the 
most damaging statements about the plaintiff. The town manager's remarks, as reported 
by the defendant, were narrowly focused on the plaintiff's alleged "illegalities, incompe-
tence and bad faith." The articles also reported statements attributed to the town man-
ager that he intended to seek to have the plaintiff's state registration revoked; that the 
district attorney's office was not investigating, but.only because it lacked sufficient man-
power at the time; and that the town manager's office had filed a complaint against the 
plaintiff with the Ethics Committee of the American Institute of Architects. 1971 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. 1265, 1266-1267, 271 N.E.2d 628, 630. 
4 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
5 Id. at 280. 
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public official and that, as a matter of law, the burden of proof under 
the New York Times standard was not applicable to him. The jury 
returned a verdict for the plaintiff of $25,000 in compensatory dam-
ages.6 In reversing, the Supreme Judicial Court held that the case was 
controlled by the decision of the United States Supreme Court in 
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,7 a decision rendered after oral 
arguments had been heard by the Supreme Judicial Court in Priestley. 
In the Rosenbloom case, Philadelphia police, responding to com-
plaints regarding the distribution of obscene material, raided the 
residence and warehouse of George Rosenbloom, a magazine distrib-
utor. Newscasts by defendant's radio station reported both Rosen-
bloom's arrest for possession of obscene literature and police seizure 
of "obscene books." Subsequent news reports, while not mentioning 
Rosenbloom by name, referred to the police action as part of a cam-
paign against "girlie-book peddlers" and the "smut literature racket." 
Following his acquittal on criminal obscenity charges, Rosenbloom 
brought a diversity action in federal district court seeking damages 
under Pennsylvania's libel law. When the case reached the United 
States Supreme Court, it was held that 
a libel action ... by a private individual against a licensed radio 
station for a defamatory falsehood in a newscast relating to his 
involvement in an event of public or general concern may be 
sustained only upon clear and convincing proof that the defama-
tory falsehood was published with knowledge that it was false or 
with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.8 [Emphasis 
added.] 
In Priestley, the Supreme Judicial Court found that the articles pub-
lished by the defendant related to a "local controversy of legitimate 
public concern" in which the plaintiff was involved. The Court held, 
therefore, that Rosenbloom required application of the actual malice 
standard in a case such as Priestley. 
Rosenbloom is the capstone of a series of cases that have expanded 
the common law's qualified privilege for fair comment and criticism 
into a rule of constitutional law. Selected cases will be discussed in 
this comment to show how the "actual malice" standard has evolved, 
but the comment is intended primarily to examine the effect of Rosen-
bloom upon the libel plaintiff and to suggest possible judicial and 
legislative responses· to the decision. 
Prior to the New York Times case, publishers commenting on the 
conduct of public officials or on matters of public concern were gen-
erally protected from liability for defamation by the fair comment 
and criticism privilege recognized by a majority of the states.9 The 
6 Punitive or exemplary damages are not allowed in libel actions in Massachusetts. 
See G.L, c. 231, §93. 
7 403 u.s. 29 ( 1971). 
8 lei. at 52. 
9 See, e.g., Knapp v. Post Printing and Pub. Co., Ill Colo. 192, 144 P.2d 981 ( 1943 ); 
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prevailing view held that statements of opinion made without malice 
were privileged, but that false statements of fact were actionable. 10 
The minority view extended the privilege to protect even false state-
ments of fact if made without malice.11 In New York Times, the 
Supreme Court interpreted the First and Fourteenth Amendments as 
providing not only a privilege for comment and criticism regarding 
official conduct, but as providing a privilege for misstatement of fact 
concerning the official conduct of "public officials." The Court qual-
ified the privilege to the extent that any defamation of a "public offi-
cial" had to be free of malice. 12 In effect, New York Times adopted 
the minority common law view of fair comment and criticism. The 
Supreme Court observed that in a democratic society there is a need for 
the actions of elected officials to be open to the scrutiny of the people, 
and that the First Amendment reflects "a profound national commit-
ment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhib-
ited, robust, and wide open, and that it may well include vehement, 
caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and 
public officials. "13 
The constitutional privilege articulated in New York Times was 
soon expanded in Garrison v. Louisiana,44 where the Supreme 
Court decided that any statement "which might touch on an official's 
fitness for office" is protected, even though such a statement might 
concern the official's private life. However, Garrison did draw a dis-
tinction between "criticism of the official conduct of public officials" 
and "purely private defamation. " 15 The term public official was 
construed to include not only incumbents and candidates for public 
office, but appointed officials as well. Moreover, in Rosenblatt v. 
Baer, the Supreme Court held that whether a person is a "public offi-
cial" is not to be determined under state law standards, but in accor-
Cherry v. Des Moines Leader, 114 Iowa 298, 86 N.W. 323 (1901); Dowling v. Livingstone, 
108 Mich. 321, 66 N.W. 225 (1896). See also Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts 819 
(4th ed. 1971). 
10 In a leading case that stated the majority view, Justice Holmes said that "what is 
privileged, if that is the proper term, is criticism, not statement, and however it might 
be if a person merely quoted or referred to a statement as made by others, and gave it no 
new sanction, if he takes upon himself in his own person to allege facts otherwise libel-
ous, he will not be privileged if those facts are not true." Burt v. Advertiser Newspaper 
Co., 154 Mass. 238, 242, 28 N.E. I, 4 (1891). 
11 Under the minority view, if a newspaper published, in good faith, an article com-
menting on the official conduct or character of a state official, the publication was 
privileged, even though matters contained in the article were untrue in fact and deroga-
tory to the official's character. E.g., Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 722-723, 
98 P. 281, 285 (1908). 
12 Malice, under the New , York Times decision, was defined as the publisher's 
knowledge of the falsity of the defamatory statement or his reckless disregard of whether 
the statement was false or not. 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964). This definition of malice did not 
require proof of bad motivation or ill will. 
13 Id. at 270. 
14 379 u.s. 64 (1964). 
15 Id. at 76. 
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dance with the basic constitutional protections afforded free expres-
sion.I6 It was also determined in Rosenblatt that a government 
employee who has, or who appears to the public to have, substantial 
responsibility for the conduct of governmental affairs is a public offi-
cial and, under New York Times and Garrison, cannot recover dam-
ages for defamatory comment about his official conduct unless he can 
prove actual maliceY 
In the companion cases of Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts and 
Associated Press v. Walker, 18 the New York Times requirement 
of proving actual malice was extended to "public figures." 19 It should 
be noted that the Supreme Court in Walker found that the respondent 
attained the status of a public figure by his "purposeful activity 
amounting to a thrusting of his personality into the 'vortex' of an 
important public controversy,"20 and the Court decided that a pri-
vate person could lose his right to privacy and anonymity by volun-
tarily seeking public attention.21 
Justice Harlan, writing for a divided majority in Butts, proposed a 
new and less rigorous test of malice that would ease a libel plaintiff's 
burden of proof. 
We consider and would hold that a 'public figure' ... may 
also recover damages for a defamatory falsehood whose substance 
makes substantial danger to reputation apparent, on a showing 
of highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme de-
parture from the standards of investigation and reporting ordi-
narily adhered to by responsible publishers.22 
Even if Harlan's proposed standard of "unreasonable conduct" had 
been adopted, Curtis' liability would have been upheld because the 
publisher had failed to check either the substance of its informant's 
story or his claimed sources, although the publisher knew that its 
informant had a criminal record. Justice Harlan, however, failed by 
16 383 U.S. 75, 84 (1966). The term public official has been applied to a deputy sheriff 
in St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968); to a criminal court clerk in Beckley 
Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81 (1967); to a county ski resort operator in Rosen-
blatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966); to a state judiciary in Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 
(1964); to a police lieutenant in Pape v. Time, Inc., 354 F.2d 558 (7th Cir. 1965), cert, 
denied, 384 U.S. 909 (1966); and to a village president in Proesel v. Myers Pub. Co., 48 
Ill. App. 2d 402, 199 N.E.2d 73 (1964). 
17 383 U.S. 75, 84-86 (1966). 
18 388 U.S. 130 (1967). 
19 The term public figure has been applied to a state university athletic director in 
Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); to a prominent retired Air Force general in 
Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); to a professional baseball player in 
Cepeda v. Cowles Magazines & Broadcasting, Inc., 392 F.2d 417 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. 
denied, 393 U.S. 840 (1968); and to a prominent scientist in Pauling v. Globe-Democrat 
Pub. Co., 362 F.2d 188 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 909 (1967). 
20 388 u.s. 130, 155 (1967). 
21 For a vivid example of a libel plaintiff who was held to have projected himself into 
the public eye, see Tripoli v. Boston Herald-Traveler Corp., 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 461, 268 
N.E.2d 350. 
22 388 u.s. 130, 155 (1967). 
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one vote to gain majority support for his proposed standard.23 Chief 
Justice Warren expressed the view that the New York Times standard 
should apply to both public officials and public figures, and that 
Curtis' liability could have been based equally on its reckless disre-
gard of the truth within the meaning of the New York Times standard. 
Subsequently, St. Amant v. Thompson24 settled the question of a 
negligence standard by declaring that "reckless" conduct is not to be 
measured by a reasonable man standard, and that the defendant must 
publish the statement with serious doubts as to its truth before liability 
will arise. Justice White, who wrote the majority opinion in St. Amant, 
recognized that "such a test puts a premium on ignorance, encourages 
the irresponsible publisher not to inquire, and permits the issue to be 
determined by the defendant's testimony that he published the state-
ment in good faith and unaware of its probable falsity."25 But Jus-
tice White went on to state that "the stake of the people in public busi-
ness and the conduct of public officials is so great that neither the 
defense of truth nor the standard of ordinary care would protect 
against self-censorship and thus adequately implement First Amend-
ment policies.26 
Time, Inc. v. Hill27 is possibly the pivotal case in the extension 
of the New York Times rule. Hill was not a libel case; it involved a 
claimed violation of a New York right of privacy statute. The deci-
sion was significant, nonetheless, because it extended the protection 
afforded publishers by New York Times to false statements on all 
matters of "public interest." As Justice Brennan stated in the majority 
opinion: 
The guarantees for speech and press are not the preserve of 
political expression or comment upon public affairs, essential as 
those are to healthy government. One need only pick up any 
newspaper or magazine to comprehend the vast range of pub-
lished matter which exposes persons to public view, both private 
citizens and public officials. Exposure of the self to others in vary-
ing degrees is a concomitant of life in a civilized community. The 
risk of this exposure is an essential incident of life in a society 
which places a primary value on freedom of speech and of press. 28 
According to the Hill decision, once an individual is catapulted into 
the limelight, his conduct can be reported under the protection of the 
actual malice standard. Hill appears to define "matter of public inter-
23 Justices Clark, Stewart, and Fortas joined Justice Harlan in advocating a variable 
"unreasonable conduct" standard. Chief Justice Warren and Justices White and Brennan 
concurred in the result, but disagreed with the proposed standard. Justices Black and 
Douglas, while concurring in the result, reiterated their position that the First Amend-
ment prohibits libel actions against the press. 
24 390 u.s. 727 (1968). 
25 ld. at 731. 
26 Id. at 731-732. 
27 385 U.S. 374 (1967). 
28 Id. at 388. 
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est" as any matter which, as judged by the news media, is of interest to 
the public. 29 Under this definition, everyone is a potential public 
figure. 
Rosenbloom, as the logical culmination of this series of cases, deter-
mined that the "First Amendment [protects] . . . all discussion and 
communication involving matters of public or general concern, with-
out regard to whether the persons involved are famous or anony-
mous."30 In applying the New York Times standard to all plaintiffs, 
public or private, involved in an event of public or general concern, 
the majority in Rosenbloom found that only "[c]alculated falsehood 
... falls outside 'the fruitful exercise of the right of free speech.' "31 
In the wake of Rosenbloom, the practitioner is forced to question 
what remains as a potential libel action. The answer may depend on 
what the Supreme Court eventually establishes as criteria for deter-
mining when a private citizen's conduct has become an event of "gen-
eral interest or public concern"; in Rosenbloom, the Court left the 
delineation of that phrase to future cases and offered only such vague 
guidance as the following: "Voluntarily or not, we are all 'public' 
men to some degree. Conversely, some aspects of the lives of even the 
most public men fall outside the area of matters of public or general 
concern."32 The only type of activity which the Supreme Court men-
tioned as possibly falling outside the constitutionally protected area 
of public interest is the "purely commercial communication made in 
the course of business."33 Still, the basic question remains as to who 
will decide what is newsworthy. Will the Supreme Court establish 
guidelines or standards, as Justices Marshall and Stewart advocated 
in their dissent to the Rosenbloom decision,34 or will the news media 
be allowed to determine newsworthiness by default? If the press is 
allowed to determine what is a public issue, publishers may soon enjoy 
the advantage of determining their own liability. 
In a recent decision, the United States District Court for the Northern 
29 See Merin, Libel and the Supreme Court, II Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 371, 402-403 
(1969). 
30 403 U.S. 29, 44 (1971). "Drawing a distinction between 'public' and 'private' figures 
makes no sense in terms of the First Amendment guarantees." ld. at 45-46. 
31 Id. at 52, quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964). 
32 403 u.s. 29, 48 (1971). 
33 Id. at 44 n.l2. See also Grove v. Dun and Bradstreet, Inc., 438 F.2d 433 (3rd Cir. 1971), 
in which it was held that the doctrine of New York Times does not extend to private credit 
reports and that allegations of defamation concerning such reports are properly subject to 
the libel laws of the states. · 
34 "In order for particular defamation to come within the privilege there must be a 
determination that the event was of legitimate public interest. That determination will 
have to be made by courts generally and, in the last analysis, by this Court in particular. 
Courts, including this one, are not anointed with any extraordinary prescience. But, 
assuming that under the rule announced by Mr. Justice Brennan for the plurality, courts 
are not simply to take a poll to determine whether a substantial portion of the population 
is interested or concerned in a subject, courts will be required to somehow pass on the 
legitimacy of interest in a particular event or subject; what information is relevant to 
self-government." 403 U.S. 29, 79 (1971). 
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District of California held that matters of public interest could be 
equated with "newsworthiness" and that a magazine article on young 
Americans abroad, containing photographs and interviews of such 
Americans on Crete, was newsworthy.35 The decision articulated a 
standard, based on state precedent, 36 for determining whether a par-
ticular incident is newsworthy. The court recognized such criteria as 
"(1) the social value of the fact published; (2) the depth of the article's 
intrusion into ostensibly private affairs; and (3) the extent to which 
the party voluntarily acceded to a position of public notoriety. " 37 The 
court applied Rosenbloom in reaching its decision and attempted to 
expand on Rosenbloom by establishing some guideposts to assist in 
separating newsworthy incidents from those which are not. In the 
process, it appears the court looked back to some pre-Rosenbloom 
decisions for its criteria. Although any measure of "social value" is 
highly subjective, the second criterion noted above is similar to the 
recognition in Garrison of an area of "purely private defamation," 
and the third criterion is similar to the discussion in Butts regarding 
reduced protection from public scrutiny for one who thrusts himself 
into the discussion of a question of pressing public concern. 
The Supreme Court will also have to decide to what extent pub-
lishers other than the news media are privileged under the New York 
Times standard to comment on public officials, public figures, and 
newsworthy events. As has been noted, perhaps some or all publica-
tions of a purely commercial nature will fall outside the protection of 
New York Times. What of those publications which have made the 
sensational expose, the bizarre, and the lurid their hallmark? It may 
be asked whether such sensationalistic publications are to receive the 
same broad protection as those publications committed to an informed 
public. One's response may well be that reputable professional news 
publishers who unintentionally injure someone's reputation in the 
course of supplying the public's informational needs deserve more 
protection from libel judgments than do the purveyors of innuendo 
and scandal. However, it is difficult to conceive how a distinction can 
be drawn between the reputable and the disreputable publisher, with 
one receiving the protection of Rosenbloom and the other not, without 
basic notions of equal protection being violated. The question of 
which publishers, if any, are to be denied the protection of Rosenbloom 
again hinges on whether judicial distinctions can be made among 
matters of legitimate public interest, matters of mere public curiosity, 
and matters relating to purely private relationships. 
It might also be asked whether a libeled private citizen could recover 
on the ground that his name was needlessly associated with an event of 
public interest, i.e., that the First Amendment goal of an informed 
citizenry could have been achieved without mentioning his name.38 
35 Goldman v. Time, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 133 (1971). 
36 Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Assn., 4 Cal. 3d 529, 483 P.2d 34 (1971); Kapellas v. Ko£-
man, I Cal. 3d 20, 459 P.2d 912 (1969). 
37 366 F. Supp. 133, 138 (1971). 
38 See Comment, Further Limits on Libel Actions-Extension of the New York Times 
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It would appear to be justifiable for a plaintiff to argue that he was 
needlessly defamed, and that his defamation added nothing of signifi-
cance to the public disucssion. Again, however, such an attack calls for 
a judicial interpretation of the scope of public concern. In light of 
the Court's strong language in Rosenbloom, it is doubtful whether any 
attack would succeed if predicated on the relevance of the defamation to 
the subject of public concern or if based on the publisher's negligence 
in failing to delete the plaintiff's name. As Justice Brennan stated: 
In this case, the vital needs of freedom of press and freedom of 
speech persuade us that allowing private citizens to obtain dam-
age judgments on the basis of a jury determination that a pub-
lisher probably failed to use reasonable care would not provide 
adequate 'breathing space' for these great freedoms. 39 
The majority was concerned that a publisher's fear of being wrong 
would inevitably lead to self-censorship of the press. Indeed, the Court 
went so far as to state that "[t)he very possibility of having to engage in 
litigation, an expensive and protracted process, is threat enough to 
cause discussion and debate to 'steer far wider of the unlawful zone' 
thereby keeping protected discussion from public cognizance. " 40 
Justice Harlan in his dessent in Rosenbloom took strong exception 
to this notion that the First Amendment gives the press special pro-
tection from being engaged in litigation. It was his view that freedom 
of the press does riot include immunity from 'the general application 
of law, and he argued that the states were not completely prohibited 
from exacting compensation for the adverse consequences of speech.41 
Rule to Libels Arising From Discussion of Public Issues, 16 Viii. L. Rev. 955, 973 (1971). 
39 403 U.S. 29, 50 (1971). While Priestley did follow Rosenbloom in applying the 
actual malice standard to a situation where the plaintiff was involved in an event of pub-
lic and general concern, the Court also cushioned its decision with the use of traditional 
standards of reasonability. The Supreme Judicial Court stressed that the defendant oper-
ated under time restraints; that the defendant was impartial in its reporting; that it was 
accurate in what it reported; and that at trial none of the defendant's statements were 
proven to be false. 
40 Id. at 52-53. It is also interesting to note that just four months prior to the decision 
in Rosenbloom, Justice Black stated that "the existence of a 'chilling effect,' even in the 
area of First Amendment rights, has never been considered a sufficient basis, in and of 
itself, for prohibiting state action. Where a statute does not directly abridge free speech, 
but-while regulating a subject within the State's power-tends to have the incidental 
effect of inhibiting First Amendment rights, it is well settled that the statute can be up-
held if the effect on speech is minor in relation to the need for control of the conduct and 
the lack of alternative means for doing so .... Just as the incidental 'chilling effect' of 
such statutes does not automatically render them unconstitutional, so the chilling effect 
that admittedly can result from the very existence of certain laws on the statute books 
does not in itself justify prohibiting the State from carrying out the important and 
necessary task of enforcing these laws against socially harmful conduct that the State 
believes in good faith to be punishable under its laws and the Constitution." Younger 
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 51-52 (1971). 
41 Justice Harlan quoted from his opinion in Curtis Publ. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 
130, 160 (1967): "To exempt a publisher, because of the nature of his calling, from an 
imposition generally exacted from other members of the community, would be to extend 
a protection not required by the constitutional guarantee." 
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As he stated, "if this is not so, it is difficult to understand why gov-
ernments may, for example, proscribe 'misleading' advertising prac-
tices or specify what is 'true' in the dissemination of comsumer credit 
advertisements."42 Nevertheless, the majority feared the effect that 
large damage awards would have upon the viability of the press.43 
However, if damages are indeed a real danger, it seems that a plaintiff's 
damages could be limited carefully to those he actually suffered, as 
Justices Marshall and Stewart suggested in their dissent.44 In his 
concurring opinion, Justice White even said," ... I am unaware that 
state libel laws with respect to private citizens have proved a hazard to 
the existence or operations of the communications industry in this 
country. "45 
The impact that Rosenbloom will have on publishing standards in 
this jurisdiction and across the nation should be very significant. 
Proof by a private citizen of actual knowledge on the part of a pub-
lisher that the matter published was false is extremely difficult.46 
Rosenbloom gives to individual publishers a privilege that closely 
parallels the absolute privilege that common law has recognized for 
high government officials. Publishers may now be free to defame pri-
vate citizens as long as the defamation takes place within the context 
of reporting an event of "public or general concern," which after all 
is the perimeter within which the news media supposedly operate by 
definition. When this extensive privilege to defame is coupled with 
the trend toward consolidated control of mass media,47 a danger to 
the right of an individual citizen to be free in his integrity and privacy 
seems apparent. The Supreme Court in Hill spoke of the "primary 
value" which our society places on freedom of speech. Yet privacy is 
also a basic right,48 and in this technological age it is in need of in-
creasing protection.49 It is significant that in the evolutionary pro-
cess which produced the Rosenbloom decision, Justice Harlan's sug-
gested standard of unreasonable conduct "constituting an extreme 
42 403 u.s. 29, 67 (1971). 
43 Id. at 52-53. See also New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964); Smith 
v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 153-154 (1959); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958). 
44 403 U.S. 29,84 (1971). 
45 Id. at 60. 
46 While actual malice is difficult to demonstrate, two cases have allowed malice, 
under the New York Times rule; to be inferred from the circumstances of the cases. In 
Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1049 (1970), 
rehearing denied, 397 U.S. 978 (1970), the negligence of the defendant was so gross as to 
permit an inference of reckless disregard of truth. In Mahnke v. Northwest Publications, 
Inc., 280 Minn. 328, 160 N.W.2d I (1968), failure to verify information from one known 
to have no firsthand knowledge permitted the drawing of an inference of reckless dis-
regard for the truth. 
47 "In 1909, 689 cities had competing newspapers, but by 1968 this number had 
fallen to 50 .... In 1910, 6 out of 10 cities with newspapers had at least 2 newspapers . 
. . . By 1960, this had become less than 2 out of 10." Comment, 12 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. 
Rev. 937 n.l. (1971). 
48 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483-485 (1965); and Justice Fortas' 
dissent in Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 4ll-420 (1967). 
49 See 1969 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §10.6. 
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departure from the standards ... ordinarily adhered to by responsible 
publishers" has been rejected. The Court's rejection of this standard 
will certainly not encourage the news media to improve and enforce 
their own standards of professional responsibility. 
It is also questionable whether the expansion of theN ew York Times 
rule in Rosenbloom will in fact help to protect and foster the First 
Amendment rights that were the concern of the Supreme Court. As 
one commentator has stated: 
In a system where free expression is not allowed, decisions are 
made by the few and obeyed by the masses. Unlimited freedom of 
expression, however, may well result in the same situation if it 
allows the powerful, the unscrupulous, or the careless to defame 
those they oppose, shout into silence those who disagree, distort 
the truth to a guileless population, and make an interested. citi-
zenry cynical and jaded. 5o 
Providing a constitutional privilege to defame private individuals may 
actually deter the public discussion the Court seeks. Any private indi-
vidual who speaks his mind on an issue or who is involuntarily in-
volved on the periphery of news may now be subject to privileged de-
famation. 51 The private citizen who is defamed has neither the 
position of the public official nor the notoriety of the public figure to 
facilitate his rebuttal. Freedom of speech is not an absolute, nor is it 
an end in itself. The constitutionally protected right of speech is di-
rected primarily toward guaranteeing political dialogue and fostering 
an open atmosphere in which decisions affecting the body politic can 
be made without governmental suppression of information.52 The 
meaning of "public or general concern" in Rosenbloom should be 
narrowed in the direction of insuring the goal of an informed citizenry 
while protecting the reputations of all persons, particularly private 
citizens, from unjustified invasion and wrongful hurt. The Massachu-
setts legislature should be sensitive to the implications of the Rosen-
bloom and Priestley decisions with regard to the vulnerability of pri-
vate citizens who enter or are drawn into events of "public or general 
concern." In fact, the majority in Rosenbloom said: 
If the states fear that private citizens will not be able to respond 
adequately to publicity involving them, the solution lies in the 
direction of ensuring their ability to respond, rather than in 
stifling public discussion of matters of public concern.53 
Some states have adopted retraction statutes54 or right of reply stat-
50Merin, Libel and the Supreme Court, II Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 371, 41~ (1969). 
51 See Note, The Invasion of Privacy by Defamation. 23 Stan. L. Rev. 547, 563 (1971). 
52 See the historical analysis of the origins of the First Amendment in Wade, Defama-
tion and the Right of Privacy, 15 Vand. L. Rev. 1093 (1962). 
5S4Q3 U.S. 29,47 (1971). 
54 Although many states have "timely retraction" statutes that can be used by de-
fendant publishers to mitigate their damages, such statutes would appear to have lost 
much of their significance after Rosenbloom. With the great difficulty a plaintiff now has 
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utes,ss but while these legal devices do allow a form of rebuttal or 
confession of error, they do not have the effect of legally determining 
the truth or falsity of the disputed statements. Litigation is usually the 
only route available to a private plaintiff to vindicate his reputation. 
But given the difficulty of the actual malice standard and the cost and 
time involved, a person defamed may decide to avoid litigation, in 
which case his reputation must absorb the impact of the defamation. 
Professor Freund of Harvard Law School has suggested that defama-
tion plaintiffs 
be permitted to request a special verdict, so that if there is a ver-
dict for the defendant based solely and simply on absence of mal-
ice, the plaintiff could nevertheless receive a vindication of his 
character by a special verdict, finding that the utterances were 
untrue but not actionable because not spoken with malice.56 
Professor Freund's plan seems to assume, however, that the plaintiff 
can successfully overcome the obstacles of summary judgment and 
directed verdict and can reach the jury. This would appear to be an 
unwarranted assumption after Rosenbloom. It is suggested, instead, 
that the Massachusetts legislature consider the merit of permitting 
a defamation plaintiff in the Commonwealth to bring a declaratory 
action for a jury determination of the truth or falsity of the disputed 
statement. This would be a right exclusive of the traditional damages 
suit. Calendar priority should be provided for such actions, consider-
ing that speed is important in reaching the publisher's original audi-
ence and in preventing further harm to the plaintiff. Furthermore, the 
right to bring such an action should be allowed to survive the death of 
the plaintiff and to accrue to the benefit of the decedent's immediate 
family. The reason for such a provision is that the impact of defama-
tion, in many instances, strikes beyond the plaintiff and seriously 
affects the well-being of his or her family. Upon a determination of 
falsity, the court would issue an order requiring the defendant publi-
cation to print the findings of the court. This vindicatory publication 
of the jury determination would be given the same prominence in the 
publication as the article which precipitated the action. The above 
procedure would not only help to clear damaged reputations but would 
also help to provide accuracy in the forum of public discussion. 57 
KENNETH A. WoLFE, jR. 
in proving actual malice, defendant publishers may be less inclined to retract because 
any award of damages is unlikely. 
55 See Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 
1641, 1666-1678 (1967); Donnelly, The Right of Reply: An Alternative to an Action for 
Libel, 34 Va. L. Rev. 867 (1948); and Note, Vindication of the Reputation of a Public 
Official, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1730 (1967). 
56 Freund, Political Libel and Obscenity, 42 F.R.D. 437, 497 (1966). 
57 The above suggestion for a special declaratory action for the determination of the 
truth or falsity of allegedly defamatory statements is set forth in Mass. House Bill 2104, 
drafted and filed in the General Court by the author for the 1971-19721egislative session. 
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§16.11. Successive prosecutions for the same criminal act: Com-
monwealth v. White.! The defendant was indicted by a Middlesex 
County grand jury for larceny of a motor vehicle in Massachusetts. 
The automobile had been stolen in Montreal, Canada, from a resident 
of that city, and White was later apprehended in Lexington in posses-
sion of the vehicle. The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment 
on the ground that the superior court lacked jurisdiction over the 
alleged offense. He contended that the motor vehicle, if stolen at all, 
was stolen outside of the United States. The motion to dismiss the 
indictment was granted by the superior court on the authority of 
Commonwealth v: Uprichard,2 and the Commonwealth appealed. 
The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the order and held: "The dis-
tinction drawn in the Uprichard case ... between bringing into 
Massachusetts (a) goods stolen in another nation's territory and (b) 
goods stolen in another state, is illogical and cannot stand. " 3 
Uprichard was decided in 1855 and involved money that had been 
stolen in Nova Scotia. The alleged thieves were later caught and 
indicted in Massachusetts for larceny. The Supreme Judicial Court 
held that the bringing into Massachusetts of goods stolen in a foreign 
country did not constitute larceny within the Commonwealth. Almost 
50 years prior to its decision in Uprichard, the Supreme Judicial Court, 
in Commonwealth v. Andrews, had held that when goods stolen in 
another state are brought into Massachusetts, a crime is committed 
under the laws of the Commonwealth.4 In Andrews, the Court upheld 
the larceny conviction even though the original theft had occurred in 
New Hampshire. The defendant contended that allowing his Massa-
chusetts conviction to stand would subject him to multiple prosecution 
and punishment for the same offense since he could subsequently be 
indicted in New Hampshire. In rejecting his argument, the Court con-
cluded that Massachusetts had a compelling interest in protecting its 
citizens from the sale of stolen goods and in not becoming a refuge for 
felons. The opinion in Andrews also noted that English law allowed a 
thief to be indicted in any county in which he was caught in possession 
of stolen goods, and the Court felt that the same law should apply be-
tween the American states. Justice Sedgwick summarized the position 
of the Court: "For myself, I feel no such tenderness for thieves, as to 
desire that they should not be punished wherever guilty. If they offend 
against the laws of two states, I am willing they should be punished in 
both."5 
Although the holding in White was confined to overruling Uprich-
ard, the tenor of the decision indicates that the Supreme Judicial Court 
was reaffirming the rationale of Andrews. Since White had not been 
convicted in Massachusetts or anywhere else, the Court was not re-
§16.11. 1 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1651, 265 N.E.2d 473. 
2 69 Mass. (3 Gray) 434 (1855). 
3 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1651, 1653, 265 N.E.2d 473, 474. 
4 2 Mass. 13 (1806). 
5 Id. at 22. 
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quired to consider his argument that a conviction in Massachusetts 
would not bar a later indictment in Canada for the same offense. The 
Court noted that "[t]he present record presents no question of double 
jeopardy and the point is not sufficiently argued to require us to con-
sider it,"6 yet Justice Sedgwick's rationale in Andrews was quoted 
with approval. If the rationale of Andrews is still correct, as the Court 
in White strongly suggested, White's indictment in Massachusetts 
would not be affected by pending or potential indictments in Canada 
or other states through which the stolen vehicle had passed. 
The situation in White offers a starting point for discussing the 
constitutionality of successive prosecutions by different jurisdictions 
for the same criminal act, even though White involved only the first 
stage of the question. This comment will examine the background, 
current status, and possible future developments in the area of succes-
sive criminal prosecutions. The English common law will be men-
tioned because it bears significantly on the early American cases, 
such as Andrews, which still retain much of their vitality today. 
The common law crime of larceny consisted of three elements: a 
taking, a carrying away, and a felonious intent in the taking and 
carrying away of the property.7 Under early English common law, a 
court could take jurisdiction of a larceny only if the taking had oc-
curred within its geographic jurisdiction.8 Since the English courts 
were organized by counties, flight across a county line was a great pro-
tection for the criminal. Of course, if he was subsequently caught in 
another county, he could be returned to the county where the taking 
had occurred, but the probability of this happening was small. The 
inefficiencies in the communication and transportation of that day 
made arrest and rendition to another county difficult and unlikely in 
all but a few cases. 
The jurisdiction of the English courts over larceny was expanded 
by statute in 1773.9 Under the statute, a person who stole goods in one 
county and carried them into another could be indicted for larceny in 
either county. The rationale behind the statute was that rightful 
possession of the stolen goods vested in the true owner, and every 
moment's wrongful possession by a thief was a continuing trespass 
and constituted a new taking of the goods. 10 It should be noted that 
the basis for the court's jurisdiction over larceny was not changed by 
the statute: all the elements necessary for a larceny still had to have 
occurred within that court's jurisdiction. The only change the statute 
made was to infer a new taking from the fact of wrongful possession 
with felonious intent, thereby permitting the alleged thief to be tried 
in any county where he was caught with the stolen goods. 
It was this English view of larceny as a continuing offense that was 
6 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1651, 1654, 265 N.E.2d 473, 475. 
7 See 4 Blackstone, Commentaries 229-232 (Christian ed. 1807). 
"Commonwealth v. Andrews, 2 Mass. 13, 14-16 (1806). 
9 13 Geo. 3, c. 31, §4. 
10 I Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown 136-137 (6th ed. 1778). 
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adopted by the early Massachusetts cases, based on the analogy that 
the states legally related to each other in the same way as did the En-
glish counties.u That analogy, it is submitted, was inaccurate even in 
the early 1800s. The states, with their separate systems of criminal 
law, do not stand in the same relation to each other as do the English 
counties, which are all under the same system of criminal law. The 
English view was simply a legal fiction created to extend venue-not 
jurisdiction-to any county in England into which a thief might 
flee.I 2 Under English law, "the measure of the crime, the mode of 
trial, the extent of punishment, and the effect of the conviction would 
be identical in whichever county the trial occurred." 13 However, not 
every thief who was found with stolen goods within an English county 
could be tried for larceny. In orde~ for the law to apply, the initial tak-
ing must have been within the jurisdiction of English common law. 
Under English law, a thief could be prosecuted either by the juris-
diction apprehending him or the jurisdiction where the original taking 
occurred, but since both jurisdictions were under the same system of 
law, a conviction or acquittal in one was a bar to an indictment in the 
other. However, the adoption of the English view of larceny by Massa-
chusetts and a majority of other American states14 made it possible 
for a defendant to be twice prosecuted and punished for the same crimi-
nal act. On its face, such a result would appear to be unconstitutional 
as violative of the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against double 
jeopardy; but, as will be seen, the United States Supreme Court has 
sustained the practice of successive prosecutions by different jurisdic-
tions for the same criminal conduct. 
In 1847, the United States Supreme Court, in Fox v. Ohio, 15 heard 
the appeal of a man who had been convicted under a state law punish-
ing the uttering of counterfeit money. The petitioner argued that the 
federal Constitution, in granting to Congress the exclusive power to 
coin money, had given the federal government exclusive jurisdiction 
over counterfeiting offenses. The Supreme Court agreed with an earlier 
Massachusetts decision which had held that Congress did not possess 
the exclusive power to punish counterfeiting activities; 16 however, 
the Supreme Court did not conclude, as had the Supreme Judicial 
Court in the earlier case, that where state and federal courts have 
concurrent jurisdiction, a judgment in one is conclusive and bars the 
other from a subsequent prosecution. 17 The Supreme Court ex-
pressed serious doubts that a defendant would ever be subjected to 
successive prosecutions by the state and federal governments: "It is 
11 Commonwealth v. Cullins, 1 Mass. 115, 116 (1804); Commonwealth v. Andrews, 
2 Mass. 13, 23 (1806). 
12 Brown v. United States, 35 App. D.C. 548, 555 (1910). 
"State v. LeBlanch, 31 N.J.L. 82,85 (Sup. Ct. 1864). 
14 2 Anderson, Wharton's Criminal Law and Procedure §485 (1957); Annot., 156 
A.L.R. 862 (1945). 
15 46 U.S. 410 (1847). 
16 Commonwealth v. Fuller, 49 Mass. (8 Met.) 313 (1844). 
11 Id. at 317-318. 
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almost certain, that, in the benignant spirit in which the institutions 
both of the State and federal systems are administered, an offender who 
should have suffered the penalties denounced by the one would not be 
subjected a second time to punishment by the other for acts essentially 
the same .... " 18 However, the Court went on to add that 
were a contrary course of policy and action either probable or 
usual ... [it would not] justify the conclusion [advanced by the 
petitioner], that offences falling within the competancy [sic] of 
different authorities to restrain or punish them would not prop-
erly be subjected to the consequences which [both] those authori-
ties might . . . affix to their perpetration. 19 
The language in Fox seemed to indicate clearly, at least on the facts of 
that case, that the Supreme Court would find nothing unconstitutional 
in successive prosecutions. The dictum in Fox regarding multiple 
prosecutions was strengthened in United States v. Marigold, wherein 
the Supreme Court Stated: 
With a view of avoiding conflict between the State and Federal 
jurisdictions, this court in the case of Fox v. The State of Ohio 
have [sic] taken care to point out, that the same act might ... 
constitute an offence against both the State and Federal govern-
ments, and might draw to its commission the penalties denounced 
by either [or both] as appropriate to its character in reference to 
each. 20 
Prior to 1922, the United States Supreme Court had never been 
directly confronted with the question of the constitutionality of suc-
cessive prosecutions. In Fox, the defendant had raised the possibility of 
a subsequent prosecution as an argument against the constitutional 
validity of a first indictment, but in no case had a defendant actually 
been indicted by a second jurisdiction for the same criminal act. The 
question of the constitutionality of successive prosecutions for the 
same criminal act was first brought directly before the Supreme Court 
in United States v. Lanza.21 The defendants in Lanza were indicted 
for manufacturing, transporting, and possessing intoxicating liquor 
in violation of the National Prohibition Act. They filed a special plea 
in bar setting out the fact that they had been indicted and convicted 
under the laws of the state of Washington for manufacturing, trans-
porting, and possessing the same liquor. The United States demurred 
to the plea, but the federal district court dismissed the indictment. The 
government appealed the dismissal directly to the United States 
Supreme Court under the provisions of the Criminal Appeals Act.22 
The defendants argued that two prosecutions for the same act, one 
l8 46 u.s. 410, 435 (1847). 
19 Ibid. 
2°50 u.s. 560,569 (1850). 
21 260 U.S. 377 (1922). 
22 18 U.S.C. §3731. 
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under federal law, the other under state law, amounted to double 
jeopardy in violation of the Fifth Amendment. They further argued 
that both prohibition laws derived their force from the same authority, 
the second section of the Eighteenth Amendment and, therefore, it 
was as if both prosecutions were by the United States in its courts. The 
Supreme Court rejected the defendant's Fifth Amendment argument on 
the grounds that the Fifth Amendment applied "only to proceedings by 
the Federal Government, . . . and the double jeopardy therein for-
bidden is a second prosecution under authority of the Federal Govern-
ment after a first trial for the same offense under the same author-
ity."23 Neither did the Court agree with the defendant's contention 
that both state and federal prohibition laws derived their power from 
the same source. The Court found that the states had the independent 
authority to prohibit intoxicating liquors under the powers reserved 
to them by the Tenth Amendment. After deciding aginst the 'defen-
dant's double jeopardy arguments, the Court outlined what has since 
become the rationale for allowing successive prosecutions, the dual 
sovereignty theory: 
We have here two sovereignties, deriving power from different 
sources, capable of dealing with the same subject matter within 
the same territory. Each may, without interference by the other, 
enact laws to secure prohibition, with the limitation that no 
legislation can give validity to acts prohibited by the Amendment. 
Each government in determining what shall be an offense against 
its peace and dignity is exercising its own sovereignty, not that 
of the other.24 
The basis for the dual sovereignty theory rests on the nature of our 
federal system. Under the Constitution, the federal government is one 
of enumerated powers; all powers not specifically given to the federal 
government are reserved to the states.25 Therefore, in matters properly 
within their power, the states are truly sovereign, and one of the tra-
ditional powers of a sovereign government is the power to make and 
enforce criminal laws. In the United States, the power of local law 
enforcement has historically been left to the states. The federal gov-
ernment, however, also has defined certain criminal acts which in-
fringe on its sovereign interests. If one looks solely at the need for each 
state and the federal government to be able to protect its own sovereign 
interests, then the result in Lanza is reasonable. The Court in Lanza, 
however, apparently did not consider important the fact th~H the de-
fendants were forced to defend themselves twice and eventually to 
receive two punishments for the same criminal conduct. 
Although the decision in Lanza may have be~n influenced by the 
special problems encountered in enforcement of the prohibition laws, 
the dual sovereignty theory has been used to sustain successive prose-
23 260 u.s. 377, 382 (1922). 
24 Ibid. 
2s U.S. Canst. amend. X. 
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cutions in other contexts. In Bartkus v. Illinois, 26 the defendant had 
originally been tried and acquitted in federal district court for robbery 
of a federally insured savings and loan association, in violation of 18 
U .S.C. §2113. He was subsequently indicted and convicted by the state 
of Illinois under its robbery statute. Prior to Bartkus' state trial, the 
local United States attorney and the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
cooperated fully with state law enforcement officials in gathering new 
evidence and in preparation of the case. Bartkus challenged his state 
conviction, claiming that the right not to be twice placed in jeopardy 
for the same offense is so fundamental that the second trial deprived 
him of due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. He also 
argued that the second trial was a sham and nothing more than a 
second federal trial, in violation of the Fifth Amendment, because of 
the large part played by federal authorities in preparing the state's 
case. 
The Supreme Court, in a 5 to 4 decision, rejected both of Bartkus' 
arguments. The Court found his due process arguments insufficient in 
light of the standards set out in Palko v. Connecticut, where the Court 
had held that the words "due process of law" excluded only those 
procedures which were "so acute and shocking that our [policy] will 
not endure it."27 Because in 1959 a majority of the states would have 
allowed a second prosecution in the Bartkus situation, the Court 
found that there was nothing in the petitioner's second trial which 
appeared to violate the conscience of American society. The Court 
also found little substance in the defendant's Fifth Amendment argu-
ment. The fact that federal law enforcement officials assisted the state 
in the preparation of the case for the state trial did not mean the federal 
government was trying the defendant a second time. Because the second 
trial was under the authority of the state of Illinois, the state was free 
to accept assistance from any source. The Court even stated that coop-
eration between federal and state law enforcement officials was both 
desirable and necessary for the proper administration of justice in 
America. 
The majority opinion in Bartkus brought a vigorous dissent from 
Justice Black. He believed that to allow successive prosecutions, simply 
because each prosecution was by a different government, was in contra-
vention of the historical prohibition against double jeopardy. He also 
criticized the Court's reliance on the Lanza decision, stating: 
The Court, without denying the almost universal abhorrence of 
such double prosecutions, nevertheless justifies the practice here 
in the name of "federalism." ... I have been shown nothing in 
the history of our union, in the writings of its Founders, or else-
26 359 u.s. 121 (1959). 
27 302 U.S. 319, 328 (1937). The Palko standard of a scheme of due process secured 
only those rights which were the "very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty" and which 
were "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as funda-
mental." Id. at 325. 
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where, to indicate that individual rights deemed essential by both 
State and Nation were to be lost through the combined operations 
of the two governments. Nor has the Court given any sound rea-
son for thinking that the successful operation of our dual sys-
tem of government depends in the slightest on the power to try 
people twice for the same act. 28 
The Supreme Court in Lanza and Bartkus appeared to be more con-
cerned with the practical results of disallowing successive prosecutions 
than with the effect of their decisions on the rights of the accused. This 
concern was highlighted in a campanian case to Bartkus, Abbate v. 
United States.29 The issue in Abbate was the same as in Bartkus, ex-
cept that in Abbate the state conducted the first prosecution and the 
federal government subsequently tried the defendant. Justice Brennan, 
writing for the majority in Abbate, noted that the petitioner's state 
conviction carried a sentence of three months, whereas the federal 
prosecution could result in a sentence of up to five years. 
Such a disparity will very often arise when ... the defendant's 
acts impinge more seriously on a federal interest than on a state 
interest. But no one would suggest that, in order to maintain the 
effectiveness of federal law enforcement, it is desirable completely 
to displace state power to prosecute crimes based on acts which 
might also violate federal law. 30 
In Justice Brennan's view, allowance of successive prosecutions was 
necessary for the effective administration of criminal justice. He 
pointed out that it would be impractical for the federal government to 
protect its interests by attempting to keep informed of all the state 
prosecutions which might bear on federal offenses, yet the government 
might be forced to do so if a prior state prosecution would bar a trial 
for a federal offense. According to Justice Brennan, the alternative to 
the dual sovereignty theory was an increased involvement by the fed-
eral government in local law enforcement. 31 
Although the Supreme Court has discussed at length the difficulties 
which might arise if the dual sovereignty theory of Lanza were over-
ruled, it has not commented on the fact that many jurisdictions have 
not found it necessary to resort to successive prosecutions in order to 
enforce their laws effectively. The common law, as it has developed in 
England and the British Commonwealth, does not allow successive 
prosecutions.32 In this country, at least 20 states have passed statutes 
specifically barring prosecutions of defendants who have previously 
"359 U.S. 212, 155-156 (1959). Joining Justice Black in his dissent were Chief Jus-
tice Warren and Justice Douglas. Justice Brennan wrote a separate dissenting opinion. 
29 359 U.S. 187 (1959). 
30 Id. at 195. 
3I See Justice Black's dissenting opinion in Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130, 
143 (1952). 
32 Grant, Successive Prosecutions by State and Nation: Common Law and British 
Empire Comparisons, 4 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. I, 34 (1956). 
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been tried in another jurisdiction for the same criminal act.33 Cali-
fornia's statute is typical: 
Whenever on the trial of an accused person it appears that upon a 
criminal prosecution under the laws of another State, Govern-
ment, or country, founded upon the act or omission in respect 
to which he is on trial, he has been acquitted or convicted, it is a 
sufficient defense.34 
In 19 of the 20 states, the bar to a second prosecution arises when the 
first trial occurred under the proper jurisdiction of any state or the 
federal government, and in all but one of those states the statute has 
general application to all criminal prosecutions. It is interesting to 
note that although the majority of the Supreme Court in Bartkus 
made much of Illinois' interest in prosecuting Bartkus, apparently 
Illinois felt its interests could be amply protected without reliance on 
successive prosecutions. Less than a year after the decision in Bartkus, 
Illinois enacted a statute similar to the California statute quoted 
above.35, 
An examination of some. recent Supreme Court decisions dealing 
with successive prosecutions indicates a possible change in the Court's 
approach. In Benton v. Maryland, 36 the Supreme Court sustained the 
petitioner's double jeopardy claim in the face of successive prosecu-
tions by the state of Maryland. In so doing, the Court found that the 
Palko standard for judging state conduct in the double jeopardy con-
33 Alaska Stat. §12.20.101 (1962); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §13-146 (1956); Cal. Penal Code 
§656 (West 1970); Ga. Code Ann. §26-507(c) (1970), prior fe~eral prosecution only; Idaho 
Code §19-315 (1947); Ill. Ann. Stat. c. 38, §3-4(c) (Smith-Hurd 1964); Ind. Ann. Stat. 
§9-215 (1956); Mich. Stat. Ann. §28.1004 (1954), larceny prosecutions only; Minn. Stat. 
Ann. §609.045 (1964); Miss. Code Ann. §2432 (1957); Mo. Ann. Stat. §541.050 (1953); 
Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. §94-6808.4 (1969); Nev. Rev. Stat. §208.080 (1967); N.Y. Crim. 
Pro. Law §40.20 (McKinney 1971); N.D. Cent. Code §29-03-13 (1960); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 
21, §25 (1958); Ore. Rev. Stat. §131.240(1) (1969); Tex. Coae Crim. Pro. art. §12.23 (1966); 
Utah Code Ann. §77-8-8 (1953); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §10.43.040 (1961). 
34 Cal. Penal Code §656 (West 1970). The proposed revision a£ the Massachusetts 
Criminal Code contains a provision similar to that set out in the text but has some addi-
tional qualifications. Senate Bill 200 (1972), §13 provides: "When conduct constitutes 
an offense within the concurrent jurisdiction of this commonwealth and of the United 
States or of another state in the United States, a prosecution in one of the latter two is a 
bar to a subsequent prosecution in this commonwealth, under either of the following 
circumstances; (a) the prior prosecution resulted in an acquittal or a conviction as set 
forth in section eleven and the subsequent prosecution is based on the same criminal 
episode, unless (I) the law defining the offense of which the defendant was formerly 
convicted or acquitted is intended to prevent a substantially different harm or evil from 
the law defining the offense for which he is subsequently prosecuted, or (2) the second 
offense was not consummated when the first trial began; or (b) the prior prosecution was 
terminated by an acquittal or by final order, verdict or finding for the defendant which 
has not been set aside, reversed, or vacated and which necessarily required a determina-
tion inconsistent with a fact which must be established for conviction of the offense for 
which the defendant is subsequently prosecuted, unless the court in its discretion de-
termines that the interests of the commonwealth would be unduly harmed if the com-
monwealth's prosecution is barred." 
35 Ill. Ann. Stat. c. 38, §3-4(c) (Smith-Hurd 1964). 
36 395 u.s. 784 (1969). 
53
O'Reilly: Chapter 16: Constitutional Law
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1971
§16.11 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 461 
text was no longer acceptable: "[T]he double jeopardy prohibition of 
the Fifth Amendment represents a fundamental ideal in our Constitu-
tional heritage, and ... should apply to the States through the 
Fourteenth Amendment."37 The Court, quoting from Green v. United 
States, 38 also noted that 
the underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the 
Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with 
all its resources and power should n,ot be allowed to make re-
peated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, 
thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and 
compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and in-
security, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though 
innocent he may be found guilty.39 [Emphasis added.] 
The decision in Benton is significant in the area of successive prose-
cutions for two reasons. First, by applying the Fifth Amendment to the 
states, it made applicable a uniform standard in both the state and 
federal courts regarding the issue of double jeopardy. Second, and per-
haps of more importance, the decision clearly sets forth the approach 
to be used in analyzing questions of double jeopardy. Prior to Benton, 
the primary consideration was "the Palko notion [of due process] that 
basic constitutional rights can be denied by the States so long as the 
totality of the circumstances does not disclose a denial of 'fundamental 
fairness.' " 40 It was the Palko standard of due process under which 
the Court in Bartkus upheld successive prosecutions. Under Benton, 
the courts must look to the specific guarantees of the Fifth Amendment 
in reaching a decision regarding a question of due process. 
Since Benton, there has been only one case dealing directly with 
successive prosecutions. In Waller v. Florida, 41 the defendant had 
taken a mural from a city building in St. Petersburg, Florida. He was 
later apprehended and charged with violation of two city ordinances: 
(I) destruction of city property, and (2) disorderly breach of the peace. 
He was found guilty in the municipal court on both counts and was 
sentenced to six months in the county jail. He was subsequently in-
dicted by the state of Florida for grand larceny, based on the same acts 
which were involved in the violation of the two city ordinances. The 
Florida Supreme Court denied the defendant's claim that the munici-
pal court conviction barred the second indictment. The defendant was 
subsequently found guilty and sentenced to six months to five years, 
less the time already served. The issue directly before the United States 
Supreme Court in Waller was the asserted power of two separate 
courts of the same state to try the defendant for the same alleged 
criminal acts. The state of Florida sought to justify the two trials under 
37 Id. at 794. 
38 355 U.S. 184 (1957). 
39 395 u.s. 784, 795-976 (1969). 
•o Id. at 795. 
41 397 U.S. 387 (1970). 
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a dual sovereignty theory. Florida, relying mainly on Bartkus to sup-
port its position, alleged that the relationship between a municipality 
and the state is analogous to the relationship between a state and the 
federal government. Such a rationale was not new; many states had 
based similar results in their courts on the dual sovereignty theory.42 
The Supreme Court disagreed with the analogy advanced by Florida. 
It pointed out that both the state and municipal courts derive their 
judicial power from the same source, the state constitution, and, there-
fore, their relation is not like that between the state and federal courts. 
[T]he apt analogy to the relationship between municipal and 
state governments is to be found in the relationship between the 
government of a Territory and the Government of the United 
States. The legal consequence of that relationship was settled 
in Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333 (1910), where this Court 
held that a prosecution in a court of the United States is a bar to 
a subsequent prosecution in a territorial court, since both are 
arms of the same sovereign.43 
The court held that Florida could not lawfully try the defendant twice 
for the same offense and vacated the second judgment. 
Since the Supreme Court in Waller did not find Bartkus controlling, 
its decision has no effect on the status of Bartkus as authority for suc-
cessive prosecutions by different governments (i.e., two different states 
or state-federal prosecutions). The Court did, however, comment that 
"[i]n this context [two prosecutions by the same state], a 'dual sover-
eignty' theory is an anachronism .... "44 It should also be noted that 
the Supreme Court apparently was not concerned with the considera-
tions that Justice Brennan had found important in Abbate. In Waller, 
the defendant's conviction of a misdemeanor in municipal court ob-
viously carried a much lighter sentence than a state felony conviction 
would have, and the state was denied the opportunity to enforce what-
ever it saw as its sovereign interests. 
Since Bartkus and Abbate, the Supreme Court has not decided a 
case in which the issue has been successive prosecutions by two differ-
ent governments; nevertheless, the decisions in Benton and Waller may 
be indicative of a change. The Supreme Court has based the validity 
of successive prosecutions not on constitutional principles, but rather 
on the dual sovereignty theory. The dual sovereignty theory, however, 
is not based on any principle of law, but is simply a rationalization 
which allows a necessary result to be reached. As can be seen in Bartkus 
and Abbate, the Court has historically placed great weight on the 
practical necessity of allowing successive prosecutions, and on bal-
ance, this consideration has outweighed the rights of the accused. 
The decision in Benton may have substantially altered the balance. 
42 Gross, Successive Prosecutions by City and State-The Question of Double 
Jeopardy, 43 Ore. L. Rev. 281 (1964). 
43 397 u.s. 387, 393 (1970). 
44 Id. at 395. 
55
O'Reilly: Chapter 16: Constitutional Law
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1971
§16.12 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 463 
Benton clearly held the Fifth Amendment protection against double 
jeopardy to be a fundamental constitutional right, and also indicated 
the approach which the courts should follow whenever fundamental 
constitutional rights are involved. That approach is to apply the same 
constitutional standards to both the state and federal governments. If 
the issue of the constitutionality of successive prosecutions is to be de-
cided in the future by considering, primarily, the effect the decision 
will have on the rights of the accused, the constitutional status of 
successive prosecutions may change. Indeed, such an approach would 
be similar to that of Justice Black in his dissent in Bartkus.45 The 
practical effect of allowing successive prosecutions seems clear. Regard-
less of the rationale used by a court, the accused is forced to defend 
himself twice for the same alleged criminal acts, ". . . enhancing the 
possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty."46 
Some people may take the approach of the Andrews case and argue that 
criminals "should ... be punished wherever guilty."47 However, 
in all likelihood, it is not the guilty who are tried a second time; it is 
those who are found innocent in the first instance who carry the greater 
risk of being tried again. 
j. MICHAEL DEASY 
§16.12. Grand jury: Indictment by fictitious name: Connor v. 
Picard. 1 A Suffolk County grand jury, on August 4, 1965, returned 
an indictment for murder against four named defendants and, pur-
suant to statute, against one "John Doe, the true name and a more par-
ticular description of the said John Doe being to the said jurors un-
known."2 Two days later defendant was taken into custody and 
subsequently served with a "John Doe" arrest warrant. Five days after 
return of the indictment, the Suffolk Superior Court allowed, over 
defendant's objection, the Commonwealth's motion to amend the 
indictment by substituting the name James J. Connor (defendant's 
true name) for the name "John Doe," a procedure presumed to be 
authorized by the same statute permitting indictment by fictitious 
name.3 
"See n.28 supra. 
46 Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 188 (1957). 
47 2 Mass. 13, 22 (1804). 
§16.12. 1 434 F.2d 673 (1st Cir. 1970). 
2 G.L., c. 277, §19 provides: "If the name of an accused person is unknown to the 
grand jury, he may be described ,by a fictitious name or by any other practicable de-
scription, with an allegation that his real name is unknown. An indictment of the de-
fendant by a fictitious or erroneous name shall not be ground for abatement; but if at 
any subsequent stage of the proceedings his true name is discovered, it shall be entered 
on the record and may be used in the subsequent proceedings, with a reference to the fact 
that he was indicted by the name or description mentioned in the indictment." 
3 It is probable that the form of the Commonwealth's motion was not carefully chosen. 
A "motion to amend indictment" was filed on Aug. 9, 1965, presumably in accordance 
with G.L., c. 277, §19. The Commonwealth apparently intended to move that Connor's 
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At trial, defendant was found guilty and sentenced to life imprison-
ment. On appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court, he challenged the 
sufficiency of his indictment by fictitious name, contending that the 
indictment contained no means of identifying him and was therefore 
violative of both the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights4 and the 
United States Constitution. The defendant was not specific as to the 
particular federal constitutional provision claimed to have J:?een vio-
lated, although his brief on appeal contained an argument that the 
Fifth Amendment right to grand jury indictment would probably be 
applicable.5 No due process claim was made, even though some pas-
sages in the defendant's brief might have been construed as relating to 
a due process claim.6 The Supreme Judicial Court, with two Justices 
dissenting, affirmed the conviction,7 relying on the similar case of 
Commonwealth v. Gedzium,8 which had held that the "John Doe" 
indictment statute did not violate the Massachusetts Constitution.9 
Defendant thereupon unsuccessfully petitioned the federal district 
court for a writ of habeas corpus.10 On appeal, the First Circuit Court 
of Appeals reversed and remanded with instructions to grant the writ 
unless the Commonwealth indicted petitioner within a reasonable 
time set by the district court.n In an opinion by Chief Judge Aldrich, 
the First Circuit pointed out that Article XII of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights has been interpreted as guaranteeing that no 
one shall be held to answer a criminal charge until a grand jury has 
found at least probable cause to believe the truth of the facts upon 
which the criminality depends.12 By its "John Doe" indictment 
statute, the Commonwealth authorizes a grand jury to return an in-
dictment when the only evidence before it is the fact that a crime has 
been committed. Thereafter, a prosecutor may continue to gather 
name be substituted in subsequent proceedings and not, as the motion prayed, to amend 
the indictment. Amendment is permitted by G.L., c. 277, §35A, but necessitates a judicial 
determination of whether the amendment would prejudice the defendant in his defense, 
and no such determination appears to have been explicitly made in Connor's case. In-
deed, it does not appear that the Commonwealth's motion was supported by any evidence 
bearing on the identity of "John Doe." 
4 Mass. Const. pt. 1, art. XII provides in part: "[N]o subject shall be arrested, im-
prisoned, despoiled, or deprived of his property, immunities, or privileges, put out of 
the protection of the law, exiled, or deprived of his life, liberty, or estate, but by the judg-
ment of his peers, or the law of the land." 
5 Brief for Defendant at 13, Commonwealth v. Doherty, 353 Mass. 197, 229 N.E.2d 
267 (1967). 
s See id. at 11, 12. 
7 Commonwealth v. Doherty, 353 Mass. 197, 229 N.E.2d 267 (1967), cert. denied, 390 
u.s. 982 (1968). 
8 259 Mass. 453, 156 N.E. 890 (1927). 
9 A Fifth Amendment claim in Gedzium was dismissed by the Supreme Judicial Court. 
At that time (1927), the Fifth Amendment was held to govern only the actions of the fed-
eral government. 
10 Connor v. Picard, 308 F. Supp. 843 (D. Mass. 1970). 
11 Connor v. Picard, 434 F.2d 673 (1st Cir. 1970). 
12 Article XII was so interpreted by Chief Justice Shaw in Commonwealth v. Holley, 
69 Mass. (3 Gray) 458, 459 (1855). 
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evidence and when he is satisfied as to the identity of the person who 
committed the crime, he may, without returning to the grand jury, 
cause that person's name to be entered on the record and thereafter used 
in the proceedings. This procedure is, according to the circuit court, 
a delegation of grand jury authority to the prosecutor, which results 
in two classifications of criminal defendants, those accused on "regu-
lar" indictments by a grand jury and those brought to trial by a prose-
cutor under the statutory procedure. The court decided that the differ-
ent treatment accorded criminal defendants charged with the same 
offense is not rationally related to a permissible state purpose and 
violated petitioner's right to equal protection of the laws. It was held 
that "[i]n the light of the Commonwealth's otherwise universal com-
mitment to grand jury indictments in felony cases," the arbitrary 
decision, in petitioner's case, to permit the grand jury to delegate its 
accusatory power to the prosecutor was "constitutionally impermis-
sible discrimination. "13 
Following the First Circuit's decision, the Commonwealth peti-
tioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, claim-
ing that: (l) petitioner had not exhausted his state remedies, (2) the 
"John Doe" indictment statute did not violate the equal protection 
clause, and (3) the application of the statute in the instant case did not 
raise a federal constitutional question. On May 3, 1971, the Common-
wealth's petition was granted. 14 At the time this comment went to 
press, the case had been argued, and a decision early in 1972 appeared 
likely. 
Grand jury indictment: The federal right in state courts. The Fifth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees that "[n]o 
person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury .... " 
In 1884, the United States Supreme Court decided in Hurtado v. Cali-
fornia15 that the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause does 
not compel the states to afford this same protection to persons prose-
cuted in state courts. Interestingly, of those guarantees of the Bill of 
Rights relating to the administration of criminal justice, only the 
Fifth Amendment guarantee of grand jury indictment in serious cases 
has not been extended to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment 
due process clause. 
In Hurtado, the Supreme Court discussed extensively the common 
law source and meaning of the phrases "due process of law" and "law 
of the land" and concluded that neither phrase embodied a right to 
grand jury indictment in criminal cases. In arriving at its conclusion, 
the Supreme Court was critical of jones v. Robbins, 16 a decision 
rendered by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in 1857, in 
which the Court had held that the phrase "law of the land" as used in 
13434 F.2d 673,676 (1st Cir. 1970). 
14 Picard v. Connor, 402 U.S. 942 (1971). 
15 110 U.S. 516 (1884). See also Lem Woon v. Oregon, 229 U.S. 586 (1913). 
16 74 Mass. (8 Gray) 329 (1857). 
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Article XII of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights made indict-
ment a prerequisite to conviction in felony casesY 
Notwithstanding the determination that states need not proceed 
against an accused by indictment, it is important to note that in 
Hurtado the Supreme Court did recognize that the particular state 
practice employed to bring an accused to trial must conform to due 
process of law. 18 In later decisions, the Supreme Court acknowledged 
the applicability of the Fourteenth Amendment to state grand jury pro-
ceedings by holding that intentional exclusion from grand juries of 
those belonging to the same race as the accused is violative of the equal 
protection clause.'9 
In his appeal to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, the 
petitioner in Connor v. Picard suggested that the Hurtado rationale 
should be reevaluated in view of later Supreme Court decisions that 
have held various Bill of Rights guarantees applicable to the states. 20 
However, petitioner apparently did not pursue this argument in his 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. In fact, in his Supreme Court 
brief, petitioner conceded that there is no Fourteenth Amendment due 
process right to a grand jury indictment in state prosecutions.21 
Thus, Connor v. Picard should not be regarded as an attack on the 
Hurtado decision. 
The Massachusetts "john Doe" indictment statute. In 1897, the 
General Court of Massachusetts appointed a commission of three per-
sons to investigate existing criminal procedure and to recommend a 
plan for its simplification.22 The commissioners, in 1899, sent their 
report and the draft of a bill to the governor, who transmitted both 
17 Relying primarily on a passage from Lord Coke's commentary on the Magna 
Carta, Chief Justice Shaw declared: "The right of individual citizens to be secure from 
an open and public accusation of crime, and from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a 
public trial, before a probable cause is established by the presentment and indictment 
of a grand jury, in cases of high offences, is justly regarded as one of the securities to the 
innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive public prosecutions, and as one of the 
ancient immunities and privileges of English liberty." Id. at 344. 
Ironically, the Commonwealth is placed in the anomalous position in Connor v. Pi· 
card of supporting the Hurtado proposition that due process does not include a right to 
grand jury indictment in criminal cases. Jones v. Robbins was most recently cited as 
established authority by the Supreme Judicial Court in Commonwealth v. Favulli, 352 
Mass. 95, 104, 224 N.E.2d 422, 429 (1967). 
18 "[W]e are unable to say that the substitution for a presentment or indictment by a 
grand jury of the proceeding by information, after examination and commitment by a 
magistrate, certifying to the probable guilt of the defendent, with the right on his part to 
the aid of counsel, and to the cross-examination of the witnesses produced for the pro-
secution, is not due process of law." 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884). 
19 Coleman v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 129 (1964); Arnold v. North Carolina, 376 U.S. 773 
(1964); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950); 
Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463 (1947). 
20 Brief for Defendant at 13, Commonwealth v. Doherty, 353 Mass. 197, 229 N.E.2d 
267 ( 1967). The case became Connor v. Picard once the federal habeas corpus petition had 
been filed. 
21 Brief for Respondent [Connor] at 13, Picard v. Connor, appeal docketed, No. 
70-96 (U.S. Oct. 1970 Term). 
22 Resolve of June 7, 1897, c. 85, [1897] Mass. Acts and Resolves 621. 
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the report and the draft to the General Court. The bill was enacted into 
law as Chapter 409 of the Statutes of 1899. Section 8 of the new law 
embodied a provision substantially the same as the present G.L., c. 
277, §19, authorizing indictment by fictitious name or other practicable 
description. 23 Thf:' commissioners' report discussed the constitution-
ality of portions of the proposed legislation, but there was no mention 
of a potential conflict of Section 8 with either the Massachusetts or 
the federal Constitution. Statutes comparable to the present Massa-
chusetts "John Doe" indictment statute have been enacted in 23 
other states and Puerto Rico. 24 
The constitutionality of the Massachusetts statute was challenged in 
the 1927 case of Commonwealth v. Gedzium,25 which concerned a 
murder indictment charging "John Doe, Richard Roe and Richard 
Doe, whose other and true names and more particular descriptions 
of whom are to said Jurors unknown." Almost one year after the in-
dictment was returned, on motion of the district attorney, the Middle-
sex Superior Court ordered the name "Jerry Gedzium" to be entered 
on the record and used in subsequent proceedings. Defendant moved 
to quash the indictment on the grounds that it was insufficient and 
violated both the Massachusetts and federal constitutions. The motion 
was denied and defendant was thereafter tried and found guilty of 
first-degree murder. He appealed to the Supreme Judicial Court, al-
leging error in the denial of his motion to quash the indictment. 
Speaking for a unanimous court, Chief Justice Rugg observed that 
"[i]f it were not for G.L., c. 277, §19, plainly the indictment would have 
been insufficient" because previous Massachusetts authority had held 
that "when the name of party was unknown, the best description 
possible of the person must be given and one sufficient to indicate 
clearly on whom it is to be served."26 The Court acknowledged that 
23 Section 8 was later amended to require that when the name of the accused person 
was discovered and entered in the record of subsequent proceedings, there must be a 
reference to the fact that he was indicted by the name or description mentioned in the 
indictment. 
24 Ala. Code tit. 15, §240 (1959); Ariz. R. Crim. Pro. II 7 (1956); Cal. Penal Code 
§953 (West 1970); Fla. R. Crim. Pro. 1.140(d)(2) (1967); Idaho Code §19-1412 (1948); Ind. 
Ann. Stat. §9-II26 (1956); Iowa Code Ann. §773.8 (Supp. 1970); La. Code Crim. Pro. 
Ann. art. 466 (West 1967); Mich. Stat. Ann. §28.989 (1954); Minn. Stat. Ann. §628.13 
(1947); Miss. Code Ann. §2452 (1957); Nev. Rev. Stat. §173.105 (1967); N.M. Stat. Ann. 
§41-6-10 (1964); N.D. Cent. Code §29-11·14 (1960); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2941.03 
(Page 1964); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, §409 (1969); Ore. Rev. Stat. §132.540(c) (1969); R.I. 
Gen. Laws Ann. §12-12-2 (1970); S.D. Code §34.3010(3) (Supp. 1960); Tenn. Code Ann. 
§40-1803 (1955); Tex. Code Crim. Pro. art. 26.10 (1966); Utah Code Ann. §77-21-11 (1953); 
Wash. Rev. Code §10.46.060 (1961); and P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 34, R. Crim. Pro 35 (Supp. 
1969). In the process of enacting new codes of criminal procedure, Kansas and New York 
have recently repealed statutes authorizing indictment by fictitious name. No comparable 
law was reenacted in either state. 
25 259 Mass. 453, 156 N.E. 890 (1927). An earlier case, Commonwealth v. Capland, 
254 Mass. 556, 150 N.E. 869 (1926), held a "Fred Doe" indictment valid under G.L., c. 
277, §19, presuming but not deciding the constitutionality of the statute. 
26 259 Mass. 453, 457, 156 N.E. 890, 891 (1927), citing Commonwealth v. Crotty, 92 
Mass. (10 Allen) 403 (1865). 
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the grand jury had not known the true names of the defendants and 
was unable to give more particular descriptions of them, but the Court 
made allowance for this deficiency by stating that the existence of a 
state-created right to grand jury indictment did not prohibit the 
legislature from altering "minor details" or "unessential formalities" 
not affecting "vital characteristics" of the grand jury proceeding. 27 
It was also declared that the criminal who had successfully concealed 
his name and other identifying characteristics from general knowledge 
ought not to escape justice simply because the grand jury was unable 
to describe him adequately in the indictment, particularly when the 
evidence disclosed his definite existence as a human being. The Court 
characterized the efforts of a criminal to disguise himself and conceal 
his identity as a deliberate and intentional attempt to obstruct the 
grand jury in the performance of its duties. Under these circumstances, 
the Court concluded, a statute authorizing indictment by a "fictitious 
description of an actual person, when that is the best description ob-
tainable," was not repugnant to Article XII of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights.28 
In Commonwealth v. Doherty,29 the same case that became Con-
nor v. Picard once a federal habeas corpus petition had been filed, the 
Supreme Judicial Court adhered to the Gedzium rationale. However, 
two dissenting Justices took the position that G.L., c. 277, §19 should 
apply "only where the indictment clearly shows that the grand jury 
intended to indict a particular person whose identity was known to 
them although his true name may not have been known. " 30 The dis-
senters argued that the Doherty indictment prima facie foreclosed the 
possibility that the grand jury knew the identity of the accused. Be-
cause the defendant was subjected to a public trial before the grand 
jury had determined that there was probable cause to believe that he 
committed the crime, the dissenters concluded that the indictment 
was an indictment in blank and therefore fatally defective.31 
The dissent also contended that the majority interpretation of G.L., 
c. 277, §19 would serve to nullify the provisions of the Massachusetts 
statute of limitations for criminal offenses.32 Assuming, for example, 
27 259 Mass. 453, 459, 156 N.E. 890, 892 (1927). 
28 Id. at 461, 156 N.E. at 893. It is doubtful that the Supreme Judicial Court intended 
the literal meaning of the quoted words since the statute does not, by its terms, authorize 
an indictment by a fictitious description. Any attempt by the grand jury to describe an 
unknown person fictitiously would inevitably fail. A constitutional challenge under the 
Fifth Amendment wad dismissed by the Court. See n.9 supra. Hurtado v. California 
was not mentioned at all in the Gedzium opinion. 
29 353 Mass. 197,229 N.E.2d 176 (1967) (JJ. Kirk and Spiegel, dissenting), cert. denied, 
390 u.s. 982 (1968). 
30 353 Mass. 197, 218, 229 N.E.2d 176, 280 (1967). 
31 Id. at 217, 229 N.E.2d at 279-280. 
32 G.L., c. 277, §63 provides: "An indictment for murder may be found at any time 
after the death of the person alleged to have been murdered. An indictment for the crime 
or crimes set forth in sections seventeen [armed robbery], eighteen [assault with intent to 
rob or assault with a dangerous weapon], nineteen [robbery by an unarmed person] and 
twenty-one [stealing by confining or putting in fear] [of c. 265), or for conspiracy to 
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that the criminal act was detected prior to the running of the statute, 
the grand jury could be convened, sufficient evidence of a criminal 
act presented to it, and a "John Doe" indictment returned, thereby 
permitting the state to circumvent the statute of limitations. The 
efficacy of the statute of limitations as a defense and as a meaningful 
legislative policy would thereby be substantially impaired, a result 
not likely to have been intended or even contemplated when the "John 
Doe" indictment statute was enacted.33 
The First Circuit Court of Appeals in Connor v. Picard agreed with 
the dissent in Doherty that the accusatory procedure under the statute 
was tantamount to an indictment in blank. However, as discussed 
earlier, the First Circuit held specifically that the absence of a sufficient 
description of the petitioner in the indictment denied him the federal 
right to equal protection of the laws: In a rather strongly worded 
opinion, the First Circuit found "no end served by the statute except 
prosecutorial convenience" and declared the Gedzium rationale 
"sophistical" and "not even minimally persuasive."34 In answer to 
the Gedzium "disguise" rationale, the First Circuit said that even if the 
perpetrator made a deliberate attempt to obstruct the grand jury by 
concealment and disguise, his conduct would not justify the denial of 
customary rights to the person the prosecutor elected to accuse. 
It is undoubtedly true, as the First Circuit observed, that the Massa-
chusetts "John Doe" indictment statute serves "prosecutorial conve-
nience." Most statutes which are enacted for the purpose of stream-
lining cumbersome common law criminal procedures are, to some 
extent, intended to facilitate the prosecution of criminals. The elimi-
nation of the delay, complexity, and inconvenience of outmoded crimi-
nal procedure is clearly a legitimate legislative purpose so long as 
substantive rights are preserved.35 The question thus raised is whether 
the Massachusetts "John Doe" indictment statute serves any legitimate 
state purpose without unduly limiting the substantive rights of an 
accused. To answer this question, the operation of the statute must be 
examined. 
On its face, the statute permits indictment by fictitious name in at 
least the following three situations: (1) a defendant whom the grand 
jury.has probable cause to accuse of a crime is in custody but refuses 
commit such crime or crimes, or as accessory thereto, or any one or more of them may be 
found and filed within ten years of the date of commission of said crime or crimes. An 
indictment for any other crime shall be found and filed within six years after the crime 
has been committed; but any period during which the defendant is not usually and 
publicly resident within the commonwealth shall be excluded in determining the time 
limited." 
33 353 Mass. 197, 218, 229 N.E.2d 267, 280 (1967). 
34 434 F.2d 673, 675-676 (1st Cir. 1970). 
35 Statutory procedures providing for substitution of an information for an indict-
ment in less serious cases, a knowing waiver of grand jury indictment or of trial by jury 
in noncapital cases, and amendments of complaints, informations, and indictments to 
correct misnomer and other errors of form are examples of procedures intended to serve 
"prosecutorial convenience" without undue impairment of rights. 
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to reveal his true name or any other information about himsel£;36 
(2) the defendant is at large, his true name unknown to the prosecutor, 
grand jury, and witnesses, but he is reasonably identifiable by physi-
cal description or other means; or (3) defendant is at large, and the 
only known evidence of his existence is the fact of his criminal ac-
tivityY 
In the first situation, the unidentified defendant in custody, there 
would seem to exist no valid objection to an indictment by a fictitious 
name. This assumes, of course, that the grand jury, after a finding of 
probable cause, would include a description sufficient to indicate that 
the recalcitrant prisoner is the intended accused. Absent the "John 
Doe" indictment statute, the unidentified person in custody could, 
at common law, bring a plea in abatement to any indictment which 
stated his name incorrectly. He would have to be discharged, or else 
proceedings would have to be commenced de novo under the name in 
his plea.38 To avoid the delay and expense resulting from this circu-
itous common law procedure, the statutory provisions for the indict-
ment by fictitious name would seem to embody a proper legislative 
purpose without impairment of defendant's constitutional rights. 
The second situation noted, the unknown defendant at large but 
reasonably identifiable by physical description or other means, poses 
somewhat more difficult constitutional questions. A person indicted 
by a fictitious name followed by a reasonably accurate description has 
no complaint if the description is sufficiently narrow to manifest the 
grand jury's intent to single him out as the subject of its accusation. 
However, the difficulty arises in attempting to define what constitutes 
an acceptable description. An examination of several cases will illus-
trate what the courts have considered meaningful descriptive cri-
teria.39 
In Commonwealth v. Baldassini4° the defendant challenged the 
denial of his motion to suppress an arrest warrant41 which charged 
"John Doe, also known as 'Baldi' and Baldassini, a white male, 
between 50 and 55 yrs. of age, 5'8", 170-180 pounds, and dark hair, of 
said Quincy in said County of Norfolk" with possession of gaming 
apparatus. Defendant sought to suppress the warrant on the ground 
that it did. not indicate clearly on whom it was to be served, since it did 
not state his occupation, his place of residence, and the personal 
peculiarities by which he could be identified. The Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court upheld the validity of the warrant, citing the 
s6 This category would include those defendants who falsely identify themselves and 
are subsequently indicted by the false name. 
s7 This category would include defendents not yet implicated in the crime charged in 
the "John Doe" indictment, but who are in custody for some other reason. 
ss See United States v. Fawcett, '115 F.2d 764, 766 (3d Cir. 1940). 
sg The illustrative cases cited did not all arise in jurisdictions having "John Doe" in-
dictment statutes in force; for example, there is no federal "John Doe" indictment statute. 
40 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 989, 260 N.E.2d 150. 
41 G.L., c. 277, §79 makes the "John Doe" indictment statute applicable to com-
plaints. 
63
O'Reilly: Chapter 16: Constitutional Law
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1971
§16.12 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 471 
authority of Gedzium and Doherty. Even though the Court relied on 
authority subsequently rejected by the First Circuit in Connor v. 
Picard, it is submitted that this warrant, which included defendant's 
surname, a nickname, some accurate physical characteristics, and his 
city of residence, would meet the constitutional standards set by the 
First Circuit.42 
On the other hand, several courts have found certain descriptions 
of unknown defendants to be unreasonably vague. In United States v. 
Doe, 43 the defendant was arraigned on a federal indictment accusing 
"John Doe, a Chinese person, whose true name is to the grand jurors 
aforesaid unknown," with aiding the illegal landing of an alien. 
Sustaining a demurrer to the accusation, the federal district court held 
that "an indictment so indefinite in its description of the defendant 
that a warrant for his arrest, following the description contained in 
the indictment, would be void, lacks that degree of certainty which 
the law requires, and must be held insufficient, when directly assailed 
by a demurrer or motion to quash upon that ground."44 The court 
also pointed out that "[ w ]ith no other description of the defendant 
than this, it is not possible to say what particular Chinese person the 
grand jury intended to indict. ... "45 In the case of State v. Gei-
ger,46 an indictment was returned by the grand jury against "a man 
in Turner Hall [a town], whose name to the grand jurors is unknown." 
An Iowa statute permitted indictment by fictitious name if the defen-
dant's true name could not be discovered. 47 In quashing the indict-
ment, the Iowa Supreme Court said: "[T]he description [in the indict-
ment] by which it is attempted to identify [defendant], may apply with 
the same certainty and distinctness to fifty men in Turner Hall, if 
there are fifty men there."48 In Duffy v. Keville, 49 an opinion ren-
dered by the federal District Court for Massachusetts, one Mary Duffy 
was arrested in Massachusetts and held for removal to New York on 
an indictment returned in a New York federal court. The indictment 
charged "Jane Duffy, the name Jane being fictitious" and others with 
conspiracy. In granting the petitioner's writ of habeas corpus, the 
district court held that the indictment was patently indefinte and 
void inasmuch as it was "equally applicable to every woman named 
'Duffy' residing anywhere in the world."50 
Seeming particularity of description in an indictment can be some-
•z See Connor v. Picard, 434 F.2d 673, 675 n.4 (1st Cir. 1970), where the court cites 
with approval dictum of the Supreme Judicial Court in Commonwealth v. Crotty, 92 
Mass .. (10 Allen) 403 (1865). The dictum suggests so~e identification cues which might 
be sufficient to permit issuance of a warrant using a fictitious name. 
"127 F. 982 (N.D. Cal. 1904). 
44 Id. at 984. 
45 Id. at 983. 
46 5 Iowa 484 (1858). 
47 The statute was a predecessor of the present Iowa "John Doe" indictment statute, 
Iowa Code Ann. §773.8 (Supp. 1970). 
48 5 Iowa 484, 486 (1858). 
49 16 F.2d 828 (D. Mass. 1926). 
50 Ibid. 
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what deceiving. Two California decisions are illustrative. An indict-
ment that charged "Jane Doe (Charlene) female Negro, 39 years, 
5'7", weight 165 lbs., olive complexion" was upheld despite the fact 
defendant weighed 110 pounds rather than 165 pounds.51 Similarly, 
an indictment that designated the accused as "John Doe 'Bill,' male 
Negro, 30-35 yrs., 5'7"-5'10", 150-160 lbs., black hair, brown eyes" was 
also found to be su££icient.52 It is submitted, however, that the latter 
description could fit thousands of male Negroes, and such particulars 
as "black haM-" and "brown eyes" apply almost universally to the 
Negro race. It would seem that the potential for error clearly outweighs 
any inconvenience or delay that may be caused by insisting that the 
prosecutor resubmit the case to the grand jury when he has either 
identified the suspect or otherwise narrowed the suspect's description. 
In the case of the "Jane Doe (Charlene)" indictment, somewhat more 
particular evidence was presented to the grand jury, and since most of 
the particulars apparently were correct, it could be argued that it was 
justifiable to disregard the significant error in weight. 
When a "John Doe" indictment is returned in the situation of an 
unknown defendant at large, it contains no description of the accused. 
It must be presumed, therefore, that the grand jury has found no more 
than probable cause to believe a crime has been committed by an un-
known person. Connor v. Picard and Gedzium illustrate this situation. 
Once the prosecutor feels he knows the identity of the person respon-
sible for the crime, that person's name may be substituted for the ficti-
tious name in the indictment on the prosecutor's motion. Viewed as a 
materially different proceeding, with less assurance of fairness than 
that contemplated by the regular grand jury procedure, the substitution 
of names by the prosecutor appears to be inconsistent with the man-
date of the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause. 
In addition, it is submitted that application of the "John Doe" 
indictment statute to persons wholly unknown to the grand jury 
contravenes the Massachusetts Constitution by eliminating the sub-
stance of the grand jury protection guaranteed an accused by Article 
XII of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. In Gedzium, the 
Supreme Judicial Court advanced its paradoxical "disguise" rationale 
as the possible justification for enactment of the forerunner of G.L., 
c. 277, §19. However, when a criminal disguises himself so as to 
conceal his identity, the grand jury and the prosecutor should proceed 
with utmost caution to insure against accusation of an innocent per-
son; and it seems preferable in such a situation to require the prosecu-
tor to return to the grand jury when he has what he considers suf-
ficient evidence as to a particular person. The Supreme Judicial Court 
in Doherty apparently felt compelled by the doctrine of stare decisis 
to follow Gedzium, despite the cogent and well-reasoned Doherty 
51 People v. Erving, 189 Cal. App. 2d 283, II Cal. Rptr. 203 (1961), cert. denied, 368 
U.S. 960 (1962). Cal. Penal Code §953 (West 1970) permits "John Doe" indictments. 
52 People v. McCrae, 218 Cal. App. 2d 725, 32 Cal. Rptr. 500 (1963), cert. denied, 
376 u.s. 934 (1964). 
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dissenting opinion. If the Court is presented with the opportunity to 
reexamine its Gedzium and Doherty decisions because of remand from 
the Supreme Court, the equal protection issue need not be reached if 
the Court finds, as is urged here, that the "John Doe" indictment 
statute violates Article XII of the Declaration of Rights when applied 
to persons whom the grand jury is unable to describe with any par-
ticularity.53 
GEORGE c. MYERS 
§16.13. Prisoners' rights: Access to the courts; Due process in disci-
plinary proceedings. Since the introduction of the prison system into 
the United States in the early nineteenth century,' the civil rights of 
state prison inmates have been drastically curtailed so that prisons 
could be easily administered and prison discipline maintained. At 
various times since the late nineteenth century, prison reformers have 
attempted to advance the civil rights of prisoners, but have toiled 
against unfavorable public opinion and indifferent legislatures. In 
the past, the federal courts have not played an active part in protecting 
the civil rights of state prison inmates.2 Although the rights of pris-
53 On December 20, 1971, as this article was awaiting publication, the United States 
Supreme Court, by a 6 to I majority (Justice Douglas dissenting), reversed the First Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals and remanded respondent (Connor) to the Supreme Judicial 
Court for a determination of his equal protection claim. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270 
(1971). Specifically refusing to reach the merits of the constitutional question, the 
Court held that the respondent had not exhausted his state remedies, in that the Supreme 
Judicial Court had no fair opportunity to consider and act upon his equal protection 
claim. The Supreme Judicial Court will now be presented with the following consider-
ations and alternatives. 
(I) If the Court elects to decide the case on the basis of the equal protection issue, sub-
sequent federal court involvement is likely. A decision adverse to the Commonwealth, 
i.e., holding the "John Doe" indictment statute invalid, could result in a petition by the 
Commonwealth to the Supreme Court for certiorari pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1257(3). 
Conversely, a decision adverse to the defendant will almost certainly be attacked either 
by appeal to the Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. §1257(2) or by a petition for habeas cor-
pus, or both. 
(2) If the Court reaffirms the validity of the "John Doe" indictment under state law, 
it would seem that the equal protection issue must be reached, and the same alternatives 
as in (I) would follow. 
(3) If, however, the Court finds that the defendant was illegally indicted under state 
law, by overruling Gedzium and Doherty and holding the application of G.L., c. 277, 
§19 to the defendant as repugnant to Article XII of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights, no federal court involvement would be likely. 
§16.13. 1 Prior to the acceptance of incarceration as a penal instrument, American 
society relied almost exclusively on harsh corporal punishment to deter criminal activity. 
See Barnes and Teeters, New Horizons in Criminology 466-475 (1943). 
2 Traditionally, state courts have also not been sympathetic to claims of civil rights 
on the part of state prison inmates. In Ruffin v. Commonwealth, the Virginia Supreme 
Court declared: "The convicted felon has, as a consequence of his crime, not only for-
feited his liberty, but all his personal rights except those which the law in its humanity 
accords him. He is for the time being a slave of the state. 
The bill of rights is a declaration of general principles to govern a society of freemen, 
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oners have been recognized by the courts,3 federal judges have gen-
erally accepted the thesis that citizens of necessity lose many of their 
civil rights when they become prisoners. 4 Furthermore, many federal 
courts have long practiced a hands-off policy with respect to the ad-
ministration and regulation of state prisons in the belief that the 
supervision of state institutions belongs exclusively in the hands of 
the state's own judiciary.5 It has only been within the past few years 
that the federal courts have become involved in the protection of the 
civil rights of state prison inmates.6 Although accepting the proposi-
tion that state authorities should have broad discretion to deal with 
prison administration/ federal judges have come to recognize that 
the granting of such discretion does not preclude judicial review of 
the manner in which that discretion is exercised.8 In carrying out 
their review, the federal courts have typically employed a balancing 
test, weighing the prisoner's rights against the demands of prison 
administration and discipline.9 This comment will review several 
recent federal court decisions on prisoners' rights, including four 
decisions involving inmates of Massachusetts prisons, IO in order to 
examine the issues presented by the inmates and the responses of the 
federal judiciary. Two specific topics will be considered: (l) access of 
and not of convicted felons .... " 62 Va. (21 Grat.) 790, 796 (1871). 
3 See In re Bonner, 151 U.S. 242 (1894); Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th 
Cir. 1944), in which the court declared: "A prisoner retains all the rights of an ordinary 
citizen except those expressly, or by necessary implication, taken from him by law." 
4 See, e.g., Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266 (1948). 
5 E.g., Banning v. Looney, 213 F.2d 771 (lOth Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 859 
(1954), in which the court, in a per curiam decision, declared it unnecessary to cite au· 
thority for the proposition that federal courts were "without power to supervise prison 
administration or to interfere with ordinary prison rules or regulations." Id. at 771. 
See also Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969); Burns v. Swenson, 430 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 
1970); Krist v. Smith, 309 F. Supp. 479 (S.D. Ga. 1970); United States ex rei. Keen v. Maz· 
urkiewicz, 306 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa. 1969). For a full discussion of the rationale behind 
the hands-off doctrine, see Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial 
Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 Yale L.J. 506 (1963). 
6 See Jacob, Prison Discipline and Inmate Rights, 5 Harv. Civ. Rights-Civ. Lib. L. 
Rev. 227, 228 n.5 (1970), for a listing of various articles dealing with the new develop-
ments concerning judicial intervention in state prison administration. 
7 For a listing of state statutes granting broad discretion to prison administrators, see 
Jacob, n.6 supra, at 227 n.l. 
8 Muniz v. United States, 305 F.2d 285, 287 (2d Cir. 1962), aff'd, 374 U.S. 150 (1963), 
in which the court declared: " ... (A] mere grant of authority cannot be taken as a 
blanket waiver of responsibility in its execution. Numerous federal agencies are vested 
with extensive administrative responsibilities. But it does not follow that their actions 
are immune to judicial review." 
9 The need for a balancing of interests was explicitly recognized in United States ex 
rei. Yaris v. Shaughnessy, 112 F. Supp. 143, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), where the court said: 
"It is hard to believe that persons ... convicted of crime are at the mercy of the execu-
tive department and yet it is unthinkable that the judiciary should take over the operation 
of the . . . prisons. There must be some middle ground between these extremes." 
10 Nolan v. Scafati, 430 F.2d 548 (1st Cir. 1970); Nolan v. Fitzpatrick, 326 F. Supp. 209 
(D. Mass. 1971); Tyree v. Fitzpatrick, 325 F. Supp. 554 (D. Mass. 1971); and Meola v. 
Fitzpatrick, 322 F. Supp. 878 (D. Mass. 1971). 
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prisoners to the federal courts, and (2) due process safeguards appli-
cable to prisoners involved in prison disciplinary hearings. 11 · 
Access to the courts. Of fundamental importance to state prison 
inmates in their attempts to gain redress for alleged wrongs is the right 
of access to the judicial system. In four recent cases that involved in-
mates of Massachusetts prisons, the federal courts unanimously re-
affirmed the prisoners' right of access. In Nolan v. Scafati, 12 Nolan, 
a prisoner at the Massachusetts Correctional Institution in Walpole, 
Massachusetts, had been involved in prison disciplinary proceedings 
and had attempted to send a letter to the Massachusetts Civil Liberties 
Union. The officials at Walpole had refused to allow the letter to be 
sent, and when Nolan was ordered to solitary confinement by the 
prison disciplinary committee, he appealed to the federal district 
court. 13 Nolan sought. relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983 14 and invoked 
the court's jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1343, 15 contending that 
the refusal to forward his letter was a denial of due process. 
11 Federal court decisions in cases arising in other states have dealt extensively with 
First Amendment freedoms and prisoners' rights. Although the balancing test applied 
by the courts is phrased in familiar terms (a strong showing of a substantial and con-
trolling interest, e.g., Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529, 541 (5th Cir. 1968) ), the rights 
sought by the prisoners have been basic: to gather in a body for religious services, to 
consult a minister of their faith, to possess and subscribe to religious literature, and to 
correspond with their spiritual leader. See Walker v. Blackwell, 411 F.2d 23 (5th Cir. 
1969); Long v. Parker, 390 F.2d 816 (3d Cir. 1968); Cooper v. Pate, 382 F.2d 518 (7th 
Cir. 1967); Northern v. Nelson, 315 F. Supp. 687 (N.D. Cal. 1970); Knuckles v. Prasse, 
302 F. Supp. 1036 (E.D. Pa. 1969); Banks v. Havener, 234 F. Supp. 27 (E.D. Va. 1964). 
Religious freedom has been denied where a reasonable and compelling state interest 
exists. See Abernathy v. Cunningham, 393 F.2d 775 (4th· Cir. 1968); Jones v. Willing-
ham, 248 F. Supp. 791 (D. Kan. 1965); United States ex rei. Cleggett v. Pate, 229 F. Supp. 
818 (N.D. III. 1964); Kelly v. Dowd, 140 F.2d 81 (7th Cir. 1944); see also In re Ferguson, 
55 Cal. 2d 663,361 P.2d 417, 12 Cal. Rptr. 753, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 864 (1961); Wright 
v. Wilkins, 26 Misc. 2d 1090,210 N.Y.S.2d 309 (Sup. Ct. 1961). Although there is no ab-
solute right to send or receive mail without interferenre-see, e.g., Ortega v. Rogers, 
216 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 940 (1954); United States ex. rei. Hen-
son v. Myers, 244 F. Supp. 826 (E.D. Pa. 1965); United States ex r~l. Thompson v. Fay, 
197 F. Supp. 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1961)-federal courts are beginning to weaken the almost 
absolute discretion to control speech heretofore accorded prison officials. See Fortune 
Society v. McGinnis, 319 F. Supp. 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (prison officials may not prohibit 
a newspaper published by ex-convicts); Palmigrano v. Traviseno, 317 F. Supp. 776 
(D.R.I. 1970) (censorship of inmates' mail limited); Carothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp. 
1014, 1024 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (prison officials may not prohibit inmates from sending 
letters which voice complaints which do not threaten prison security or discipline). 
12 430 F.2d 548 (1st Cir. 1970). 
13 In his letter, Nolan claimed that his impending sentence to solitary confinement 
resulted from his insistence on a right to counsel at the disciplinary hearing. 
14 42 U.S.C. §1983 provides: "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordi-
nance, regulation custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects or causes to be 
subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privi-
leges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party 
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress." 
15 28 U.S.C. §1343 provides in part: "The district courts shall have original juris-
diction in any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person ... (3) 
To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the 
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Nolan's complaint was dismissed by the district court, 15 but on 
appeal the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit took a 
firm stand on a prisoner's right of access to the courts and the "corol-
lary right to obtain some assistance in preparing [a] communication 
with the court." The circuit court held that in the absence of some 
"countervailing interest," usually involving prison security, the state 
cannot "prevent an inmate from seeking legal assistance from bona 
fide attorneys working in an organization such as the Civil Liberties 
Union." 17 To rule otherwise would, in the words of the court, "allow 
prison officials to silence-and perhaps punish-inmates seeking 
vindication of those constitutional rights clearly held by prison in-
mates."18 
In Tyree v. Fitzpatrick, 49 the petitioner alleged general censorship 
of his incoming and outgoing mail and the refusal of prison officials 
to mail "certain communications." The federal District Court for 
Massachusetts decided that while it would not issue an injunction for-
bidding Massachusetts correctional officials from opening mail, either 
incoming or outgoing, it would enjoin officials from deleting material 
or refusing to mail communications from prisoners to the courts, 
attorneys, or public officials.20 In reaching its decision, the court 
applied the balancing test and found that the necessities of prison 
administration did not outweigh the need for an inmate to be able to 
communicate with counsel. 
The case of Meola v. Fitzpatrick2 1 also involved issues of access to 
the courts and due process in prison disciplinary hearings. In Meola, 
the inmate's complaint alleged that the procedure whereby state cor-
rectional officials reviewed all petitions sent by a prisoner to the courts, 
with the right to return those in which the language was deemed 
"improper," violated his right of access to the courts. The federal 
District Court for Massachusetts stated flatly that censorship of the 
contents of a prisoner's petition to court violated his First Amendment 
United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens .... " 
16 The district court believed that the disciplinary committee had informed Nolan of 
the charges against him and had given him an opportunity to respond by giving his own 
version of the events in question. 306 F. Supp. I, 2 (D. Mass. 1969). 
17 430 F.2d 548, 551 (lst Cir. 1970). 
18 Ibid. Justification for the intervention of federal courts in certain matters relating 
to state prisoners emanates from the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Ex 
parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941), and Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969). In Johnson, 
the Court expressed guidelines for federal judicial intervention in prisoners' rights cases: 
"There is no doubt that discipline and administration of state detention facilities are 
state functions. They are subject to federal authority only where paramount federal con-
stitutional or statutory rights supervene. It is clear, however, that in instances where 
state regulations applicable to inmates of prison facilities conflict with such rights the 
regulations may be invalidated." Id. at 486. Although both Ex parte Hull and Johnson 
v. Avery dealt with writs of habeas corpus, federal courts have applied the principles 
of these cases to the entire area of prisoners' access to the courts. 
19 325 F. Supp. 554 (D. Mass. 1971). This case also raised questions concerning the 
constitutionality and utility of solitary confinement; see n.50 infra. 
20 !d. at 559. 
21 322 F. Supp. 878 (D. Mass. 1971). 
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rights. It held that "there [was] no valid prison interest in screening 
and controlling the content of court papers sufficiently compelling so 
as to limit a prisoner's constitutional right to free and unfettered access 
to the courts."22 Although noting that men in a prison environment 
are often prone to exaggerate the conditions under which they are 
living, the court could not find sufficient justification for review and 
censorship of their petitions. 
Possibly the most important issue raised by any of the Massachusetts 
cases dealing with access to the courts arose in Nolan v. Fitzpatrick. 23 
Nolan challenged the policy of state prison authorities against allow-
ing inmates to send grievance letters to the news media. He had at-
tempted to send unsealed letters to Boston newspapers and broad-
casters; the letters commented on news reports concerning conditions 
at Walpole, and one contained an invitation to a particular newspaper 
reporter to visit the prison. The letters were returned by the prison 
authorities as " 'not allowed . . . pursuant to the policy of the Mas-
sachusetts Department of Corrections prohibiting inmates at Wal-
pole ... from corresponding with representatives of the news media 
on matters concerning prison management, treatment of offenders, and 
personal grievances.' " 24 The federal District Court for Massachu-
setts found that although there are often important administrative 
considerations that might warrant censorship of inmate correspon-
dence, these considerations do not generally affect communications 
directed to the news media. In regard to the defendant's argument that 
an added "burden and expense of administration" could result if the 
requested visits were allowed, the court reasoned that such consider-
ations might be valid if the visits were the main issue in the case. Be-
cause they were not, and because there would be no additional expense 
involved in reading the letters, it was decided that permission should 
have been granted for the letters to be sent. The court reasoned that 
censorship of media-directed correspondence was not supported by 
any valid security interests, since representatives of the news media are 
not inherent security risks. Moreover, the court concluded that such 
censorship cannot be upheld upon any considerations relating to the 
punishment of prisoners, their rehabilitation, or the deterrence of 
other cirminal acts they may commit. In explaining its very significant 
decision, the federal district court said the following: 
... Plaintiffs' affirmative claim rests less on analogy than on the 
argument that they have a right to appeal for the redress of griev-
ances not only to the courts and to the elected and appointed 
representatives of the people, but to the people themselves, .and 
that such people are best reached by communications with the 
news media .... In some cases it is as essential to the cure of the 
prisoner's grievance that he be able to reach the court of public 
22 Id. at 885. 
23 326 F. Supp. 209 (D. Mass. 1971). 
24 Id. at 210. 
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opinion as that he reach a judicial court or the General Court of 
Massachusetts. 2s 
Not all federal courts have interpreted the same broad rights of access 
to the courts as are found in the recent cases arising in Massachusetts. 
Two cases holding somewhat stricter views are Sostre v. McGinnis26 
and Burns v. Swenson.27 In Sostre, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit reaffirmed the right of prison officials 
to open and read all incoming and outgoing mail. In Burns, which 
concerned correspondence with a branch of th~ American Civil Liber-
ties Union by an inmate at the Missouri State Penitentiary, the Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeals noted a "weighty interest in the security and 
orderly administration of the in~ernal affairs of the penal institution" 
and ordered that correspondence with the ACLU may be subjected to 
"reasonable regulation consistent with legitimate policies of internal 
prison administration and security, so long as such regulation does 
not become a subterfuge to deny [petitioner] access to the ACLU, and 
through it, to the courts."28 
Due process in prison disciplinary hearings. Another important 
issue for prisoners is whether a prison disciplinary committee made up 
of various prison guards and administrators must accord procedural 
due process safeguards to inmates, and, if so, how fully this protection 
must be extended. In Scafati, the petitioner alleged that at his disci-
plinary hearing he had been denied due process of law by having been 
denied the right to counsel, the right to cross-examine his accuser, and 
the right to call witnesses on his behalf. Chief Judge Wyzanski of the 
federal district court noted that the Fifth Amendment rights that Nolan 
alleged had been violated were procedural, not substantive, and he 
held, therefore, that the nature of the hearing did not require the im-
position of the requested due process safeguards. Judgy Wyzanski took 
the view that procedural rights vary depending on the forum involved, 
i.e., the relationship between the party and the particular tribunal, as 
well as the general context of the particular proceeding. In view of 
specific prison security and administrative considerations present in 
the case, he felt compelled to uphold the prison authorities in their 
administration of disciplinary hearings.29 In its decision on appeal, 
the First Circuit did not express exact standards for deciding the 
25 Id. at 216. 
26 422 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971 ). 
27 430 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1970). 
28 I d. at 777. 
29 See Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 196-197 (2d Cir. 1971), where the court noted 
that "[b ]eyond the process of guilt determination and initial incarceration, courts have 
displayed greater reluctance to import all the trappings of formal due process .... 
Certainly, formal rules of evidence would be entirely inappropriate at a disciplinary 
proceeding. . . . There is correspondingly less need for cross-examination and calling 
of witnesses .... Most important, we think it advisable for a federal court to pass judg-
ment one way or another as to the truly decisive consideration, whether formal due pro-
cess requirements would be likely to help or to hinder in the state's endeavor to preserve 
order and discipline in its prisons and to return a rehabilitated individual to society." 
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due process issues, but sent the case back to the district court for re-
hearing on the merits. However, the circuit court did state that a dis-
ciplinary hearing must provide "assurances of elemental fairness" 
when "substantial individual interests are at stake."30 
Decisions subsequent to Scafati have sought to interpret the vague 
standard enunciated by the First Circuit. Tyree involved a Massachu-
setts inmate who had been given an official disciplinary hearing at 
which he was informed of the chargeS against him and was given a 
chance to explain his version of the events. Relying on the aforemen-
tioned remarks of the First Circuit in Scafati, the federal district court 
held that there was no denial of due process since there was every indi-
cation that prison officials had tried to provide at least "some assur-
ances of elemental fairness." However, in Meola, where the imposition 
of substantial punishment at the disciplinary hearing was summary in 
nature, the federal District Court for Massachusetts held that the im-
position of the punishment without notice to the prisoner of the 
charges against him or an opportunity for him to reply to them was 
"unlawful and violative of the provisions of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution. "31 The court reasoned that 
the punishments imposed on the prisoner were sufficiently great to 
require procedural safeguards, "at least the elementary ones of notice 
of the charges against him and an opportunity to reply to them. "32 
Among the reasons given for denying certain due process safeguards 
at prison disciplinary hearings is the claimed similarity of the hearings 
to nonadjudicatory commission hearings. Concerning the latter type 
of proceeding, the United States Supreme Court in Hannah v. 
Larche33 held that certain procedural safeguards34 were not necessary 
in hearings conducted by the Commission on Civil Rights when alle-
gations of racial or religious discrimination were being investigated. 
However, the Court discussed what is an important distinction in 
understanding the difference between the situation involved in Han-
'" 430 F.2d 548, 550. (1st Cir. 1970). 
'' 322 F. Supp. 878, 886 (D. Mass. 1971). The court found the punishments to be as 
follows: "(a) segregation in the 'new man's section' of the prison [a segregation facility 
for newly admitted inmates, where men are kept until their classification and assignment 
to a particular section of the prison] for approximately 60 days . . . on suspicion of 
placing an explosive in another inmate's cell, (b) loss of 60 days earned good time ... 
on a charge of destruction of furnishings in [petitioner's] room ... , (c) transfer to 
[departmental segregation unit] for approximately 10 weeks ... on a principal allega· 
tion of racial agitation. As to punishments (a) and (c), no hearing of any kind was held." 
Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
"363 U.S. 420 (1960). The Supreme Court set out a guide for judicial intervention on 
due process grounds: "[A]s a generalization, it can be said that due process embodies the 
differing rules of fair play .... Whether the Constitution requires that a particular 
right obtain in a specific proceeding depends upon a complexity of factors. The nature 
of the alleged right involved, the nature of the proceeding, and the possible burden on 
that proceeding, are all considerations which must be taken into account." Id. at 442. 
34 The safeguards sought by the petitioner included the right to be informed of the 
specific charges under investigation and the identity of the complainants, and the right 
to cross-examine these complainants, as well as other witnesses. Id. at 441-442. 
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nah and that which obtains in many prison disciplinary cases. The 
Court in Hannah noted that "[the commission] ... does not adjudi-
cate. It does not hold trials or determine anyone's civil or criminal 
liability. It does not issue orders. Nor does it indict, punish, or impose 
any legal sanctions. It does not make determinations depriving anyone 
of his life, liberty, or property."35 The commission merely heard 
complaints and made findings that had no legal significance, whereas 
a disciplinary committee may make determinations that affect the 
liberty of the party before it. 
Another argument that has been made against any major extension 
of procedural due process standards to prisoners is that prison disci-
plinary hearings are not strictly criminal in nature and, therefore, 
do not demand full application of such safeguards as the right to coun-
sel or the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses. Analogous argu-
ments were rejected by the United States Supreme Court in In re 
Gault36 and Mempa v. RhayY The Gault case dealt with the question 
of the necessity for due process standards in juvenile hearings, but the 
rationale supporting the Court's ruling can arguably be applied to 
prison disciplinary hearings. In stating that juvenile hearings that 
can result in incarceration demand due process safeguards such as 
notice and the right to counsel, the Supreme Court affirmed the right 
to due process protection where there is the possibility of a substantial 
loss of personal liberty.38 Admittedly, a prisoner who comes before a 
prison disciplinary committee is not in the same position as a juvenile 
who appears before a juvenile court judge, yet the resulting loss of 
liberty-incarceration for the juvenile and solitary confinement and 
loss of "good time" for the prisoner-is similar in effect, if not in 
degree. In Mempa, the Supreme Court applied reasoning similar to 
that in Gault and decided that the protection of the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments applied to probation revocation hearings; this decision 
was specifically designed to make the right to counsel a basic require-
ment.39 
The principal arguments for applying due process safeguards to 
prison hearings concern the direct affect the disciplinary hearings may 
have on the liberty of the prisoner. These arguments involve the possi-
ble loss of "good time" and/or transfer to another form of confine-
ment. An adverse decision by a prison disciplinary committee can re-
sult in loss of "good time," either as part of the decision or because 
a sentence to solitary confinement cuts off the chance to earn "good 
time"; such a penalty raises the important question of the legal effect 
35 Id. at 441. 
36 387 U.S. I (1967). 
37 389 u.s. 128 (1967). 
38 Justice Fortas stated in Gault that "[d]ue process of law is the primary and indis-
pensable foundation of individual freedom. It is the basic and essential term in the social 
compact which defines the rights of the individual and delimits the powers which the 
state may exercise." 387 U.S. l, 20 (1967). 
39 389 U.S. 128, 131 (1967). 
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of this imposed forfeiture.40 "Good time" is regulated by statute m 
Massachusetts,41 and the statute provides for specific deductions of 
time from a prisoner's maximum sentence if he complies with prison 
regulations. The statute also provides for forfeiture of portions of 
earned "good time" upon a determination by prison officials that 
an inmate has violated a prison regulation. 
The leading Massachusetts case regarding "good time" is Lember-
sky v. Parole Board of the Department of Correction, 42 wherein a 
prisoner complained that new amendments to the Massachusetts Con-
stitution concerning "good time" affected his rights adversely in cer-
tain determinations made by the parole board. The Supreme Judicial 
Court found that a deprivation of a man's justly earned "good time" 
"as a practical matter results in extending his sentence and increas-
ing his punishment."43 Lembersky and subsequent decisions44 have 
thus created a foundation for an expanded recognition of prisoners' 
rights. In view of the determination that deprivation of "good time" 
in effect constitutes an extension of sentence, it seems to follow that a 
determination to reduce "good time" must be made with the same 
procedural safeguards-such as right to counsel and right to call and 
cross-examine witnesses-that are constitutionally required in crimi-
nal proceedings that involve sentencing. 
Some federal courts have held that the application of due process 
standards is required in cases that involve the removal of an inmate 
from one form of confinement to a substantially harsher form. 45 In 
United States ex rei. Schuster v. Herold,46 which involved a habeas 
corpus proceeding by a New York prisoner protesting his transfer from 
a penal institution to a state mental institution, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the transfer could 
not take place until a full hearing had been conducted, at which the 
prisoner was to have a right to counsel. It seems that the Second Cir-
cuit would also hold that an inmate who is to be confined to solitary, 
40 This issue was raised specifically in Nolan v. Scafati, 430 F.2d 548 (1st Cir. 1970). 
41 Under G.L., c. 127, §129, "The officer in charge of each correctional institution 
. . shall keep a record of each prisoner in his custody whose term of imprisonment 
is four months or more. Every such prisoner whose record of conduct shows that he has 
faithfully observed all the rules of his place of confinement, and has not been subjected 
to punishment, shall be entitled to have the term of his imprisonment reduced by a de-
duction from the maximum term for which he may be held under his sentence or sen-
tences, which shall be determined as follows .... If a prisoner violates any rule of his 
place of confinement, the commissioner of correction . . . upon recommendation and 
evidence submitted to [him] ... in writing by the principal officer, or officer in charge, 
shall decide what part, if any, of such good conduct deduction from sentence or sentences 
shall be forfeited by such violation. . . . " 
42 332 Mass. 290, 124 N.E.2d 521 (1955). 
43 Id. at 294, 124 N.E.2d at 524. 
44 Greenfield v. Scafati, 277 F. Supp. 644, 645 (D. Mass. 1967), aff'd, 390 U.S. 713 
(1968); Gildea v. Commissioner of Correction, 336Mass. 48, 49, 142 N.E.2d 400,401 (1957). 
45 See, e.g., Shone v. Maine, 406 F.2d 844 (1st Cir. 1969), vacated as moot, 396 U.S. 6 
(1969). 
46 410 F.2d 1071 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 847 (1969). 
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with its attendant deprivations, should also be accorded the same 
basic safeguards. Although it is beyond the scope of this comment to 
treat the issue of solitary confinement and the challenges that are being 
raised to its use, it must be noted that a growing body of scientific 
study is revealing the emotional and psychological damage that 
usually results from any prolonged period of solitary isolationY 
What will happen in Massachusetts regarding disciplinary hearing 
procedures may depend on the future interpretation given to the 
First Circuit's opinion in Scafati. The admonition to provide "assur-
ances of elemental fairness" may invite one of several standards. A 
court may feel secure that it is following Scafati if it decides that ele-
mental fairness requires only minimal safeguards, such as notice of 
47 What solitary confinement means to a prisoner is this: "A prisoner ... stays in 
his own cell for 23 or 23.5 out of each 24 hours; he is not allowed to mingle with other 
members of the prison population; he is allowed from 30 minutes to an hour a day outside 
his cell for exercise; and he is not allowed to work, to visit the library, or to attend movies 
or religious services." Tyree v. Fitzpatrick, 325 F. Supp. 554, 556 (D. Mass. 1971) (citing 
conditions at Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Concord). 
A growing body of empirical research suggests that, because of the psychological im-
pact of solitary confinement, it ought to be prohibited as being cruel and unusual per se 
or be used only as a last resort in cases involving the most serious prison disciplinary in-
fractions-and then only under rigidly prescribed circumstances. Psychological studies 
indicate the following: (a) the limitations of sensory perception imposed by prison con-
ditions cause temporary impairment of emotional reaction, mental activity, and mental 
health (Heron, Effects of Decreased Variation in the Sensory Environment, [1954] Can.]. 
Psychology 70-76); (b) isolation from sensory variation and social intercourse tends to 
alter thought production, to evoke feelings of aggression and sexuality, and to increase 
levels of anxiety (Zuckerman, Persky, Link, and Basu, Experimental and Subject Factors 
Determining Responses to Sensory Deprivation, Social Isolation, and Confinement, 73 
]. Abnormal Psychiatry 183, 192 (1968) ); (c) isolation significantly Jowers thresholds 
for pain, even after isolation is ended (Zubeck, Flye, and Aftamas, Cutaneous Sensitivity 
after Prolonged Visual Deprivation, 144 Science 1591 ( 1964); Vernon and McGill, Sensory 
Deprivation and Pain Thresholds, 133 id. 330, 331 (1961) ); and (d) solitary confinement 
causes "confinement psychosis," a psychotic reaction "characterized frequently by hal-
lucinations and delusions [that is] produced by prolonged physical isolation and in-
activity in completely segregated areas" (Scott and Grandreau, Psychiatric Implications 
of Sensory Deprivation in a Maximum Security Prison, 14 Can.]. Psychiatry 337 ( 1969) ). 
More severe effects are undoubtedly caused in prison inmates who, unlike the volunteer 
experimental subjects, suffer greater sensory isolation under actual prison conditions. 
See Thurrell, Halleck, and Johnson, Psychosis in Prison, 56]. Crim. L.C. & P.S. 271, 
272 (1965). 
These modern findings are supported by historical evidence and recognized by prison 
administrators, legislators, and courts. The so-called Pennsylvania system, practiced 
during the nineteenth century, was based on the isolation of individual prisoners as a 
substitute for group confinement. Studies made in New York of prisoners confined under 
the Pennsylvania system report widespread insanity. Barnes, The Story of Punishment 
(1930). See generally Barnes and Teeters, New Horizons in Criminology (1943). See also 
In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160 (1890). The American Correctional Association recommends 
that solitary confinement be used only for flagrant offenses and notes that although iso-
lation may encourage conformity in some prisoners over the short term, for the majority 
it increases and deepens feelings of hostility. Am. Correctional Assn., Manual of Cor-
rectional Standards 246 (2d ed. 1960). Massachusetts has restricted the use of solitary 
confinement to some extent, both as to the reasons for which an inmate may be placed 
in solitary and as to the length of his stay (a maximum of 15 days per individual offense). 
See G.L., c. 127, §§39, 40. Although solitary confinement has not been found to be per 
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the charges and a chance to present a personal defense.48 On the 
other hand, it is possible that a court could view the First Circuit's 
words as demanding the right to counsel and the right to call or 
cross-examine witnesses. The phrase "assurances of elemental fairness" 
is at least specific enough to command a consideration of the due pro-
cess issues. 
The recent California case of Clutchette v. Procunier49 has ap-
parently gone further than any other in expanding the rights of a 
prisoner at a prison disciplinary hearing. The case originated as a 
Section 1983 action brought by inmates who alleged deprivation of 
their constitutional rights as the result of such hearings. In Clutch-
ette, the federal District Court for the Northern District of California 
held that whenever a prisoner is subject to "grievous loss, "50 virtually 
full due process must be accorded him. Among the rights found ap-
plicable are the right to notice; the right to call witnesses and to cross-
examine adverse witnesses; the right to counsel where the offense will 
be referred to the district attorney, and the right to at least a "counsel-
substitute" in all other cases; the right to an unbiased fact finder's 
decision based upon the evidence; and the right to appeal the de-
cision.51 
Conclusion. The charge is often made that according prisoners too 
many constitutional rights will undermine official authority or will 
prove impossibly burdensome to the administration of a prison sys-
tem.52 Nonetheless, the federal courts, in Massachusetts and else-
where, are beginning to take the view that prisoners may not be denied 
fundamental rights solely out of deference to internal prison policy.53 
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit noted as early as 1957 
that"[ w ]e must not play fast and loose with basic constitutional rights 
se cruel and unusual (see Burns v. Swenson, 430 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1970); Graham v. 
Willingham, 384 F.2d 367 (lOth Cir. 1967); Krist v. Smith, 309 F. Supp. 497 (S.D. Ga. 
1970) ), and although courts have sometimes declined to review decisions as to solitary 
confinement (see Roberts v. Pegelow, 313 F.2d 548 (4th Cir. 1963) ), courts have pro-
hibited the use of solitary confinement under certain circumstances (see Wright v. 
McMann, 387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967); Knuckles v. Prasse, 302 F. Supp. 1036 (E.D. Pa. 
1969), aff'd, 435 F.2d 1255 (3d Cir. 1970); Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. 
Cal. 1966) ). 
48 See n.29 supra. 
49 328 F. Supp. 767 (N.D. Cal. 1971)' 
<9 Grievous loss was defined by the court to include any of the following situations: 
"(a) Violations punishable by indefinite confinement in the adjustment center or segre-
gation; (b) Violations, the punishment for which may tend to increase a prisoner's 
sentence, i.e., those which must be referred to the Adult Authority; (c) Violations which 
may result in a fine or forfeiture; (d) Violations which may result in any type of isolation 
confinement longer than ten days; (e) Violations which may be referred to the district 
attorney for criminal prosecution." Id. at 781. 
51 Id. at 782-784. 
52 See Nolan v. Scafati, 306 F. Supp. I, 4 (D. Mass. 1969): "[S]ociety ... has a most 
important interest in preserving the executive authority of the prison superinten-
dent. ... " 
53 See Washington v. Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Ala. 1966), aff'd per curiam, 390 
u.s. 333 (1968). 
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in the interest of administrative efficiency."54 Society's continuing 
responsibility for the inmates in its prisons has been expressed thusly 
by Chief Justice Burger: 
We take on a burden when we put a man behind walls, and that 
burden is to give him a chance to change. . . . If we deny him 
that, we deny his status as a human being and to deny that is to 
diminish our humanity and plant the seeds of future anguish for 
ourselves. 55 
G. MICHAEL PEIRCE 
54 United States ex rei. Marcial v. Fay, 247 F.2d 662, 669 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 
355 u.s. 915 (1958). 
55 Address of Chief Justice Warren E. Burger at the Association of the Bar of the City 
of New York, Feb. 17, 1970, reported in N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1970, at 16. 
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